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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
I What is a Social Welfare Function?
Economists often employ a device referred to as a social welfare function to evaluate
different policies in order to decide which of them is "best" for society, (where society is
nothing more than a collection of individuals). But comparatively little attention is
given to what we actually understand by the term 'social welfare function' itself. A
useful way of thinking about the concept in general is provided by Samuelson:
"a function of all the economic magnitudes of a system which is supposed to
characterise some ethical belief - that of a benevolent despot, or a complete egoist, or
"all men of good will", a misanthrope, the state... .Any possible opinion is
admissible 	 We only require that the belief be such as to admit of an unequivocal
answer as to whether one configuration of the economic system is "better" or "worse"
than any other or "indifferent" III
In the above, Samuelson is referring to any function which can be used to rank different
social states. We can think of a real valued function, where higher values reflect
increased social welfare. Samuelson refers to the function as being characterised by
'some ethical belief. Any social welfare function must represent the beliefs of some
individual or group. The acceptability of the social welfare function as a device to be
used for evaluating alternative economic policies obviously rests on the acceptability of
I Samuelson (1983), p.221.
2such ethical belief(s). For example, one cannot imagine a function based on the beliefs
of a single "complete egoist" being acceptable for such a purpose! To be operational as
a device used to make actual decisions for society, one would want such a function to be
based on value judgements (or ethical beliefs) generally accepted by the individuals who
make up society.
The social welfare function upon which applied welfare economics is based can be
traced back to Abram Bergson2. Bergson identifies a set of conditions both necessary
and sufficient to identify a situation of maximum economic welfare for particular sets of
"value propositions". There is thus necessarily an implicit underlying social welfare
function, but Bergson was concerned with identifying the conditions which would be
satisfied when such a function is maximised. His maximum conditions, therefore, relate
to a specific welfare function which reflects particular value judgements. According to
Bergson, his maximum conditions reflect "values current in economic literature". He
does not enter into discussion on their desirability, but presents technical conditions
which reflect them. These conditions can then be used to evaluate a given allocation of
resources to assess whether the welfare of society can be increased.
Arrow and Sen, however, focus specifically on the value judgements underlying a social
welfare function. They are interested in the possibility of whether the value judgements
upon which a social welfare function is based could conflict with one another. In other
words, they were considering the possibility that a social welfare function might not
2 Bergson, A (1938), pp.7-25.
3exist for a particular set of value judgements. The analytical framework of Arrow and
Sen differs from that of Bergson and Samuelson in that it is more abstract. Letters are
used to denote social states, where a social state is a complete description of society and
everyone's position in it. The social welfare function, in this context, specifies a
complete ordering of all possible social states, R, for any given set of individual
orderings, R 1 , where the latter represent the preferences of individuals. Each ft; denotes
a ranking of alternatives for a given individual. The social welfare function can be
written as follows:
R = R (RI, R2, 	 An)
Value judgements come into the analysis at two levels: in the individual rankings
themselves, the Ris, and in the way that they are aggregated to derive a social ranking, R.
Further, implicit in the construction of a social welfare function, is the idea that social
welfare depends only on the welfare of individuals (an individualistic approach to social
welfare). Both Arrow and Sen were interested in the value judgements involved in the
process of aggregating individual preferences, in that they were concerned with
establishing the existence or otherwise of a social welfare function.3
Economists typically take an individualistic view of society, that it is merely a collection
of individuals. From this concept of society, it follows that (i) the welfare of society
must depend solely on the welfare of individuals who make up that society. Further,
economists also adhere to non-paternalism, that (ii) the individual is the best judge of his
3 Strictly speaking Sen was concerned with establishing the existence of a social decision function. See
note 7.
4own welfare. These two ideas reflect Paretian value judgements. If a social state, x,
were unanimously preferred to another, y, then someone who accepted the Paretian
value judgements given here would judge x to be socially better than y. Thus this is the
condition which is generally imposed on the social welfare function to reflect Paretian
value judgements: if x P i y for all i, then x P y (Condition P)
Bergson, Arrow and Sen all accept the idea of a Paretian social welfare function (one
which satisfies condition P above). In other words, all regard Paretian value judgements
as an acceptable ethical basis for the social welfare function, because of their acceptance
of an individualistic approach to social welfare. Both Arrow and Sen also impose
condition U on the social welfare function which represents the idea that no set of
individual preferences should be excluded from the domain of the function. In other
words, the social welfare function should be defined for any possible set of individual
preferences. Condition U seems to follow from an acceptance of Paretian value
judgements: the idea that certain sets of preferences should be excluded from the domain
of the social welfare function would seem to be inconsistent with the idea that the
individual is the best judge of his own welfare.
There are various ways in which one can interpret the social welfare function:
1. As a device which represents the welfare of society. On this interpretation, R is
accepted as a social value scale, which is derived from individual values. One can
think of it as a set of preferences for 'society' because 'society' (i.e. the individuals
5of which society consists) accepts the value judgements which underlie the social
welfare function.
2. As a single individual trying to form her own ranking of social states which is
representative of her view of the welfare of society. It is helpful in this case to think
of the value judgements which underlie the social welfare function as the value
judgements of some specific individual. The individual wishes to adhere to the
value judgements underlying the social welfare function in forming her own welfare
judgements. Thus the social preference relation, R, represents the view of social
welfare of this individual.
3. Individuals have different views of the common interest so, in order to make a
collective decision, they need some device which can reconcile these views into a
single ranking. They may be able to accept the use of a social welfare function for
such a task without accepting interpretation one above, that the ranking is
representative of the common interest.
4. As a voting mechanism which is used to aggregate individual preferences. The
value judgements underlying the social welfare function reflect certain desirable
properties that individuals feel that acceptable voting procedures should satisfy.
Individuals accept the outcome of the vote because they accept the voting procedure
itself
The above interpretations can be grouped into what I shall term 'pragmatic' and 'ethical'
interpretations. Interpretations one and two are clearly ethical in that the social welfare
function is of normative significance, it represents a value scale. To attach normative
6significance to the social welfare function, however, is not necessary in order for
someone to accept interpretations three and four. This is why I refer to the latter as
'pragmatic' interpretations. (Interpretations three and four are almost the same, given
that it is very likely that a device used to reconcile differing views would be some kind
of voting system.) Little was vehemently opposed to interpretation one above, of the
social welfare function as a social value scale. He prefers to think of Arrow's social
welfare function as a 'machine' into which value judgements are `fed':
"Imagine the system (social welfare function) as a machine which produces a card on
which is written "x is better than y", or vice versa when all individual answers to the
question "is x better than y?" have been fed into it. What significance are we to attach
to the sentence on the card, i.e. to the resulting "master-order?... although it is a
sentence employing ethical terms, (it) is not a value judgement. Every value judgement
must be someone's judgement of values. If there are n people filling in cards to be fed
into the machine, then we have n value judgements, not n + 1. The sentence which the
machine produces expresses a ruling, or decision, which is different in kind from what is
expressed by the sentences fed into it. The latter express value judgements; the former
expresses a ruling between these value judgements."4
The above seems to confuse pragmatic and ethical interpretations of a social welfare
function. The idea of individuals "feeding" judgements into a machine which produces
a "ruling" sounds very much like the process of voting where the voting system is the
method by which the group arrive at a collective decision. The above can be interpreted
4	 • I.M.D (1952), p.427.
7as, individuals vote according to whether they regard x or y as more desirable and the
voting system 'selects' between them on the basis of these votes. The passage above
suggests that Little can only accept the pragmatic interpretations, he can only accept the
social welfare function as a decision making mechanism. He does not accept that the
'ruling' provided by the collective choice rule constitutes a value judgement. Little is
uncomfortable with the idea of attaching normative significance to the ranking produced
by the social welfare function because there exists no social entity to which the social
ranking can be attributed. My point is that there need not be. This is where it is helpful
to turn to interpretation two above and think of the process of aggregating individual
judgements as a single individual trying to answer the question, "which is the best
outcome for society?" Suppose Little's 'machine' is a social welfare function satisfying
conditions which reflect what I regard as desirable value judgements. Individuals all
feed their own views of social welfare into the machine. Little argues that, "the only
order which I can fully accept is one that coincides with my own" 5 . No. I feed my own
judgement into the machine, but still accept the ruling of the machine as the best
outcome for society because I accept the value judgements upon which the social
welfare function is based, as well as those values which were involved in the
determination of my own personal ranking of alternatives (which went into the
`machine'). My acceptance of Paretian value judgements implies that I cannot come up
with a ranking of alternatives which is representative of social welfare alone.
5 Little (1952), p.429.
8Robert Sugden provides an interpretation of an Arrovian social welfare function ('Arrow
constitution') as, "a procedure used by a dictatorial decision-maker to form a value
system".
"Arrow's social choice theory makes the crucial simplification of admitting value
judgements about the relative merits of different social ends; judgements about the
relative merits of different means of social decision-making are excluded. The latter
kind of judgements is necessarily excluded because the theory presupposes one
particular means of social decision-making - that of the dictatorial public official - and
requires all value judgements to be made in the context of this."6
Obviously, to accept the social welfare function as representative of the social welfare
does not necessarily imply actually using it to determine every aspect of the social state.
But if we are to take it seriously, then presumably it does. In that case, there are
worrying implications for individual liberty, hence Sugden's reference to the paradigm
of the dictatorial decision maker.
II Sen's Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal
Sen was asking the question as to how liberty might fit into the social welfare function,
together with Paretianism. He was concerned that we would want our social judgements
to reflect a commitment to individual liberty as well as Paretianism. More specifically,
he was concerned that the social welfare function reflect the idea that it is better that
individuals be allowed to decide certain private matters for themselves irrespective of
6 Sugden (1978), p251.
9the views of others. He therefore imposed a further condition on it, condition L, which
he argued reflected the idea that certain private matters should be the concern of that
individual alone.
The following is a formal presentation of Sen's original theorem. Sen imposed just
three conditions on the social decision function7:
"Condition U (Unrestricted Domain). Every logically possible set of individual
orderings is included in the domain of the collective choice rule"
The value judgement involved here is that individuals should be free to rank alternatives
in any way they want. They are free to be as selfish or as altruistic as they like,
preferences are merely taken as brute facts.
"Condition P. If every individual prefers any alternative x to another alternative y, then
society must prefer x to y."
Specifically, condition P reflects the idea of a Pareto improvement, that society is better
off in a social state in which at least one individual is made better off and no individual
worse off. Thus condition P reflects both Paretian value assumptions that (i) the
individual is the best judge of his own welfare (non-paternalism) and (ii) the idea that
the welfare of society is solely a function of the welfare of individuals (individualism).
7 I have switched from the term 'social welfare function' to 'social decision function' here for the sake of
being technically correct. A social decision function only requires that the social ranking of alternatives,
R, be acyclical, it need not be transitive. A social welfare function should generate an R which is
transitive. Sen was concerned with the existence of a social decision function. Obviously, in so far as they
represent a way of making social judgements, the two concepts are virtually the same. For this thesis, I
prefer to use the term 'social welfare function' because it emphasises the normative interpretation of R.
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"Condition L* (Minimal Liberalism) 8 . There are at least two individuals such that for
each of them there is at least one pair of alternatives over which he is decisive, that is,
there is a pair of x,y such that if he prefers x (respectively y) to y (respectively x), then
society should prefer x (respectively y) to y (respectively x)".
The rationale for condition L* (or L) can be found in this statement of Sen's at the
beginning of the paper:
"Given other things in society, if you prefer to have pink walls rather than white, then
society should permit you to have this, even if a majority of the community would like
to see your walls white. Similarly whether you should sleep on your back or on your
belly is a matter in which the society should permit you absolute freedom, even if a
majority of the community is nosy enough to feel that you must sleep on your back"9
In other words, liberalism can be interpreted as the value judgement that there are certain
private matters which individuals ought to be free to decide for themselves, irrespective
of the views held by others. Sen has chosen to formulate this as a correspondence
between individual and social preference, R, over a pair of social states which differ
solely with respect to the aspect of the social state which is private to the individual.
Another way of thinking about it is to use Mill's idea of a private sphere of choice:
8 Sen first proposes a stronger version of L*, which he refers to as 'Condition L (Liberalism)', that each
individual is decisive over at least one pair of alternatives. The impossibility result obviously also holds
for this stronger version of L. Many writers refer to condition L rather than L*, presumably taking the
view that L* is too minimal. I often refer to condition L rather than L* in this thesis for this reason.
9 Sen (1970b) p152.
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"...the only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence (of
choice) is, of right, absolute...."1°
Matters such as my private reading, whether I sleep on my front or back, my choice of
religion could be considered to be the concern of myself alone. Sen's way of
incorporating this idea into a social welfare function is to stipulate a correspondence
between individual and social preference over certain pairs of alternatives which differ
solely with respect to an issue which is private to some individual.
The impossibility result is formally stated as
"Theorem II. There is no social decision function that can simultaneously satisfi)
Conditions U, P, and L*."11
A formal proof of the result is given in an appendix to this chapter.
Sen also illustrates the result with an example of two individuals deciding upon the issue
of who should read the novel, 'Lady Chatterley's Lover'. It is this example which I tend
to use in the thesis to illustrate points rather than the proof itself, so it is worth setting
out the example here and using it to illustrate the proof. There are just two individuals,
referred to as Prude and Lewd to reflect their different preferences. There are three
possible social states: x (no one reads the book), y (only lewd reads it), and z (only
prude reads the book). The figure below shows the preferences of individuals in the
I ° Mill, J.S. (1993b) p.78. Brackets added.
II Sen, A.K. (1970b) p154.
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example. I have also used ordered pairs to describe the social states for clarity: the first
element refers to whether or not Prude reads the book (1 denotes that he reads it, 0 that
he does not), the second to whether or not lewd reads it:
Prude Lewd
x (0,0) z(1,0)
z(1,0) y(0,1)
y(0,1) x (0,0)
We are trying to construct a social value scale based upon these individual values
(preferences) and also reflecting the value judgements that:
(i) Unanimously preferred alternatives are socially better (Condition P).
(ii) Individuals ought to be free to do as they like in matters which are personal to
them / 2 . (Condition L*)
To reflect the value judgement (ii) above, we rank social states which differ solely with
respect to whether or not a given individual reads the book according to that individual's
preference. For example, social states x and z differ solely with respect to whether or
not Prude reads the book, and Prude prefers that he does not (given that Lewd does not).
By ranking x above z in the social preference relation, therefore, we are in some sense
incorporating the value judgement that society is better off when Prude has the right to
decide between x and z. Similarly, the pair (y,x) can be viewed as lying within Lewd's
12 Or, society should respect individual preferences over social states which lie within individual personal
spheres.
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personal sphere and thus y is ranked above x socially because this is Lewd's preference.
However, z is unanimously preferred to y (by society), thus to reflect Paretian value
judgements we would like the social preference relation to rank z above y. So if we use
both Paretian and liberal value judgements it is impossible come to a conclusion as to
what is the best social state because the social preference relation (italicised) is cyclical.
The problem stems from the fact that the liberal value judgement is the idea that
individuals ought to be free to decide personal matters for themselves, irrespective of the
views of others. However, in this case, preferences are such that the utility of each of
these individuals is more affected by whether or not the other individual reads the book
than it is by whether or not he himself reads it, e.g. for Prude, x and z (within his own
personal sphere) are ranked first and second whereas he ranks x and y (within Lewd's
personal sphere) first and last. This suggests Prude has a stronger desire for x over y
than for x over z. It is this externality which gives rise to the impossibility result.
The Paretian liberal paradox makes most intuitive sense when the social decision
function is interpreted as either the value scale of society or an individual making a
social judgement. Referring to the latter, it implies that if I want to make a judgement as
to which is the best social state for society, and I want that judgement to reflect both
Paretian and liberal values, I may find that I cannot do, and still make judgements
consistent with a social welfare function.
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III Pertinence of the Historical Literature to the Paretian Liberal Paradox
The concept of social welfare is not a new one. Historically, political philosophers have
been concerned with social welfare and the importance of individual liberty. If there is a
genuine conflict between liberty and social welfare, it would be surprising if these
writers were not aware of this conflict even if they did not formalise it. This thesis
focuses on the thought of political philosophers in an attempt to identify how such
conflict was resolved by these earlier writers, and whether there is any link between the
resolutions implied by their thought and the way that modern social choice theorists
have responded to the Sen paradox.
The following different approaches to social welfare can be identified within the
historical literature:
1. Dominance of the social welfare function
The first strand of thought can be characterised by the following points:
(i) There is a concept of the common interest which is analytically distinct from the
private wants of individuals.
(ii) It is this concept of common interest which should form the basis for governing
society.
(iii) Liberty is valued.
The historical writer who represents this approach is Rousseau. All issues are to be
subordinate to the general will which is representative of the common interest. There is
a clear commitment to individual liberty, and yet the view of social welfare is organic.
The above three points also describe a situation where the social welfare function is
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accepted as representative of social welfare and thus used to determine all aspects of the
social state. But there is also a desire to incorporate a commitment to individual liberty
within this approach to social welfare. It is in this sense that the problem which
Rousseau set himself has key points of similarity with the problem set by Sen.
2. A Utilitarian Approach to Social Welfare (IS. Mill)
The idea of social welfare is individualistic in this case in that it depends solely on the
utilities of individuals. Mill's acceptance of utilitarianism implies acceptance of a social
welfare function which reflects utilitarian value judgements, but he also advocated an
absolute right to liberty in matters which were private. The pertinent question here, if
we accept Sen's result, is, "How could Mill advocate an absolute right to liberty in
private matters whilst admitting only one fundamental value, utility, without being
logically inconsistent?" His commitment to utility as the sole value committed him to a
utilitarian approach to social welfare, he, therefore, needed to somehow reconcile this
with his argument that liberty was desirable.
3. A Con tractarian Approach to Social Welfare
In general, a contractarian approach to social welfare is characterised by an initial
contractual agreement in which the rights and rules by which individuals are to be
governed are agreed upon. This initial agreement can be thought of as the point at which
the concept of a social welfare function is either accepted or rejected and, if accepted,
the precise form it should take is agreed upon. Whereas other approaches to social
welfare can be characterised by a predetermined idea of social welfare which can be
16
thought of as implying a particular kind of social welfare function, for example,
utilitarian or 'the general will', the contractarian approach can be distinguished by the
fact that there is no such idea prior to the initial agreement. Thus individual liberty is
prior to the idea of the social welfare function on the contractarian view. The thesis
focuses on the thought of two modern contractarian writers, Buchanan and Rawls, one of
whom rejects the idea of a social welfare function entirely. It reassesses Sen's result in
the light of their thought.
The thesis aims to explore the following:
1. To identify how Rousseau and Mill respectively reconciled their commitment to
liberty with their views of social welfare, and to suggest possible ways out of the
Sen paradox in the light of these.
2. To assess the implications for the Paretian liberal paradox of an alternative
contractarian approach to social welfare.
3. To identify whether there is any evidence that modern social choice theorists are
actually using similar analytical devices to resolve conflict as those used by earlier
political philosophers.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two focuses on how Rousseau resolved
conflict between rule by the general will and liberty. The way that John Stuart Mill
reconciled a utilitarian approach to social welfare with an absolute right to liberty is the
subject of chapter three. Chapter four focuses on the concept of social welfare in a
contractarian setting. It considers the ideas of two contractarians, one of whom rejects
17
the concept of social welfare altogether, and assesses Sen's result in the light of these.
Chapter five sets out the possible ways that there are of resolving Sen's paradox in the
light of the resolutions suggested by historical writers. It then considers whether these
possible ways out of the paradox are fully exploited by social choice theorists (1970-
1980). The extent to which modern formulations of the Paretian liberal paradox have
succeeded in dealing with the problem is the subject of chapter six. Finally, concluding
comments are presented in chapter seven.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER ONE: Proof of the Paretian Liberal Paradox"
From L*, we know that there must be two individuals who each have a right over a pair
of alternatives. Let these two individuals be i and j. All other individuals in society are
denoted by k. Individual i has a right over alternatives (x, y) and j has a right over
(z, w). It would be impossible for two separate individuals to each have a liberal right
over the same pair of alternatives, given that their preferences may conflict with one
another, thus the pairs (x,y) and (z,w) cannot have more than one alternative in common.
(i) Suppose x = z.
A set of individual preferences for individuals i, j and each other individual k is set out
below.
Individual Preferences (R,․)
x Pi y P i w
y Pi w Pi
 z(=x)
y P k w (for all k)
A social decision which satisfies conditions L*, P and U generates a social preference
relation, R in the following way. Given the assignment of rights above,
by condition L*, x P y and w P z(=x)
By condition P, y P w.
Condition U implies that these sets of individual preferences all lie within the domain of
the social decision function, we cannot exclude any of them. Thus the social preference
relation xPyPwPxPy 	 etc. as shown above. Given the requirement that a social
13 This follows the proof presented in Sen (1970b) p.154.
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decision function must generate a social preference relation which is acyclical 14 , we
have thus identified a configuration of individual preferences for which a social decision
function satisfying these three conditions does not exist.
Now suppose,
(ii) that x,y,z,w are all distinct alternative social states. Again, the set of individual
preferences and the aggregation of these via a social decision function is demonstrated
below:
Individual Preferences
w P i x Pi y P i z
y Pj z P w Pj x
w Pk X and y Pk z
By condition L*, xPy and zPw.
By condition P, wPx and yPz.
Thus the social decision function generates the social preference relation,
xPyPzPwPxPy....etc. There is no best alternative for the set of alternatives (x,y,w,z),
thus no social decision function satisfying conditions U, P, and L* exists.
14 It must generate a 'choice function'.
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CHAPTER TWO: LIBERTY AND THE GENERAL WILL:
THE CASE OF ROUSSEAU
"The general will is always right and always tends to the public good; but it does not
follow that the deliberations of the people will always have the same rectitude. We
always desire our own good, but we do not always recognise it."1
I Introduction: Rousseau's Approach To Social Welfare And
The Link With The Paretian Liberal Paradox
Rousseau was committed to the idea that there exists some distinct concept of social
good, the general will, which is analytically distinct from the private wants of
individuals. Further, he was of the view that this general will should form the basis
for governing society. In other words, all issues in society, including all rights,
should be subject to this general will:
"the general will alone can direct the forces of the state in accordance with the
purpose for which it was created, namely, the common good. It is exclusively on the
basis of this common interest that society must be governed."2
This is why Rousseau can be thought of as reflecting a view of social welfare which
could be described as "social welfare function dominant": Rousseau's view that all
issues in society should be determined exclusively by the general will is analogous to
'Rousseau, J. (1953), Book 2, Chapter 3 (2.3), p28-9. Where parts of quotes are italicised this is not
in the original, unless otherwise stated.
2 Rousseau, J. (1953) (2.1) p25.
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the idea that all aspects of the social state are to be determined by a social welfare
function. Further, according to Rousseau, the general will is "discovered" by the
process of voting, i.e. aggregating individual preferences. One can, therefore, think
of the general will as a social welfare function: It is representative of the social good
and is established by aggregating the preferences of individuals. The fundamental
point is that Rousseau's concept of the general will implies that he would be
committed to the idea that a social welfare function exists which is representative of
the social good. Further, he is committed to actually using that social welfare
function to rule society.
But Rousseau also valued individual liberty. In The Social Contract, Rousseau
claimed to answer the question as to how individuals could agree to be governed by
the general will whilst remaining, "as free as before". The analogy with the problem
posed by Sen is as follows: Sen was attempting to incorporate some minimal
commitment to liberty into the social welfare function. One could think of Sen's
problem as addressing the question, "Is it possible to accept the concept of a social
welfare function as dominant, whilst retaining some minimal commitment to
liberty?" By the term 'dominant', I mean that all aspects of the social state are to be
determined by the social welfare function. Rousseau could be interpreted as going
further than this. He wanted all rights to be subordinate to the general will whilst
individuals remained "as free as before".
Sen established the result that a social welfare function may not exist when we
attempt to incorporate some minimal commitment to individual liberty into it. In
other words, valuing individual liberty seems to conflict with such an approach to
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social welfare. Rousseau's Social Contract almost looks like an attempt to resolve
this very problem:
"To find a form of association 	 where each, while joining with all the rest, still
obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before.' This is the fundamental
problem to which the social contract provides the answer."3
This chapter seeks to identify what that answer, according to Rousseau, was. In the
light of Sen's result, Rousseau must have had some analytical device which resolved
the conflict between dominance of the general will (a social welfare function) and
individual liberty.
II Multiple Utility Frameworks
Amartya Sen's Paretian liberal paradox is formulated within a mono-utility
framework. The term mono-utility refers to the number of utility functions (or sets
of preferences) attributed to each individual4 . This chapter argues that Rousseau's
notions of the private will, the general will and the will of all necessarily require a
multiple, as opposed to a mono, utility framework. By this I mean that it requires us
to attribute more than a single utility function to each individual. This chapter
therefore interprets the two types of will which Rousseau attributes to individuals as
two distinct individual utility functions. It further asserts that his notions of the will
3 Rousseau (1.6) p14-15.
4 Thus a mono-utility framework does not preclude the possibility of deriving a set of social
preferences from these individual preferences.
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of all and the general will require us to attribute two distinct sets of preferences to
society.5
Howard Margolis formulated a model of rational choice in which the individual was
conceived of as having two different motivations: selfish and unselfish. Prior to this
Harsanyi suggested the idea of an individual having preferences based on social
considerations and those relating to what he actually prefers. 6
 According to
Margolis, "The notion of a distinction between a person's motivation as a private
individual and as a citizen goes all the way back to Plato" 7 Margolis views the
individual as allocating his resources between selfish and unselfish interests rather
like an individual allocates his income between alternative goods, i.e. the individual
behaves as a utility maximiser but she has more than one utility function. The idea
of the multiple utility framework has been discussed before: Etzioni 8 and Lutz9
defend it whilst Brennan l ° is opposed, taking the view that any motive can be
captured by a single utility framework. Etzioni takes the view that ethical
considerations require a different utility function because what gives one pleasure
and what is right may well be mutually exclusive: "due to moral factors, choices do
not reflect simple, one-dimensional, preferences but are multifaceted" 11 Sen himself
has criticised the notion of a single preference ordering as being representative of all
possible interests of a person:
5j discuss this in the next section. Brennan(1989) p193-4 also suggests a similar interpretation.
6 Harsanyi, J. (1955), p63.
'Margolis, H. (1981), note 3, page 266.
8 Etzioni, Amitai (1986), p159-183.
9 Lutz, M.A (1993), p143-154.
I ° Brennan, T.J. (1989), p189-208 and Brennan, T.J (1993), p155-164.
II Etzioni, p177.
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"A person thus described may be rational in the limited sense of revealing no
inconsistency in his choice behaviour, but if he has no use for these distinctions
between quite different concepts, he must be a bit of a fool. The purely economic
man is indeed close to being a social moron. Economic theory has been much
preoccupied with this rational fool decked in the glory of his one all-purpose
ordering."12
In this paper Sen argues for the consideration of moral factors as well as self-
interested ones. However, Sen adopts the mono-utility framework for the Paretian
liberal paradox.
III Rousseau's Different Types of Will Interpreted as Separate
Sets of Preferences in a Multiple Utility Framework
Rousseau refers to two types of will of society: the general will and the will of all.
These are derived from two types of will of individuals: the belief of the general will
and the private will. I interpret the two types of individual will as two sets of
individual preferences. This implies that Rousseau is essentially working within a
dual, rather than a mono, utility framework in that there are two sets of preferences
attributed to each person. Instead of individuals having a single utility function from
which a single utility function for society (a social welfare function) is derived,
individuals have two utility functions and, depending on which set of preferences are
expressed, there are two corresponding sets of social preferences. The utility
12 Sen (1977), p332.
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framework within which I analyse the Social Contract is summarised in the table
below:
Individual Preferences Corresponding Social Preferences
Private Will Will of All
Belief of the General Will General Will
The above somewhat oversimplifies the utility framework in that the general will is
the true will of each individual as a member of society. But the general will is
established by individuals expressing their beliefs of it. It is the general will, and not
the will of all, that represents the common interest of society. In other words, the
general will is the analogue of the social welfare function in so far as its role of
determining the common good is concerned13.
(i) The Private Will
An individual's private will corresponds to the individual utility function used by
economists. The preferences reflect the individual's consideration of his own private
interest, it is the individual's selfish utility function. Although Rousseau regards
people as members of society, he also acknowledges the fact that individuals are, by
nature, physically separate and, as such, have a notion of themselves as individuals.
It is the individual's consideration of himself as a private individual with personal
interests that explains his having a private will:
titiPo	 "/„fS!
r
13	 •	 •	 •This idea is discussed in section five.
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"Each individual may, as a man, have a private will contrary to, or divergent from,
the general will he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite
differently from the common interest; his existence, being naturally absolute and
independent."14
The above also clearly indicates that each individual has a dual role in society: as a
citizen and a private individual. As a citizen, the individual is motivated by the
utility of the collective, whereas as a private individual he is motivated by personal
utility. A single utility function is incapable of capturing the different motivations
behind these two roles. Two utility functions are required to correspond to the two
roles and these are the private will and the belief of the general will. The private will
relates to the individual's role as a private individual while his belief of his general
will relates to his role as a citizen15.
(ii) The General Will and the Individual's a priori Belief of it
The general will is the common interest of society. It represents the idea that there is
a common interest of society which is separate from the private wants of individuals.
"the general will is always right and always tends to the public good"I6
The general will is something that does not alter, irrespective of the behaviour of the
individual, it is "always constant, unalterable and pure" I7 . This, and the language
14 Rousseau, J., p18-19.
15 Strictly speaking, the individual's role as a member of society is two-fold: as a citizen he contributes
to determining the general will and as a subject he has a duty to obey it, once established.
16 Rousseau (2.3), p28-29.
17 Rousseau (4.2), p114.
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that Rousseau uses to refer to the general will elsewhere in the Social Contract, is
reminiscent of Plato's form of the Good. There must, in theory, be some ordering of
social states consistent with this notion of good. I think of this as the true social
welfare function which is the interest of each individual as a member of society. It is
the welfare function of each individual, but could be different from any single
individual's belief of the general will (social welfare function) prior to its
establishment, given the fallibility of individuals.
The general will is established separately for specific issues by asking members of
society to vote on the issue in question. In the act of voting, each individual is
supposed to be acting as a citizen rather than a private individual in that he is
expressing his opinion of the common good rather than his individual private good.
Each individual should be motivated by his preferences that represent his belief of
the general will as opposed to his private will. Given this motivation, the view of the
majority will express the general will:
"Each, when casting his vote, gives his opinion on this question (whether a proposal
is in conformity with the General Will); and the declaration of the general will is
found by counting the ballots. Thus, when an opinion contrary to my own prevails,
this proves nothing more than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the
general will was not. If my private opinion had prevailed against it, I should have
done something I did not intend; and it is then that I would not have been free."18
18 Rousseau, (4.3) p118.
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Owing to the fact that there is only one general will, any single individual can only
have an opinion, a belief about his general will prior to its establishment. This
enables Rousseau to justify subjecting all members of society to the majority view,
since this is the means by which the general will is discovered whereas any single
individual could be wrong. However, the general will is not axiomatically the
majority view, since individuals could be expressing private wills or could be wrong
in their belief of the general will. The method of majority decision is merely the
most likely means of discovering the true general will. Rousseau is making an
empirical assumption that the view of the majority will result in expression of the
general will 19 . He cannot guarantee that this is the case as he himself acknowledges.
The passage above continues:
"This assumes, to be sure, that all the characteristics of the general will continue to
be found in the majority. When this ceases to be true, whatever action is taken there
is no more liberty."20
This is problematic for Rousseau since it rather undermines his justification for rule
by the majority. If he cannot guarantee that the majority view is representative of the
general will, then he cannot guarantee that individuals are free under majority rule.
There is ample evidence within the Social Contract to suggest that the general will is
each individual's will even when the individual does not recognise it.
19 This idea is considered in more depth in section four.
20 Rousseau (4.2) p118.
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"Even when he sells his vote for money, he does not extinguish but eludes the
general will within him. His fault lies in changing the terms of the question, and in
answering one different from the one he has been asked; with the result that, instead
of saying with his vote, 'It is advantageous to the state', he says, 'It is advantageous
to a certain individual"21
In the passage above, Rousseau is referring to the case of an individual being
motivated by his private will rather than his belief of the general will in deciding
whether or not to vote. The individual has opted to sell his vote because he is
making a choice consistent with the preference ordering which represents his private
will (`It is advantageous to a certain individual') rather than his belief of the general
will (`It is advantageous to the state'). Rousseau is saying that the fact that this
individual is acting according to his private will does not change the fact that he has
a general will, he is simply choosing to ignore it.
In the language of welfare economics, individuals are expressing opinions of the
social welfare function (rather than privately motivated preferences) in voting. Once
the actual social welfare function is established by the majority view, each individual
accepts this as his own social welfare function, irrespective of whether it agrees with
the opinion he expressed in his vote. This is because each individual member of
society has already accepted the majority view, rather than his individual view, as
representative of the general will in entering society.
21 Rousseau, (4.1) p115.
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"Except for the original compact, the majority always binds the minority; this is a
consequence of the contract itself'22
(iii) The Will of All
The will of all is of no use as a guide to the desirability or otherwise of social states.
But it replaces the general will when individuals subordinate their general will to
their own private will when voting. Referring to this situation, where individuals
express their private rather than their general wills when voting, Rousseau
comments:
"the general will falls silent; guided by secret motives, no one thinks as a citizen any
more than as if the state had never existed; and under the guise of laws are enacted
iniquitous decrees whose only purpose is to further private interests."23
Thus the will of all is not the true interest of society, it is merely some subjective
will which is an amalgam of the particular interests of all individuals. The will of all
manifests itself when individuals lose sight of society as a collective body in itself
and attach too much importance to their own personal interests. As a result, the
general will is replaced with the will of all. However, it is important to note that the
general will does not change, it does not become the will of all. It "falls silent",
society does not have knowledge of it. The will derived for society is now the will of
all, thus it is of little use in furthering the social (or collective) good.
22 Rousseau, (4.2) p117.
23 Rousseau (4.1) p114.
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The process of deriving the will of all is identical to the process of deriving the
general will. But the will of all is derived from individual expressions of private,
rather than general, wills. The fact that the will of all is derived from individual
private wills creates a marked difference between its nature and the nature of the
general will
"There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will; the
latter looks only to the common interest, while the former looks to private interest,
and is simply a sum of particular wills."24
The difference between the will of all and the general will stems solely from the
difference in the motivation behind the individual preferences from which they are
derived.
"what makes a will general is not so much the number of voices as the common
interest that unites them"25
Individuals who vote in accordance with their, probably, divergent private interests
are not motivated by a common interest. Without such a common interest as the
motivating factor behind the preferences, there can be no general will.
24 Rousseau, (2.3) p29.
25 Rousseau, (2.4) p33
32
IV The Process of Establishing the General Will and the
Link with Condorcet's Jury Theorem
"The general will always tends to the public good; but it does not follow that the
deliberations of the people always have the same rectitude"26
Rousseau is unambiguously clear that the general will is the true interest of society.
But he also acknowledges that individual members of society are fallible in their
judgements of it. The question then remains as to how these fallible individuals are
to discern their common interest. According to Rousseau, they are to do so via the
method of majority decision as I noted earlier. Grofinan and Feld argue that a
probability result of the mathematician Condorcet supports the idea that the method
of majority decision is the best means of establishing the general will.
"Two hundred years ago Condorcet (1785) recognised that majorities of individuals
are likely to be more often correct than individuals"27
It is also worth noting that the above enables one to understand better the apparent
inconsistency between the infallibility of the general will and the fallibility of
individuals. It implies that "society" is a better judge of its welfare than any single
individual.
26 Rousseau, (2.3) p28-29.
27 Grofman, B. and Feld, S.L. (1988) p569.
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Condorcet's essay on probability28
 contains eleven hypotheses, the first of which
refers to "the probability that there will be a majority in favour of the correct decision
of a question submitted to the voters." 29 Implicit in this is the notion that there is a
right and a wrong social outcome prior to voting, as is the case with Rousseau.
Condorcet finds that, as the number of voters tends to infinity, this probability tends
to unity which is interpreted by Grofrnan and Feld as, if there is a sufficiently large
number of voters, the majority decision will be the correct decision 30 . The derivation
of Condorcet's result can be found in Todhunter pages 353-355. Condorcet treats
individuals as homogeneous in that he assumes them to have the same probability of
making a correct decision, v, which he assumes to be greater than the probability of
voting incorrectly, e. Grofman and Feld more realistically allow the probability of
voting correctly to differ between individuals and thus the probabilities v and e are in
fact average probabilities. They use the result to support Rousseau's idea that the
method of majority decision is the best means of discovering the truth.
However, the result that the majority decision will be the correct decision is entirely
dependent on the premise that the individual is more likely to vote correctly rather
than incorrectly. One needs to remember that the individual must be more likely to
decide correctly otherwise the majority decision will not be the general will, but this
is consistent with Rousseau's warning that the majority will is not always the general
will.
28 Condorcet, Marquis de. (1785)
29 Todhunter (1949), p353
30 Grofman and Feld (1988) p569-570.
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"This (that the truth is the majority view) assumes, to be sure, that all the
characteristics of the general will continue to be found in the majority. When this
ceases to be true, whatever action is taken there is no more liberty."31
Condorcet's jury theorem shows that a majority of individuals is more likely to be
correct than any single individual in the whole group, but it is dependent on the
premise that any single individual selected is more likely to be correct than wrong. I
shall explain this more fully. Given a group of individuals, if it is known that the
average probability of individuals choosing correctly is greater than the average
probability of them choosing wrongly with regard to an issue, then the majority
decision will produce the correct decision. Thus, to assume that the majority view is
the truth, Rousseau needs to assume that the individual member of society is more
likely than not to know the general will. I shall now return to the opening quote of
this chapter:
"the general will is always right, and always tends to the public good; but it does not
always follow that the deliberations of the people will always have the same
rectitude"32
In the light of Condorcet's result, one is required to interpret the above quote in the
following way. The general will is always right because it is, by definition, the true
interest of society. The deliberations of the people, however, are not always right,
but this is unimportant provided that the average probability of an individual
31 Rousseau, book 4, chapter 2, (4.2) p118. Brackets not in original.
32 Rousseau, book 2, chapter 3, (2.3) p28-29.
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reaching the correct decision is greater that the probability of a wrong decision. This
is the assumption implicit in using the method of majority decision as the process of
establishing the true interest of society. However, there is no way of verifying
whether this assumption holds since Rousseau provides us with no other means of
knowing the general will.
V The Link between the Arrovian Social Welfare Function
and the General Will
I have already discussed how the difference between the individual's general will and
his private will lies in the different motivation behind the preferences. The private
will is based on self-interest, by which I mean whatever gives the individual utility.
The general will is guided by what the individual believes to be the interest of
society. The true will of society is deemed by Rousseau to be the majority view
when individuals express their general wills. If private wills are expressed, the will
of all is arrived at.
The process of establishing society's will is similar to the process of establishing a
social welfare function in that society's will, whether it be the general will or the will
of all, is derived from the views of individual members of society. The type of will
established for society is totally dependent on which set of preferences is expressed
by individuals. This is one sense in which the social welfare function is like a type of
will for society. The other sense is in the role of the social welfare function as a
standard of goodness of social states. To decide whether the social welfare function
actually derived is equivalent to the will of all or the general will, there is a need to
establish exactly what kind of individual preferences go into the social welfare
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function. The possibility of deriving the general will stems from Rousseau's dual
utility framework, it stems from individuals being able to separate the interests of
society from their own interests as separate private individuals.
In his book, Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow comments on both the
nature of the individual preferences in the social welfare function 33 and the views of
Kant and Rousseau34, whose position he refers to as "idealist". It seems safe to
assume that Arrow is advocating a mono utility framework since he refers to only
one set of preferences for individuals. In the following discussion, I consider
Arrow's comments on the nature of individual preferences and his own view of how
Rousseau's general will relates to the social welfare function to establish exactly
what kind of will the social welfare function represents.
Arrow's interpretation of Rousseau differs from my own in that Arrow does not
distinguish between the individual's private will and his belief of the general will.
My interpretation of Arrow is that the individual's private will is the will of which he
is conscious and is a belief (about the general will), whereas the general will itself is
an objective truth. In Arrow's view, the difference between the private and general
wills is not in the motivation behind the preferences, but in the truth status of the
two. I accept his point about the difference in truth status, it is only the general will
which represents the individual's true welfare. The general will is closer to the truth
than the private will, which is merely belief:
33 Arrow, K.J (1963), p23.
34 Arrow (1963) p81-86.
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"The idealist doctrine then may be summed up by saying that each individual has two
orderings, one which governs him in his everyday actions and one which would be
relevant under some ideal conditions and which is in some sense truer than the first
ordering. It is the latter which is considered relevant to social choice, and it is
assumed that there is complete unanimity with regard to the truer individual
ordering."35
Although the above quote refers to Rousseau and Kant collectively, the fact that
Arrow puts Rousseau and Kant in the same set is evidence that he views Rousseau's
framework as analogous to Kant's. Implicit in this is the view that the general will is
the analogue of Kant's moral imperative. In the last sentence above, Arrow is noting
that social choice is based on each individual's general will and that, since there is
only one true general will, society will be unanimous on the true social ordering. It is
important to note, however, that Arrow cannot be implying that individuals express
general wills in his social welfare function since, on his view, there is only one
individual will of which individuals are aware which is "corrupted by the
environment"36 . Arrow is pointing to the fact that there is unanimity in theory, but
does not explain how such a will could ever be established if individuals are only
aware of it under "ideal conditions". I accept that the general will is in some sense a
truth whereas the private will is subjective, but there is a further fundamental
difference which Arrow fails to highlight. The main difference between the two
wills is in the motivation behind them as well as the truth status. Rousseau is explicit
35 Arrow, K.J. (1963), p82-3.
36 Ibid, top of page 82.
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that these are two different wills corresponding to an individual's two different roles
in society:
"Each individual may, as a man, have a private will contrary to, or divergent from,
the general will he has as a citizen."37
In contrast, Arrow makes no distinction between the individual as a private person
and the individual as a member of society, there is no recognition of the two different
ends, social and individual.
It is clear from the passage below that Arrow regards the general will as the analogue
of the social welfare function because he regards Kant's moral imperative as the
analogue of the general will.
"The moral imperative corresponds to our concept of the social ordering, in a sense,
but it is also an individual ordering for every individual; it is the will which every
individual would have if he were fully rational."38
But Arrow regards the general will as the social welfare function analogue because
of the role of the social welfare function rather than the process by which it is
established. This must be the case, given his view that the individual's general will
is the will that he ought to have as opposed to the will that he actually has.
Individuals must be expressing wills of which they are conscious when deriving a
social welfare function, thus they must be expressing private wills. So with regard to
37 Rousseau (1.7) p18-19.
38 Arrow, p82.
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the process of establishing the social welfare function, the Arrovian social welfare
function actually established would have to be the will of all rather than the true
general will.
Arrow discusses the nature of the individual orderings which go into the social
welfare function earlier in his book.39 According to Arrow,
"The individual orderings which enter as arguments into the social welfare function
refer to the values of individuals rather than to their tastes" 4°
Arrow was discussing the difference between his social welfare function and
Bergson's (where the individual orderings refer to tastes). The fact that he explicitly
states that he is referring to values rather than tastes could be taken to imply that the
individual orderings are broader than straightforward tastes, possibly ethical
judgements could be included. But Arrow appears to view the distinction between
tastes and values as unimportant by claiming that "no sharp line can be drawn
between tastes and values"41 which is further evidenced by the fact that he refers to
individuals' tastes on page 81 of the book. The important thing seems to be the fact
that individual orderings are being used to derive a social ordering which is to
represent a social value system. Arrow refers to only one ordering when referring to
individuals so it seems safe to assume that he broadly accepts the standard mono-
utility framework.
39 Ibid.
40 Arrow, K.J (1963), p23. Italics not in original.
41 Arrow, p24.
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To conclude this section, Arrow considers the social welfare function itself to be
analogous to Rousseau's notion of the general will and Kant's moral imperative.
This is a result of focusing on the role of the social welfare function and his view
that consensus amongst individuals in society is necessary to the establishment of
such a function. "It must be demanded that there be some sort of consensus on the
ends of society, or no social welfare function can be formed. If we deny the
possibility or meaningfulness of two wills, the consensus must be found in the
overtly expressed individual orderings"42
However, given Arrow's view that individuals only have one set of preferences of
which they are conscious, the social welfare function actually established must
necessarily be closer to the will of all.
VI Consideration of Amartya Sen's View of the General Will43
Runciman and Sen argue that the Prisoner's Dilemma can be used to elucidate the
difference between the general will and the will of all.
"This conflict between what seems individually better and what seems to produce the
best over-all result contains, in our view, the essence of Rousseau's distinction
between the "will of all" and the "general will". The "general will" of the prisoners
is to avoid confession, but each person's "particular will" is to confess."44
42 Arrow, p83.
43 Runciman, W.G. and Sen, A.K (1965), p554-62.
44 Runciman and Sen, p555-556.
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Runciman and Sen's claim is that, in the case of the prisoner's dilemma, the Pareto
optimal outcome where neither prisoner confesses is the general will of society, but
the Pareto inferior outcome where both confess is the will of all. My main objection
to their interpretation is that it ignores the fundamental difference between the
general will and the will of all, the difference in motivation behind the preferences.
Runciman and Sen are arguing that individuals only have a private will which is
reflected in their individual preferences.
"Our interpretation (of Rousseau) does not require us to impute to each person more
than a single set of orderings....each person has (as in Rousseau) a single and
consistent aim"45
I do not share their view that The Social Contract can be interpreted as a mono-utility
framework. Ironically, what Runciman and Sen refer to as the general will, with
reference to the Prisoner's Dilemma, is actually closer to the will of all. This must
necessarily be the case given their view that each individual has "a single and
consistent aim", i.e. each individual has a private will but not a general will.
Runciman and Sen's view is that a general will is associated with a society rather
than an individual. Individuals have private wills whilst societies have general wills
which are derived from individual expressions of private wills. In my view, rather
than elucidating the nature of what the general will is, the mono-utility framework
which is implicit in their analysis confuses the issue.
45 Runciman and Sen, p557. First bracket not in original.
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Runciman and Sen identify the general will with the Pareto optimal outcome, but the
Pareto optimal outcome can only be defined with reference to some given
preferences. They are essentially saying that the general will is the Pareto optimal
outcome based on individual expressions of private, not general, wills. They appear
to have missed the fundamental point that the general will can only be determined
when each individual's vote is motivated by the social good, rather than his own
private good, a point which is supported by Grofman and Feld,
"Rousseau believed that the most certain route to finding the general will was one in
which individuals were primarily oriented toward the general will rather than to their
own narrow self-interest."46
The problem of the general will reflecting the will of all arises precisely when
individuals lose sight of the good of society and express a preference which reflects
their consideration of themselves as private individuals. In other words, it is when
the individual has the sole aim of furthering his own interest that the will of all,
rather than the general will, is arrived at.
"When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, what the voters are being
asked is not precisely whether they do or do not approve of the proposal, but whether
or not it is in conformity with the general will, which is their own."47
46 Grofman, B. and Feld, S.L. (1988), p572.
47 Rousseau (4.2), p117-8.
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The idea that the general will is the will of each individual is central to Rousseau's
social contract as I noted before. Runciman and Sen's view is that each individual is
unaware of the true interest of society because he is pursuing his own individual aim.
In the case of the prisoner's dilemma, the Pareto optimal social state will only be
realised if the individuals collude. It therefore follows from Runciman and Sen's
view of the general will that, in order to realise society's general will, individuals
must be forced to collude:
"the conflict between the will of all and the general will arises...because of the
difference between the outcome of individual strategy and of enforced collusion
which arises under the conditions of the non-co-operative, non-zero-sum game"48
But this is to ignore the fact that the fundamental difference between the will of all
and the general will lies in the motivation. Runciman and Sen believe that enforced
collusion is what Rousseau means when he claims that individuals should be "forced
to be free". In their view, realisation of the general will may require individuals to be
forced to collude.
"This (the Prisoner's Dilemma) gives immediate and plausible sense to Rousseau's
notion of the members of a society being "forced to be free'49
But Rousseau's idea was that individuals are free in the sense that the general will is
each individual's will, like another utility function. They are "forced" in the sense
that they can be wrong about their general will. But the idea that they are free stems
48 Runciman and Sen page 557.
49 Runciman and Sen p556.
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from each individual having a general as well as a private will. Without the general
will as an individual utility function, there can be no sense in which individuals are
free when the general will is imposed. If the general will were nothing more than the
Pareto optimal social state as Sen and Runciman suggest, there would be no sense in
which individuals would be free, they would merely be "forced".
Further, the idea of collusion being required to realise the general will is in contrast
to Rousseau's idea that individuals should deliberate independently in order to
discover their true general will. Rousseau took the view that the individual was more
likely to be corrupted if he allowed his belief of the general will to be influenced by
others. He took the view that each individual citizen should express his own opinion
of the general will and not be influenced by anyone else. To ensure that each
individual expresses his own true general will, there should be no communication
between individual members of society.
"If the people were sufficiently well-informed, and if in their deliberations the
citizens held no communication with one another, the general will would always
result"5°
Thus, according to Rousseau, independent, individual deliberation is a necessary
condition for finding the general will, in contrast to Runciman and Sen's view that it
may require "enforced collusion". A lot of the confusion stems from Runciman and
Sen's use of a problem which involves independent individual choice (the Prisoner's
Dilemma) to discuss a notion which relates to the social good. The general will is
50 Ibid.
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more closely analogous to the role of the social welfare function as I discussed in
section five above.
VII The Existence or Otherwise of a Private Sphere s ' of Choice
for Individuals in The Social Contract
Within Sen's framework, every aspect of the social state is determined by the social
welfare function, i.e. every aspect is determined by the collective, society, rather than
by the individual. In this sense, every aspect of the social state is, in fact, public. I
am putting to one side any normative judgements about what ought to be private and
public and considering what in fact is the case. The fact that all aspects of the social
state are, without exception, determined collectively essentially makes them all
public. No aspects are privately determined in that no aspects are actually chosen by
individuals. But Sen could still incorporate some kind of private sphere within this
framework if he made the Paretian value judgement subordinate to the liberal one.
He does not do this. In Sen's framework, individuals are only allowed their private
preferences to be reflected in social choices if these are unopposed by Paretianism.
Paretianism and liberalism have equal status in Sen's problem, where they are in
conflict, no social choice can be made. The liberal idea of giving individuals a
private sphere is contingent on this being unopposed by Paretianism. This is why I
shall refer to Sen's liberal right as Pareto-contingent.
51 By this I mean a private sphere of choice within which individuals are free to exercise their own
private wills.
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The dual preference framework has already been outlined. Individuals have two sets
of preferences: one private and one public which correspond to the individual's
private and general wills. The ability of an individual to express his private will is
clearly contingent on him being given a private sphere within which he is allowed to
make private choices. This section considers whether there is a private sphere of
choice for individuals in The Social Contract' and, if so, what type of sphere it is.
There are two possible scenarios.
(i) There is a distinction between private and public aspects of the social state.
Private aspects are determined by individuals, public aspects by society's general
will. Individuals have a private sphere within which they can exercise their private
wills independently of the views of others. This is an absolute right to liberty, it is
similar to John Stuart Mill's notion of a private sphere52.
(ii) There is a general will contingent liberal right analogous to Sen's Pareto-
contingent liberal right. All aspects of the social state are determined by the general
will, but the general will may decide that individuals ought to be allowed to
determine some aspects for themselves. There is only a private sphere if the general
will allows it, the private sphere is subordinate to the general will. In the case of a
Sen-type conflict, the general will determines the social outcome and the notion of a
private sphere goes.
52	 •Mill, J.S (1993b), I am here referring to a private sphere of individual choice which is absolute, i.e.
one which exists irrespective of the preferences of other individuals.
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Possible evidence for each of the above scenarios is considered below. The
possibility of a Mill type private sphere is considered and ultimately rejected in
favour of a private sphere which is general will contingent.
(i) Arguments for a Mill Type Private Sphere
One could argue that the fact that Rousseau distinguishes between two types of will
is suggestive of an analogous distinction between private and public domains of
choice. Although Rousseau is explicit that the distinction between the two types of
will is in the motivation behind the preferences, it could be argued that the distinction
would be futile if individuals were not able to exercise their private wills. Perhaps it
could be viewed as strange for Rousseau to acknowledge the existence of a private
will in individuals but not allow them any opportunity to exercise it.
Rousseau's identification of the (i.e. society's) general will with each individual's
general will makes it very difficult to ascertain whether there are any aspects of the
social state which are private, in fact, i.e. which are determined by individuals. A
passage such as the one below could, erroneously, be interpreted as implying that the
individual retains control over some choices. But such an interpretation ignores the
dual utility framework, the fact that the general will is the true will of each
individual. Such passages do not provide evidence for a private sphere, given
Rousseau's concept of the general will. They merely emphasise the curious nature of
the general will and its role in reconciling individual liberty with the social good.
"To renounce your liberty is to renounce your very quality of manhood; it is to
renounce not only the rights, but even the duties of humanity. There can be no
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possible compensation for anyone who renounces everything. Such a renunciation is
incompatible with the nature of man."53
To provide evidence of a private sphere of choice one needs to show that individuals
still retain some natural liberty in the civil state, i.e. that the individual is able to
exercise his private will. The passage below is a clear acknowledgement of this. It
is possibly the only passage that suggests that individuals have an a priori right to a
private sphere of choice as separate persons ("men").
"In addition to the public person, we have also to consider the private persons who
compose it, and whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it. The problem
is, therefore, to distinguish clearly between the respective rights of the citizens and of
the sovereign; and between the duties the former must fulfil in their capacity as
subjects, and the natural rights they must enjoy in their capacity as men"54
The following passage suggests that the general will only applies to a specific
domain, the public domain.
"The general will changes its nature when directed toward aparticular object, and
cannot, without ceasing to be general, pronounce on any individual or fact"55
Issues which only affect specific individuals appear to be outside of this domain,
i.e. within a private sphere of choice. The clearest indication of a Mill type right is
in a footnote in book four where Rousseau quotes the Marquis d'Argenson. The
53 Rousseau (1.4) p9.
54 Ibid.
55 Rousseau (2.4) p32.
49
comment could have come straight from the pages of Mill's 'On Liberty':
"In the republic', says the Marquis d'Argenson, 'everyone is perfectlyfree to do
anything that does not harm others.' That is the invariable boundary-line; it cannot
be more accurately defined."56
It is clearly indicative of a negative notion of liberty, i.e. the absence of interference.
Rousseau's use of the expression "boundary-line" is suggestive of distinct spheres of
private individual action. Given that the language used in this passage is the closest
to Mill's own description of the private sphere, it is ironic that the accompanying
passage in the text itself implies that the right of individuals to a private sphere is not
independent of the general will:
"The right which the social compact gives the sovereign does not go beyond the
bounds of public utility"57
If the "invariable boundary line" is "public utility", as the above suggests, then this
implies that any private sphere of choice is subject to the general will. If, for
example, the public judge that it is in the common interest that an individual is
denied the right to read a book, then this right would be denied.
(ii) Arguments for a General Will Contingent Private Sphere
There is much evidence in 'The Social Contract' to suggest that it is the community
that determines the extent of the individual's liberty.
56 Rousseau, (4.8). Note 1 on page 152.
57 Rousseau (4.8) p152.
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"Under the social compact, what each individual alienates is that part only of his
power, goods and liberty which the community needs for its own use; but it must also
be agreed that the sovereign alone is judge of that need."58
The individual retains some natural liberty provided the community allows it. It
seems reasonable to assume that private aspects such as one's colour of dress, one's
reading material would not be "needed" by the community and would, therefore, be
left to be determined by the individual concerned. But it is theoretically possible that
society's general will would not allow a private sphere to individuals. Sen's Lady
Chatterley example would illustrate this provided the individual preferences were
expressions of beliefs of the general will. There is no guarantee that individuals will
retain a private sphere of choice, Rousseau provides us with no a priori justification
for the private sphere. This passage unambiguously supports the individual right to a
private sphere being general will contingent as does the one below:
"All the services a citizen can render the state are owed to it as soon as the sovereign
requests them; but the sovereign cannot burden the subjects with any restraints
which are useless to the community"59
It seems reasonable to infer that aspects of the social state such as reading, choice of
clothes, etc. would be "useless to the community" and thus privately determined by
individuals without interference from the state. However, there is still the theoretical
possibility that the "community" views, for example, the reading of certain material
as not in the common interest, in which case such material would be denied to
individuals.
58 Rousseau (2.4) p31.
59 Ibid.
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The second chapter of book two supports the view that all rights depend for their
existence on the general will:
"The rights which are taken for parts of sovereignty are all subordinate to it, and
always presuppose the existence of a supreme will which these rights merely put into
execution"60
Thus any private sphere of choice is subordinate to the general will. Rousseau is
unambiguously clear that all individual rights depend for their existence on the
general will. This is further supported in the passage below
"If the individuals retained certain rights, each would be his own judge in certain
matters, and would soon claim to be so in all; the state of nature would continue, and
the association would necessarily become tyrannical and meaningless."61
Thus there can be no absolute rights to a private spheres of choice, i.e. rights which
are independent of the general will, because if there were such a absolute rights, then
these rights could conflict with the general will. In cases of such conflict, these
absolute individual rights would make society worse off. This follows from the fact
that the general will is the common interest of society, the true will of each
individual. In other words, the private will is subordinate to the general will, thus any
private sphere of choice is subordinate to the general will. The fact that the general
will is the will of each individual also enables Rousseau to argue that to deny
60 Rousseau (2.2) p27.
61 Rousseau (1.6) p15.
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individuals a private sphere of choice is not tantamount to denying them freedom. It
merely implies that an absolute private sphere of choice may not be consistent with
their general will, i.e. that it may deny them civil freedom, which is better than
natural freedom. Thus it is better that they do not have such an absolute private
sphere because it could interfere with civil liberty.62
VIII The Notion of Freedom Within this Dual Utility Framework
The dual utility framework has implications for the notion of freedom. Since the
individual has a general as well as a private will, there is no reason why he should be
less free when ruled by his general rather than his private will. My point is that a
private domain of choice in which individuals exercise their private wills is not
necessary for individual freedom, given a dual utility framework. Within Sen's
mono-utility framework, it is necessary because each individual has only one utility
function. There are two types of freedom implicit in Rousseau's Social Contract
corresponding to whether one is ruled by one's private or one's general will.
Rousseau refers to the two types as natural liberty and civil liberty respectively. The
fact that the general will is "always right" and "always tends to the public good"
whereas the private will is not necessarily in the interest of the individual, implies
that the utility framework is hierarchical. The private will is subordinate to the
general will and therefore civil liberty, where individuals are ruled by the general
will, is better for them than natural liberty. This explains why individuals agree to
the social contract in the first place, civil freedom is better than natural _freedom. In
entering the social contract, individuals are trading natural liberty for civil liberty
which makes them better off.
62 The two types of liberty in The Social Contract are discussed in the following section.
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"Although in this (civil) state he (man) loses many of his natural advantages, he
gains so many in return, his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas are
broadened, his sentiments ennobled and his whole soul elevated to such an extent
that if the abuses of his new condition did not often degrade him beneath his former
state, he ought unceasingly to bless the happy moment which wrested him forever
from it, and turned him from a stupid and limited animal into an intelligent being
and a man."63
It is important to note that entering society does not preclude the possibility of
individuals being able to exercise their private wills, but such a sphere of choice is
dependent on the general will allowing it.
There is also a moral element to the general will. The notion of reason is important,
it is a considered judgement:
"along with the civil state, man acquires moral liberty, which alone makes him truly
master of himself; for impulse of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to self
imposed law is liberty."64
Implicit in the view that civil freedom is better than natural freedom is also the idea
that individuals are more free when acting according to reason rather than want. The
above quote indicates that Rousseau is of the view that an individual is controlled by
his desires when given a private domain of choice in which to pursue them. In this
sense, to give an individual the liberty to respond to his private will is paradoxically
to enslave him to his personal desires. His private will is not necessarily in his
63 Rousseau, (1.8) p20.
64 Ibid.
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interest, it is merely his subjective wants. But his general will is necessarily in his
interest as a member of society. This supports the argument presented in section
seven, that natural liberty is only permitted to an extent that does not conflict with
the general will.
IX An Interpretation of the Paretian Liberal Paradox in the
Light of Rousseau's Notion of the General Will
The notion of the general will and its place in this hierarchical utility framework
could be thought of as implying the value judgement that 'society' is a better judge
of its welfare than the individual. I shall explain in more detail what I mean by this.
The set of preferences reflecting the general will is representative of the true interest
of society. Any given private will, however, is not necessarily so. Two key things
are necessary to discover the general will: individuals must be motivated by the
common interest in voting and the view must be held by a majority of them with
unanimity being the ideal.
"the more agreement there is in assemblies, the more nearly unanimous their
opinions are, the more also does the general will prevair65
Thus 'society' can know the general will but a single individual can only have a
belief of it, it requires all members of society to establish it, to discover it.
65 Rousseau, (4.2) p116
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"When an opinion contrary to my own prevails (in the majority view), this proves
nothing more than that I was mistaken and that what I thought to be the general will
was not."66
Only the general will is representative of the public good. Therefore, 'society' (the
collection of individuals) is a better judge of its welfare than the individual. The link
with a Paretian social welfare function should now be clear. The Paretian social
welfare function represents the view of 'society' because it reflects the unanimously
held view. Provided the individual preferences are motivated by the common
interest, provided they represent individual beliefs of the general will, the Paretian
social welfare function is representative of the general will°. This follows from the
passage which I have quoted above.
Given my argument that any individual private sphere is contingent on the general
will, presented in section seven, liberalism is subordinate to Paretianism. Thus one
`Rousseauian' resolution to the Paretian liberal conflict is the following. Condition
P has priority, provided that the motivation underlying the individual preferences is
the common interest rather than the individual's private interest.
I shall now explain this in relation to Sen's 'Lady Chatterley's Lover' example68.
There are two possible resolutions depending on whether the preferences expressed
represent individual private wills or beliefs of the general will. It is more likely that
66 Rousseau (4.3) p118
67 The analogy between the general will and a social welfare function satisfying condition P is one of
two possibilities. There is also a possible analogy with a social welfare function which is based upon
both P and L. I explore this in the concluding section. The fundamental point is that the general will
acts as a social welfare function.
68 Sen, A.K. (1970b) I discuss this example in section two of chapter one.
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they represent private wills, given the mono-utility framework and the actual
preferences expressed. However, I shall first assume that the underlying motivation
is the common interest. The resolution in this case is obvious. The unanimous view
of society is that it is better that Prude reads the book, i.e. better that he is denied a
private sphere of choice over his reading. Allowing Prude the freedom to determine
for himself whether or not he reads the book would not, therefore, be allowed by the
general will. Society is deemed to be the better judge of its welfare, therefore, the
Paretian view would prevail.
However, it is far more likely in this particular example, given the mono-utility
framework, that the preferences expressed reflect private wills, i.e. each individual is
motivated by his own private interest. In this case, the Sen paradox represents a
conflict of private wills. Individuals are not expressing preferences as citizens, each
is solely considering his own private interest. Given this motivation, the Paretian
judgement must necessarily represent the will of all as opposed to the general will.
In this case, the denial of a private sphere of choice for Prude (the Paretian
judgement) is not an expression of the general will but an "iniquitous decree":
"the general will falls silent; guided by secret motives, no one thinks as a citizen any
more than as if the state had never existed; and under the guise of laws are enacted
iniquitous decrees whose only purpose is to further private interests."69
In my view, it is the above that depicts what is going on in the Sen paradox.
69 Rousseau (4.1) p114.
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Individual preferences merely reflect selfish wants, thus the Paretian judgement, that
individuals should be denied a private sphere of choice, represents the will of all.
The Paretian judgement thus denies individuals both civil and natural liberty. They
have no civil liberty because they are not being ruled by the general will and no
natural liberty because they are denied a private sphere of choice. One can also,
therefore, interpret the Paretian liberal conflict as an example of the problems that
can be caused when the will of society, the collective decision, is not representative
of the general will. Rousseau himself acknowledges that, when the majority view is
not representative of the general will, individuals would be more free in the state of
nature.
"This (that the truth is the majority view) assumes, to be sure, that all the
characteristics of the general will continue to be found in the majority. When this
ceases to be true, whatever action is taken there is no more liberty."70
The problem all hinges on the motivation behind the individual preferences
expressed in the act of voting. "Society", i.e. a Paretian social welfare function, is
only a better judge of its welfare if each individual member has a notion of the
common interest. If individuals are purely selfishly motivated, Sen's condition P
does not represent the interest of society, the general will is "silent", and individuals
would actually be better off making independent decisions.
70 Rousseau (4.2) p118.
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X Conclusion
Sen has established the result that, if we attempt to construct a social welfare
function which satisfies both conditions P and L, then such a function may not exist.
If one is to interpret the exercise as an attempt to discover the general will of society,
then one is committed to responding by dropping either of the conditions P or L.
This is because the general will always exists by definition, so there must exist some
social welfare function which is representative of it. (In other words, one is
committed to the concept of a social welfare function.) The discussion of section
seven of this chapter suggests that Rousseau was of the view that a private sphere of
choice for individuals may well be an aspect of the general will. There can be no
absolute rights to such a sphere, given Rousseau's view that all rights depend for
their existence on the general wile% but Rousseau clearly viewed such a sphere as
important. This would provide a rationale for imposing Sen's condition L upon the
social welfare function in addition to condition P. However, given Rousseau's view
that unanimity is the best means of discovering the general will, if P and L were to
come into conflict, then it would be L that would be abandoned. Condition L would
go, but with no loss of individual liberty, on the basis that the social welfare function
established is a welfare function of each individual. Thus it is this idea of dual
utility, that each individual has two sets of preferences corresponding to her private
and common interest, which resolves conflict between liberty and social welfare.
71 See section seven (part ii) of this chapter.
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However, the success of this dual utility device in resolving conflict between liberty
and social welfare rests upon whether or not individuals will express their general, as
opposed to their private, will. If the preferences that go into the social welfare
function are private wills (i.e. rankings motivated by private good), then the social
welfare function is not representative of the common interest, but is the will of all.
The will of all, however, is not a welfare function of each individual (because it is
not the general will.) Thus when the social welfare function represents the will of
all, "whatever action is taken, there is no more liberty"72 . Rousseau's problem is that
he can provide us with no way of knowing that the social welfare function is
representative of the general will rather than the will of all.
In the light of Sen's result, one possibility suggests itself: Where conditions P and L
come into conflict, it might be interpreted as indicating that individuals are actually
expressing preferences which reflect private wills, not views of the general will. The
denial of some minimal private sphere of choice could be interpreted as an
"iniquitous decree". If Rousseau had been unambiguously clear that some minimal
natural rights were an aspect of the general will, then this would be a possible
interpretation: failure of the social welfare function to satisfy L could indicate that
individuals are failing to "see" the general will. On this view, the dual utility device
implies that there will always exist a social welfare function satisfying conditions P
and L, provided individuals are motivated by the common interest as opposed to their
own private interests.
72 Rousseau (4.2) p118.
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However, given the ambiguity in Rousseau's discussion of a private sphere of choice
and Rousseau's insistence that unanimity is the best way of discovering the general
will, I feel the preceding paragraph is not an accurate reflection of his view.
Rousseau's position is actually more straightforward. He acknowledges the problem
(that individuals might express private as opposed to general wills when voting), but
provides no solution. He instead assumes that the will of the majority does reflect
the general will. Thus one can think of a social welfare function which is based upon
condition P as representative of the general will. Such a welfare function may or
may not allow a private sphere of choice for individuals, but where it does not, this is
not important because the social welfare function is the true welfare function of each
individual. Rousseau is often associated with the idea of being 'forced to be free',
and the way that he uses the dual utility device can help us to understand what he
means by it:
"....anyone who refuses to obey the general will shall be forced to do so by the whole
body; which means nothing more or less than that he will be forced to be free."73
It is this idea of being forced to be free which is fundamental to the way that
Rousseau resolves conflict between liberty and social welfare. The only way that
Rousseau can reconcile liberty with dominance of the social welfare function is to
13 Rousseau (1.7) p19.
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argue that it is the welfare function of each individual. It is the general will that
represents the individual's true welfare, not his private will, and it is this sense that
Rousseau's resolution rests upon the idea that 'society' is a better judge of welfare
than any single individual.
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CHAPTER THREE: UTILITARIANISM AND LIBERTY:
THE CASE OF J.S. MILL
"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a
different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. "
I Introduction
The pertinence of the thought of John Stuart Mill to the debate on the Paretian liberal
paradox lies in the fact that Mill is committed to utilitarianism as an ethical theory,
yet also advocates an absolute right to liberty:
"....the only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence (of choice) is, of right, absolute 	 I forgo any advantage which could
be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of
utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be
utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a
progressive being...."2
The above passage summarises the essentials of Mill's position: Individuals have an
absolute right to liberty in matters which do not harm others, but it is not liberty
which is the fundamental value judgement, but utility. Mill's problem, therefore, is
I Mill, J.S. (1993a), p10.
2 Mill, J.S (1993b), p78.
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to argue for such an absolute right to liberty whilst adhering to the view "that
happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being
only desirable as means to that end." 3 There is an obvious link here with the Paretian
liberal paradox in that condition L is motivated by this concern for individual liberty
and condition P is consistent with the objective of aggregate utility maximisation
(where utility is synonymous with preference satisfaction). Sen has presented us
with the result that it is impossible to construct a social welfare function which
incorporates these two conditions (value judgements). Therefore, as a utilitarian
advocating an absolute right to liberty, Mill would have also had to deal with this
logical problem. Writers within the social choice literature referring to Mill have
tended to focus on the issue of whether Sen's formulation L adequately captures
what Mill meant by a right to liberty and whether a way out of the paradox can be
found by considering Mill's notion of liberty4 . This chapter shows how Mill
reconciles an absolute right to liberty in private matters with the idea that there is
only one fundamental value judgement, utility, by analysing Mill's notion of utility
as a hierarchical utility framework s . It argues that it is his hierarchical notion of
utility, distinct from the idea of utility as the satisfaction of existing preferences,
which is crucial in reconciling utility with liberty.
3 Mill (1993a), p36.
4 Riley, J. (1989 & 1990), Sugden (1993), Barry (1986).
5 The only writer to suggest the possibility of such a preference hierarchy in relation to Mill to my
knowledge, is Brennan (1989). The hierarchical framework which I develop here, however, differs
from Brennan's in that liberty is the necessary condition for preference development. In the
framework presented here, individuals choose to develop their preferences and thus make themselves
better off. Brennan's analysis suggests that the preference hierarchy follows from the idea that there is
a difference in quality between certain types of pleasure which is somewhat unutilitarian. I discuss his
comments later.
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There is a sense in which Mill's utility framework is akin to the revealed preference
theory of microeconomics: the judge of utility is said to be the individual, the test of
utility is the revealed preference of individuals. However, there is a fundamental
difference between modern revealed preference theory and a `Millian' notion of
utility. The revealed preference theorist passively accepts individual preferences as
brute facts, whereas Mill does not. Mill places importance on the individual's
development of his tastes or preferences; the mere satisfaction of existing preferences
is not sufficient for individual utility maximisation. It is the importance that Mill
places on the development of individual preferences ('higher faculties') that makes
the notion of individual liberty so fundamentally important to his notion of utility.
Individuals develop their preferences through critical thought, reflection and making
choices, which makes them better off. Liberty, therefore, is the necessary condition
for preference development and thus utility maximisation. Thus it is better to be
dissatisfied 'Socrates' as opposed to a satisfied fool.
In making individual liberty a necessary condition for the development of individual
preferences (and thus maximisation of utility), Mill has essentially pre-empted any
possibility of conflict between utilitarian and liberal value judgements. However,
whether or not Paretian liberal conflict is resolved is dependent on the extent to
which Mill's particular view of utilitarianism is consistent with Paretian value
judgements.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section two argues why Mill's
notion of utility should be interpreted as a hierarchical utility framework and
develops this framework. Section three contrasts this notion of utility with Pareto's
65
notion of utility ('ophelimity') as the satisfaction of existing preferences. The extent
to which maximisation of utility (in Mill's sense) is consistent with a Paretian
approach to social welfare is discussed in section four. Section five discusses the
Paretian liberal paradox in the light of the analysis of Mill's notion of utility, whilst
section six considers the influence that Mill's thought has had on the social choice
literature. Section seven provides more detailed discussion of the idea of social
welfare. Finally, concluding comments are presented in section seven.
II Mill's Notion of Utility Analysed as a Hierarchical Utility Framework
This section argues that Mill's 'model' of utility can be construed as a preference
model of utility, but as one that differs in important respects from the conventional
preference model of economic theory, described by Haslett below:
"According to the preference model, utility is preference-satisfaction 	
what increases or decreases one's utility is a matter solely of what one oneself
prefers." Haslett continues, that the preference model places "no limitations at all on
what preferences the satisfaction of which supposedly increase a person's utility, and
are thus in the person's interests"6
Implicit in both the above quotes are Paretian value judgements. The individual is
the best judge of his own welfare or interest and individual preferences are not
questioned, but passively accepted. Preference satisfaction is good. The fundamental
difference between the above framework and Mill's notion of utility is in the first
Haslett (1990), pp. 69, 70.
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italicised quote above, 'utility is preference satisfaction'. Mill's notion of utility is
not merely preference satisfaction, but Mill does make reference to what can be
regarded as a set of individual preferences or utility function ('faculties' in the
passage below). Further, the individual's notion of 'happiness' is clearly dependent
on these 'faculties' which is analogous to the modern notion of utility and the
individual utility function:
"human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when
once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not
include their gratification"7
To put the above quote in context, Mill was responding to the charge that
utilitarianism was a "doctrine worthy only of swine" 8 . His defence, interpreted in
terms of the preference model, was that human beings and swine have different
utility functions and therefore that from which they derive utility differs. At this
point in 'Utilitarianism', Mill goes no further than that. This is the essential
similarity between the single preference model paradigm of economic theory and
Mill's notion of utility. The difference lies in Mill's refusal to accept preferences as
brute facts making the notion of utility broader than satisfaction of existing
preferences. The passage above is discussed further at the end of this section after
developing a preference model to represent Mill's notion of utility.
7 Mill, J.S (1993a), p8.
8	 •Mill, p7.
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Mill's model of utility is dynamic in that preferences are not static. Individual liberty
provides the individual with the opportunity to change his preferences so that they
become "better". Mill is able to incorporate such an idea within a utilitarian
framework by arguing that the individual who has developed his preferences prefers
his situation post-preference development to his situation prior to it. In other words,
although utility is no longer synonymous with preference satisfaction, the 'revealed
preference' idea still underlies the notion of utility. Before exploring the role of
revealed preference, I discuss Mill's distinction between happiness and 'content'.
The distinction between happiness and 'content' is of fundamental importance to
Mill's model of utility. The most illuminating comment on the difference between
these two ideas to date is provided by T. Miles:
"In Mill's sense, a person is 'content' if all their appetites for pleasure are satisfied"I°
Provided one interprets "appetites for pleasure" in the above as an individual's utility
function, it is illuminating in understanding what Mill means by "content". In terms
of a preference model of utility, 'content' is the extent to which one's individual
utility function, or set of preferences, is satisfied. The notion of utility (happiness),
however, is broader than this.
9 By 'revealed preference' I mean Samuelson's idea that one's preferences are revealed in one's actual
choices. See Samuelson, PA (1948). More recent discussion of revealed preference theory can be
found in Sen, A.K. (1982) 'Behaviour and the Concept of Preference' in 'Choice Welfare and
Measurement' p54-73.
I ° Miles, T.G (1992) p262.
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"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different
opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. "11
Miles' interpretation of the above is as follows:
"A pig has the capacity to enjoy very few pleasures, and thus is easily content,
whereas Socrates has the capacity for many pleasures and thus may well be more
often discontent, but is nonetheless capable of greater happiness."12
Again, provided 'capacity for pleasure' is interpreted as set of preferences or utility
function, Miles' view of 'content' is entirely consistent with my preference model
interpretation outlined below:
The fool, or the pig, has a very simple utility function (set of preferences). He is not
a critical thinker (for he is a fool), he merely requires sufficient income to enable him
to afford the material means to satisfy his simple wants such as food, drink and
sensual pleasure. Socrates' utility function is far more complex than the fool's
because he is more intelligent, he thinks critically. He is thus less likely to be
satisfied, but he still considers himself better off (more utility). Socrates has
increased his utility by actually changing his utility function into one which he
ultimately prefers to the one he had initially, prior to learning, despite the fact that he
is now less content. Since he prefers the transformed utility function, he must derive
more utility from it. In terms of modern rational choice theory, Mill is essentially
providing us with a revealed preference argument as to why the transformed utility
II Mill, J.S (1993a), p10.
12 Ibid.
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function provides the individual with more utility than the initial utility function.
Socrates has experience of both utility functions and prefers his utility function post-
education. If the fool should claim to prefer being a fool to being Socrates, this can
be ignored essentially because 'being Socrates' is outside the fool's feasible set. The
fool has no experience of what it is to have the preferences of 'Socrates' (he 'only
knows his own side of the question').
Essentially, the individual is still sovereign, but his preferences are not. The
individual is revealing a preference for having a set of preferences. The revealed
preference basis for Mill's notion of utility, and the fact that it is distinct from
'content' is again brought out in the passage below:
"no intelligent being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person an ignoramus,
no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they
should be persuaded that the fool is better satisfied with their lot than they are with
theirs. They would not resign what they possess for the most complete satisfaction
of all the desires which they have in common with theirs."I3
The fool is more satisfied because he is an unquestioning fool and it is thus easier to
satisfy him. But, once the individual has been able to change his utility function (via,
say, education) such that he thinks critically and questions, he is less likely to be
satisfied since his wants are more complex, but he prefers this situation to the one
previously where he was uneducated. The educated individual is essentially
13 Mill, J.S (1993a), p9.
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expressing a preference for a utility function (set of preferences). There is nothing
perverse in this idea of the educated individual being better off, i.e. having more
utility, than he had prior to education provided one lets go of a narrow idea of utility
as contentment or some Benthamite pleasure index. The individual is still sovereign,
but his preferences are not.
Timothy Brennan cites Mill's notion of utility as an example of a hierarchical
preference structure 14, but Brennan's interpretation of the above passage is somewhat
confusing. My point is that, in the above passage, Mill is providing a hypothetical
revealed preference argument for the hierarchical utility framework itself, a revealed
preference argument as to why the utility function (set of preferences) of Socrates is
better than that of the fool. Essentially, it is better because the educated individual
would not consent to be a fool, he prefers being educated. Brennan, however,
misleadingly suggests that the hierarchy applies to the 'pleasures' themselves rather
than the preferences:
"An educated person may be no more capable of deriving pleasure from mud
wrestling than an uneducated person is from opera. If education precludes deriving
pleasure from the activities of the fool, there is no 'revealed preference' for the
'higher preferences"5
The confusion is exacerbated by the fact that Brennan uses the term 'higher
preferences' where what he is talking about are actually (higher) pleasures. Brennan
14 Brennan, T.J. (1989) p191-2.
15 Ibid, Note 2, p191.
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is taking the utility function of the educated individual as given and considering his
choice of 'pleasure'. This is quite different to the question addressed by Mill which
is whether an educated individual 'would consent to be a fool'. Being a fool means
having a fool's utility function, not experiencing a fool's pleasures as an educated
individual. The educated individual can reveal a preference for being educated since
he has experience of both, but the fool cannot since he only has experience of being a
fool (he 'only knows his own side of the question').
Thus the utility (preference) framework is hierarchical. This is the feature which
distinguishes Mill's notion of utility from the mono-utility paradigm of economic
theory. Although each individual only has a single set of preferences at a given point
in time, this set of preferences can in some cases be transformed into a set which is
better. This is the distinguishing non-Paretian aspect. Individual preferences are not
passively accepted as brute facts, they are not viewed as equally good. The link
between Mill's model of utility and Paretian value judgements is explored in the next
section.
I shall now return to the passage relating to the different ideas of happiness of human
beings and animals, noted at the start of this section 16 . I used this passage at the
beginning of the section to highlight the fact that Mill does make reference to some
kind of individual preferences or utility function. But the passage can also be used to
further illustrate the role of the revealed preference idea in his model of utility. Mill
notes that human beings 'when once made conscious' of their 'more elevated'
16 Mill (1993a), p8.
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faculties 'do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their
gratification'. This italicised phrase is the key as to why human beings or intelligent
individuals are the judge of which set of preferences is 'better' and not the fools.
The fool is not conscious of what it is to have a more complex utility function, this
experience is, therefore outside his feasible set. It is thus impossible for him to
reveal a preference for being a satisfied fool since he is incapable of experiencing
being a dissatisfied educated person ('dissatisfied Socrates'.) The educated human,
however, is 'conscious' of both experiences, both are within his feasible set, and thus
one can infer from his preference which of the two sets of preferences gives him
more utility (which is better.) There are a few qualifications which need to be made
in using the revealed preference idea to understand Mill's notion of utility. Firstly,
we are not talking about revealing a set of preferences in actual choice, but the
inference of a set of meta-preferences, i.e. preferences over preferences 17 . It is the
meta-preferences which are analogous to the preferences of the revealed preference
theory of microeconomics. In terms of Mill's fool and Socrates example, Socrates
has a meta-ranking but the fool does not because he only has knowledge of his own
utility function. Mill's notion of utility can be understood as going beyond
preferences to a higher order preference. Utility is meta-preference maximisation.
The idea of meta-preferences has been explored by Amartya Sen who comments,
"Morality would seem to require a judgement among preferences whereas rationality
would not"18
17 As well as exploring the philosophy behind the revealed preference approach, Sen has also explored
the possibility of higher order preferences (preferences over preferences) which he refers to as "meta-
rankings". See 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory' in
'Choice, Welfare and Measurement', p84-106 and note 18 below. Further references to literature on
preferences over preferences are contained in Brennan (1989).
18 Sen, Amartya (1982) p75.
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One could use Sen's comment above to argue that Mill's preference framework is
entirely consistent with a utilitarian morality19 . In asking the question, 'which utility
function does the individual who has experience of both utility functions prefer?'
Mill is evaluating sets of preferences in terms of utility.
III 'Better to be a Satisfied Fool': The Implication of Acceptance of
Pareto's, as Opposed to Mill's, Notion of Utility
This section argues that Pareto's notion of utility (` ophelimity) is essentially the
same as Mill's notion of 'content'. It identifies evidence of a conflict between
maximising 'content' and maximising utility (in Mill's sense of the word) within
Mill's essay on Utilitarianism. It is maximisation of content that individual liberty
could conflict with, not maximisation of utility (if one accepts Mill's view of human
beings). Thus it is in distinguishing the notion of utility from mere preference
satisfaction (content) that enables Mill to provide a utilitarian justification for
individual liberty.
Pareto defined utility ('ophelimity') in the following way:
"In political economy, the word utility has come to mean something quite different
from what it can mean in everyday language. Thus morphine is not useful, in the
ordinary sense of the word, since it is harmful to the morphine addict; on the other
hand it is economically useful to him, even though it is unhealthfid, because it
satisfies one of his wants.... It is essential not to use the same word to mean different
19 James Tarrant (1991) argues that the existence of 'higher and lower pleasures' is inconsistent with
utilitarianism.
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things
	
In our Cours we propose to designate economic utility by the word
ophelirnity"2°
I have used this passage to illustrate the similarity between Pareto's notion of
ophelimity (utility) and Mill's notion of content. Pareto's acceptance of preferences
as brute facts is made unambiguously clear by his use of a preference for a substance
which is injurious to the individual's health (morphine). The fact that the morphine
is harming the individual is irrelevant, it is the fact that he derives benefit from it, for
whatever reason, that is important. Pareto also notes in the above that he is choosing
to use a different word for utility, `ophelimity', for precisely that reason. Pareto
wants to reinforce the idea that whether or not an object is "useful" in any objective
sense is independent of whether an individual derives utility from it. The latter
depends solely on the individual's tastes or preferences. In other words, Economic
utility is want (or preference) satisfaction where the want stems from the individual.
The want itself is not questioned, thus morphine can be economically useful even
though it may be harmful. It is interesting to compare Pareto's words above with
Mill's "better to be Socrates" passage which I quoted in section one:
"It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied; better to be a human
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied"
The implication of Pareto's view that "utility is preference satisfaction" is that it is
better to be a satisfied fool as opposed to dissatisfied Socrates. This is because he
would make no distinction between the preferences of Socrates and the preferences
20 Pareto, Vilfredo (1971), pill.
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of the fool. There is no hierarchy of preferences, the analytical framework is that of
mono-utility, and thus no distinction between utility and content. The implications
of the view that utility is content are as follows:
1. The development of an individual's utility function is not valued; the set of
preferences of the individual after, say, education is regarded as no better than
his preferences prior to education. Liberty, as the necessary condition for
preference development, is thus not valued.
2. The change in the individual's utility function, where it reflects the individual
becoming more critical as above, is actually viewed as reducing an individual's
utility (ophelimity) because his preferences are less fully satisfied, he is less
'content'. Thus, on this view, it is better to be a satisfied fool. The passage
quoted above is an example of a case where there is clear conflict between
maximisation of 'content' and maximisation of utility. In distinguishing
between 'content' and 'happiness', Mill was effectively differentiating his
notion of utility from previous more simplistic notions such as Bentham's. Such
differentiation was necessary in order to justify individual development.
"It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the
greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will
always feel that any happiness that he can look for, as the world is constituted, is
imperfect."21
21 Mill, p10.
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In this passage, Mill brings out more explicitly the conflict between developing one's
preferences (one's 'capacities of enjoyment') and maximising content. Development
of an individual's preferences will mean that it is less likely that he will be able to
satisfy them. In order for such preference development to be consistent with utility
maximisation, therefore, the notion of utility must be distinguished from the
satisfaction of existing preferences.
IV Paretian and Paternalistic Elements of Mill's Notion of Utility
This section first defines what is meant by Paretian value judgements (using Peacock
and Rowley's definition) 22 and moves on to discuss the extent to which Mill's notion
of utility is consistent with these value judgements.
Both Mill's notion of content and Pareto's notion of ophelimity relate to the
individual. Paretianism, although it embodies a value judgement which relates to
individuals, essentially relates to the welfare of society. I am using the term 'a
Paretian' to refer to an individual who accepts the following three value judgements,
as defined by Rowley and Peacock23:
(i) Social welfare is solely a function of the welfare of the individuals who make up
society:
W = W( U1, U2, U3,••••,US)
W represents the welfare of society, Ui the utility of each individual member of
society.
22 Rowley, C.K and Peacock, A.T (1975), p8.
23 Rowley and Peacock (1975), p8.
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Op "An individual is to be considered the best judge of his own welfare (which is
viewed entirely subjectively). No individual may impose his/her preferences on any
other individual, no matter how well founded those preferences may appear in terms
of prevailing ethical standards."
(iii) The third 'value assumption' is the notion of a Pareto improvement, that social
welfare is increased if the utility of any individual increases and that of no other
individual decreases.
Value assumption (ii) above can support both content maximisation and utility
maximisation (using the terms content and utility in Mill's sense). Referring to the
former first, consider a society consisting of fools and intellectuals. Let UF denote
the utility function (individual preferences) of a fool and Ui the utility function of an
intellectual. The fool (I am assuming all have identical utility functions) derives
utility from any kind of sensual pleasure; the intellectual's utility function contains
additional arguments, he also derives utility from exercising his mind, from reading
and reflection. The social welfare function would take the following form:
W = W(UF, U1) (I have listed only one fool and one intellectual for simplicity)
Adopting the social welfare function above, a Paretian would view a social state
which increased the amount of sensual indulgence for some/all fools as increasing
social welfare. This is because the fools' preferences would be more fully satisfied,
thus each would view himself as better off (the utility of fools would have increased
according to value assumption (ii) above). Thus social welfare would have increased
(according to (i)). Given some social state x, another social state y in which some
fools are more content and no individual is less content would, therefore, be regarded
as better than x by a Paretian.
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However, it is precisely this value assumption (ii) which is used by Mill to justify the
preference hierarchy itself:
"no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would
be an ignoramus.... even though they should be persuaded that the fool is better
satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs 	 Whoever supposes that this
preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness (utility) confounds the two very
different ideas, of happiness (utility) and content. "2 4
Value assumption (ii) is implicit in the italicised phrase above. Once he has
developed his preferences (higher faculties), the individual prefers to have developed
preferences (higher faculties), but less content. In other words, the individual
considers herself to be better off after such preference development. Thus value
assumption (ii) above can also be used to support utility maximisation in Mill's
sense. Referring to the example above. Consider an initial social state x and another,
y, where a fool has developed his preferences via, say, education. Although his
preferences are now less fully satisfied, he prefers his situation post-preference
development and, therefore, according to (ii), his utility must have increased. Value
assumption (i) (or (iii)) then implies that social welfare must have increased relative
to the initial state x. In this case, utility maximisation in Mill's sense is consistent
with Paretian value judgements.
24 mill, p9.
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But whether or not Mill's notion of utility is consistent with Paretian value
judgements depends entirely on whether each individual prefers to have developed
'higher faculties' but less satisfaction to lower faculties and more satisfaction. In
other words, his argument is dependent on this fact. The problem with Mill's
argument is that there is no a priori justification for the preference hierarchy, other
than his assumption that fools would consider their utility to have increased if they
transformed their preferences via, say, education. This might not be the case in fact.
Mill is essentially assuming that all human beings will hold the same meta-
preferences (preferences over preferences), this is my interpretation of the italicised
phrase above. An obvious criticism would be the fact that some individuals would
be able to develop their higher faculties with more ease than others. One would not
expect all humans to have the same individual preferences, why should one expect
each to have the same meta-preferences? For Mill, these meta-preferences define
"what it is to be human" which enables him to distinguish between different sets of
preferences whilst remaining a utilitarian (or a Paretian). Although he is ranking
preferences, the way that he ranks the individual preferences themselves is consistent
with the Paretian value assumption (ii) above in that it reflects each individual's view
of his welfare. In terms of Sen's meta-preferences idea, the morality behind the
preference hierarchy is utilitarian25.
Mill's utilitarian justification for individual liberty is based on the existence of a
preference hierarchy, where individual liberty is the means to increasing utility by
enabling individuals to develop their 'higher faculties'. But the utilitarian argument
for individual liberty is dependent on individuals choosing to develop their higher
25 See note 17 above.
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faculties as opposed to what could be thought of as their lower faculties. It is
freedom to develop one's higher faculties which is good, not freedom to develop
one's lower faculties. If individuals chose some pursuit which instead transformed
their preferences in a negative way, then one could use the hierarchical utility
argument to justify denying individuals liberty. The argument which was used in the
(1961) attempt to ban the book "Lady Chatterley's Lover" can be interpreted in
precisely this way. Quoting from the trial itself:
"the charge is that the tendency of the book is to corrupt and deprave. The charge is
not that the tendency of the book is either to shock or disgust."26
The defence defined, 'to deprave and corrupt' in the following way:
"to deprave and corrupt obviously involves a change of character leading the reader
to do something wrong that he would not otherwise have done."27
In terms of preference theory, to corrupt and deprave is to transform an individual's
preferences, whereas the terms 'shock' and 'disgust' are reactions which are
dependant on existing preferences, but leave the preferences themselves unchanged.
There is clearly a hierarchical utility framework implicit in this argument, but in this
case individual liberty (freedom to read the book) enables the individual to transform
his preferences such that he becomes worse off Thus in this case, transformation of
individual preferences is being used as an argument against individual liberty. Mill
does not entertain the possibility of liberty facilitating such a negative transformation
of preferences, but he does deal with the objection that those who have supposedly
26 Rolph, C.H. (1961), p13.
27 Ibid., p29.
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developed their higher faculties are sometimes "tempted" to choose the lower
pleasures. His response is as follows:
"Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they
have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to
inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are
either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any
longer capable of enjoying."28
Having developed one's higher faculties, one needs to exercise them, otherwise one's
preferences will degenerate to the lower ones one had before:
"capacity for the nobler feelings (higher faculties) is in most natures a very tender
plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance"29
These passages bring out the hidden element of paternalism in Mill's notion of
utility. Each individual is free to choose for himself, but if he chooses an 'inferior
pleasure', then it is not said to reflect an underlying preference, it merely reflects the
fact that he has not nurtured (to adopt the plant metaphor used by Mill) his higher
preferences, but allowed them to degenerate. The individual who has previously
developed his higher preferences, but then chooses to allow his preferences to
transform back to those of a fool as he chooses sensual over intellectual gratification
is deemed to be 'addicted' to lower pleasures rather than expressing a deliberate
28	 •Mill, J.S. (1993), pll.
29 Ibid.
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preference. By dismissing the individual's own preference as 'addiction', Mill is
imposing his own view of the welfare of individuals, thus violating value assumption
(ii) above. Mill is not prepared to allow for the possibility of some individuals
preferring being satisfied fools to dissatisfied Socrates.
V Analysis of the Paretian Liberal Paradox in the Light of Mill's
Notion of Utility
The Paretian liberal paradox arises when trying to derive a ranking of social states
which reflects the welfare of society (social preferences) from individual rankings of
social states (individual preferences). It is not Sen's particular formulations of
Paretianism and liberalism that Mill might object to, but the whole social choice
framework per se. The mechanistic idea of a social welfare function that 'moves'
from a set of individual preferences of all members of society to a ranking of
alternatives that can be considered to represent the welfare of society is at variance
with Mill's idea that certain sets of preferences are 'better' than others and thus with
Mill's distinction between preference satisfaction ('content') and utility. It is a
mono-utility framework, i.e. there is no preference hierarchy, and the notion of utility
is synonymous with preference satisfaction. Sen translates Paretian value judgements
into the condition that a social state which is unanimously preferred to another by
individual members of society is regarded as better for society. Thus social welfare
is evaluated solely according to existing preferences. Sen's formulation of liberalism
rests on the assumption that individuals will exercise choice in accordance with their
preferences. Mill would accept this, but it ignores the more subtle role of liberty in
encouraging individuals to question and develop the preferences themselves and thus
increase their utility. Within a mono-utility framework, the Paretian liberal paradox
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is merely indicative of a conflict between content maximisation and individual
liberty.
Within a hierarchical preference framework, however, the transformation of
individual preferences is viewed as increasing individual utility, because utility is no
longer synonymous with the satisfaction of existing preferences. Liberty is the
means by which individuals transform their preferences into ones which they
ultimately regard as better (increase their utility). The process of exercising choice
will encourage individuals to become more critical, they will ultimately develop their
'higher faculties' (their minds, their intellect) and regard themselves as better off,
even if these new preferences are less fully satisfied. This is essentially how Mill
characterises human beings: they will prefer enlightenment to ignorance even if such
enlightenment means that they are less content. According to this argument,
individual liberty is consistent with maximisation of utility (and Paretian value
judgements).
However, there are fundamental problems with this argument:
The notion of utility itself has hidden elements of paternalism. It is Mill's view that
individuals will prefer to be critical thinkers, educated individuals, as opposed to
fools who pursue sensual pleasure. But individuals are not at liberty to take a
different view 30. An individual who decides to abandon the exercise of his mind and
instead become indolent and choose pushpin over poetry has his preference
dismissed as 'addiction', i.e. there is a sense in which Mill is imposing his own view
30 This point was discussed at length in section three.
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of individual welfare on individuals. Thus Mill has only been able to make his
argument for individual liberty consistent with utilitarianism (maximisation of
utility) by introducing a 'hidden' element of paternalism into the notion of utility
itself. The element of paternalism is 'hidden' in the sense that it comes in the guise
of Paretianism:
"no intelligent being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person an ignoramus,
no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they
should be persuaded that the fool is better satisfied with their lot than they are with
theirs "31
In claiming that it is the individual who views having developed 'higher faculties' as
better, Mill can argue that his utilitarian theory is entirely consistent with the idea
that each individual is the best judge of his own welfare (Paretian value assumption
(ii) in section three). Thus the argument is dependent on Mill's view of human
nature which may or may not be true.
Further, Mill's utilitarian justification for individual liberty is contingent on
individuals using that liberty in a particular way. If individuals were to use their
liberty to develop their 'lower faculties', then this could be used as an argument to
deny individuals liberty because in this case liberty would be making them worse off.
The argument which was used to in the 1961 attempt to ban the book 'Lady
Chatterley's Lover' can be interpreted in this way. This highlights a conflict between
maximisation of Mill's notion of utility and individual liberty as opposed to conflict
between Paretianism and liberalism, because in this case conflict stems from the fact
31 Mill, J.S. p9.
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that individuals' view of their own welfare clearly differs from the view taken by
Mill. But the argument against 'Lady Chatterley's Lover' also illustrates how
Paretianism does not necessarily imply the preference hierarchy identified by Mill:
Individuals could choose to become corrupted (for example by reading Lady
Chatterley's Lover) and then regard themselves as better off after this transformation
of their preferences.
VI Influence that the Thought of J.S. Mill has had on the Literature
This section briefly considers the way that the ideas of Mill have influenced debate
on the paradox within the social choice literature. It is the importance that Mill
placed on individual autonomy that contributed to the view that the social choice
framework was inadequate to represent rights. This was because the social welfare
function merely ranks outcomes and thus does not consider the process by which they
came about. Dissatisfaction with the social choice framework was expressed in the
early 1970s by Peacock and Rowley32 and then Sugden:
"Sen's theorem, and the work of most commentators on this theorem, are constructed
within the framework of a theory of social choice that rests on presuppositions that
make impossible any discussion of liberty. All attempts to formalise liberalism
within this framework are thus doomed to failure.."33
Focus on Mill's idea of liberty lends support to this idea that social choice theory was
inadequate to address the Paretian liberal question because of Mill's idea of the
importance of individual autonomy to Mill. Consideration of the liberty issue made
32 Rowley and Peacock, 1972 and 1975.
33 Sugden, Robert (1978).
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game theory much more attractive, given that it analyses the process of individual
choice34.
Thus Mill's ideas on liberty could be viewed as being important in bringing about
this rejection of social choice theory as capable of incorporating ideas about
individual rights. The problem, however, is that in doing so most writers overlook
the fact that Mill is prepared to admit only one fundamental value judgement, utility.
Most writers do not discuss the underlying view of social welfare in advocating game
forms to represent liberty as opposed to preference formulations. Those who do (e.g.
Sugden, Barry) argue for absolute rights with reference to indirect (or rule)
utilitarianism. Indirect utilitarianism involves evaluation of the rights or rules with
reference to utility considerations. Individual rights are assessed according to
whether or not they are in the interest of utility as a rule, in other words it does not
involve consideration of a particular case. There are similarities with a contractarian
approach to social welfare here in that we are not ranking outcomes, but evaluating
rights or rules. However, it is important to note that the rights or rules are being
evaluated with reference to social (and not individual) welfare. Sugden comes to this
conclusion because he recognises the importance of autonomy in Mill's notion of
individual good and thus argues that, in the case of Mill, "Rights matter because they
are a means of securing the autonomy of individuals" 35 On this argument, the Sen
paradox does not present a problem. To try to rank outcomes in this particular case
is not meaningful because we wish to consider such rights in general. The Sen
paradox would only present a problem to an act utilitarian where each act is judged
34 The debate between use of game theory and social choice theory to analyse the paradox largely
occurred during the 1980s and is discussed fully in chapter six.
35 Sugden (1993) p.140.
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according to its effect on overall utility.
Barry also argues for the right to liberty with reference to indirect utilitarianimsm:
"Mill's 'simple principle' is compatible with a very indirect sort of utilitarianism.
The point that matters here is that a conflict between a liberal system of rights and
the Pareto principle can arise only if (a) every single act is to be assessed according
to the Pareto principle, and if (b) enforcement is considered to be an appropriate
response to infractions of it. And it is made quite clear by Mill that this is exactly
what he wants to deny..."36
The above passage provides a good summary of the way that indirect utilitarianism
resolves liberty/utility conflict: the only way for a utilitarian to be able to support
meaningful individual rights is if the rights need not maximise utility in each specific
case. However, Barry separates the issue of social welfare from how rights should be
assigned which is not consistent with a utilitarian ethic:
"...there are three things to be distinguished: what constitutes a good state of the
world (this is what a social welfare function should tell us); what rights individuals
should be granted... .and what morally speaking individuals have a duty to do"37
The above distinction is not consistent with Mill's acceptance of utility as the
fundamental value. It represents an approach to rights which is more characteristic
of Nozick than Mill, i.e. the idea that individual rights identify some private sphere
which is not subject to social evaluation. It contradicts Mill's assertion:
36 Barry (1986) p.29.
37 Ibid., p.30.
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"To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to
defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can
give him no other reason than general utility"38
I am not arguing against the validity of this indirect utilitarian argument, I am
arguing that it overlooks many interesting features of Mill's distinctive notion of
utility. Further, the conclusion to be drawn from it is that the Sen paradox is
uninteresting - that it does not matter, and it is in this sense that the conclusion of the
indirect utilitarianism argument is misleading. Far from being an isolated
uninteresting case, the Sen paradox serves to highlight interesting and important
features of Mill's utilitarianism.
VII Liberty and Social Welfare
The idea of social welfare implicit in Rousseau, it has been argued, is very similar to
the idea of a social welfare function. The social welfare function involves the
construction of a ranking of alternatives which is representative of the social good.
The view of social welfare taken by Mill is utilitarian, however, this section argues
that, given the importance that he places on individual development as a means of
increasing utility, to think of it as being represented as a static ranking of alternatives
is misleading.
This chapter has presented Mill's idea of utility as a dynamic concept: The process of
individual choice has a fundamentally important role to play in enabling individuals
to develop their preferences and thus make themselves better off:
38 Mill, p57.
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"He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has
no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation 	 It is possible that he
might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way	 But what will be
his comparative worth as a human being? "3 9
This emphasises the point that exercise of choice is imperative if we are to realise
our full potential as human beings. Underlying Mill's whole argument for liberty
and why it is consistent with utility is his idea of what it is to be human - that humans
are capable of criticising and reasoning and thus have the potential to increase utility
via the act of choice. The idea of merely taking a set of existing preferences and
maximising satisfaction (content) is far too limiting because it ignores the potential
that the exercise of choice has for making us better off. Thus individual utility is not
a static concept. Rowley and Peacock support this view of Mill's characterisation of
what it is to be human, but suggest that liberty is of value in itself:
"This fundamental notion that the essence of humanity lies in the capacity to
choose... ...implies that individuals must be granted the widest possible freedom of
choice... if they are to develop their capacities.... The essence of liberalism is freedom,
therefore, not as an instrument, or even as a human preference, but as an ethical
value in itself...."4°
The italicised phrase above is illuminating in highlighting the fact that Mill's whole
reconciliation of the liberty/utility issue is dependant on his view of humans: to
realise utility in the fullest sense, it is necessary that individuals develop their
preferences hence the need for liberty. Thus liberty is instrumental in securing
maximum utility for individuals. There is still only one fundamental value and this
39	 •Mill, p.126-127. Italics added.
40 Rowley and Peacock (1975) p79.
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is the point that is invariably lost in discussions of Mill, as it is in the above, despite
the illuminating opening phrase.
Mill's ideas on liberty are almost invariably used to argue for a procedural
formulation of rights, e.g. game forms, where the social welfare function is absent.
This leaves unanswered the question, "where does the social welfare function go?".
Despite Mill's insistence on the importance of liberty, it is a question that needs to be
addressed, given his adherence to utilitarianism. Peacock and Rowley, however,
discuss this social welfare issue:
".... liberals in the tradition of Mill are not convinced of the existence of objective
immutable truth, but believe that a good society is one that is uncertain of its truths
and dedicates itself, not to an ideal, but to an eternal search. For liberals, fallibility
and the right to err are viewed as necessary corollaries to the capacity for self-
improvement..."41
This passage brings out the difference between the approaches to social welfare of
Rousseau and Mill. The social welfare function fits well with Rousseau's idea of
social welfare because it tells us which is the best social outcome. Given the
emphasis placed on the process of individual development by Mill, however, the idea
of an "eternal search" for the social good is helpful because it serves to emphasise
the fact that the social good for Mill is constantly changing with the changing values
of individuals. The idea of a single best outcome, which we have with a social
welfare function, is more appropriate when utility is synonymous with preference
H Ibid.
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satisfaction. However, it is important to keep in mind that a necessary implication of
Mill's adherence to utilitarianism is that there is in theory a socially best outcome, it
is that outcome which produces the "greatest utility of the greatest number". Mill
links the process of individual development to social welfare in his essay On Liberty:
"In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more
valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There
is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the
units there is more in the mass which is composed of them"42
The italicised phrase above obviously relates to his utilitarian approach to social
welfare, that the welfare of society is the sum of the welfares of individuals. Thus
maximum social utility requires individual liberty.
VIII Conclusion
In 1970, Amartya Sen set out an impossibility theorem which indicated that there is
an underlying conflict between Paretian and liberal value judgements. Whether or
not the importance of individual liberty in John Stuart Mill's (1861) notion of utility
implicitly resolves this Paretian liberal conflict is dependant on the extent to which
his notion of utility is consistent with Paretian value judgements. Mill makes an
important distinction between the satisfaction of existing preferences (content) and
utility. Individual liberty is the necessary condition for individual preference
development. Such preference development increases individual utility, but may
reduce content. Thus, within this analytical framework, individual liberty could
conflict with content maximisation, but is consistent with utility maximisation.
42 Mill, p.131.
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"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a
different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. "43
Mill's notion of utility only retains the Paretian idea that the individual is the best
judge of his own welfare if his view of human nature is correct, that the individual
will prefer being educated but possibly less satisfied (`Socrates dissatisfied') to the
time previously when she was a satisfied fool. This view enables Mill to argue that
the individual has more utility once she is educated (i.e. after developing her
preferences) because she prefers this situation. The fool has no experience of being
educated, thus if he claims to prefer being a satisfied fool to being educated, one
cannot infer that he has more utility as a fool than he would have if he were educated
(because he only knows his 'own side of the question'). If Mill is correct in his
assertion that human beings will prefer preference development to existing
preference satisfaction, then the Paretian idea of the individual as the best judge of
his own welfare is retained. If, however, Mill is wrong and, in fact, individuals do
not prefer such preference development, then there is an element of paternalism in
his notion of utility. Thus ultimately, whether one can accept the role of individual
liberty in Mill's notion of utility as a resolution of Paretian liberal conflict is
dependant on whether one can accept his view of humans as individuals who prefer
preference development to existing preference satisfaction.
Mill's utilitarian theory could be viewed as an indictment of the utility theory of
Bentham, or the idea of utility as simple, unquestioning, preference satisfaction. Mill
43	 • J.S (1993a), p10.
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wanted to emphasise the role of enlightenment, of opening individuals to new ideas,
in improving their welfare. The following discussion of the value of originality
taken from his essay 'On Liberty' is invaluable in understanding why he
distinguishes his notion of utility from the satisfaction of a given set of preferences:
"...in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action, though no one says that
it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think that they can do very well
without it. Unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at. Originality is the one
thing that unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of They cannot see what it is to do
for them: how should they? If they could see what it would do for them, it would not
be originality. The first service that originality has to render them, is that of opening
their eyes: which being once fully done, they would have a chance of being
themselves original. Meanwhile... .let them be modest enough to believe that there is
something still left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in
need of originality, the less they are conscious of the want. "44
Mill's argument can be summarised as, individuals prefer having their eyes opened
(once opened) but when their eyes are closed, they have no desire to open them.
This implies that they are not best judges of their own welfare when their eyes are
closed thus violating Paretian value assumption (ii). In the light of the passage
above, one could view the Paretian liberal paradox as highlighting the danger of
44 Mill, J.S., p.133-134.
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accepting Paretian value assumption (ii) in its entirety, that individuals are always the
best judges of their own welfare. If this value assumption is accepted and combined
with the utilitarian social objective of maximising the sum of these individual
welfares, it could lead to denying individuals the opportunity to develop and
transform their preferences (in denying them individual liberty). Without this liberty,
they would be content, but would remain with their eyes closed, in blissful ignorance
of how much better off they could have been had they been given the liberty to open
them.
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIAL WELFARE IN A CONTRA CTARIAN
SETTING: BUCHANAN AND RAWLS
"...rules that constrain sociopolitical interactions must be evaluated ultimately in
terms of their capacity to promote the separate purposes of all persons in the polity.
Do these rules permit individuals to pursue their own private ends, in a context
where securing these ends involves interdependence, in such a way that each person
secures maximal attainment of his goals consistent with the equal liberty of others to
do the same?"
"On the contract view, the grounds of liberty are completely separate from existing
preferences. Indeed we may think of the principles of justice as an agreement not to
take into account certain feelings when assessing the conduct of others "2
This chapter focuses on the concept of social welfare in a contractarian setting. Both
Mill and Rousseau start from a pre-determined idea of social welfare, which can be
characterised by some form of social welfare function. Contractarian thought, in
contrast, can be characterised by the idea of a social contract. It is this idea of a
social contract which is the starting point for determining rights rather than some
specific form of social welfare function. Initially, liberty is there, but the concept of
social welfare has yet to be determined. This chapter focuses on where the idea of a
social welfare function fits into a contractarian setting. It also assesses Sen's
'Brennan, G, Buchanan, J.M. (1985) p7-8. Italics added.
2 Rawls, John (1972), p450.
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Paretian liberal paradox in the light of this discussion, and links recent game
theoretic formulations of the paradox to the contractarian thought of Buchanan3.
Introduction: The Contractarian Approach
Social contract theory is generally a theory of the establishment of the State, i.e.
government - the rights that individuals are to have (if any) and the rules by which
they are to be governed. The feature common to all social contract theories is the
idea that the rights of individuals and the rules by which they are governed are to be
established by a contractual agreement (or 'social pact') 4:
"The social pact is...a pact to establish rule. It marks the transition from the 'state of
nature' to the 'civil state'".5
However, one can distinguish between individual contractarian writers with respect
to the following points:
1. The object of the agreement
2. Whether the agreement is actual, tacit or hypothetical.
3. Whether the agreement is individually or socially motivated.
In more general terms, contractarians place value on the process of agreement. There
is no predetermined idea of social welfare, as with utilitarianism. The contractual
agreement could be interpreted as agreement on the form of the social welfare
3 Game theoretic formulations of the paradox are discussed in chapter six. In this chapter, I do not
discuss specific papers, but instead link the approach to social welfare which is implicit in these
resolutions to contractarianism.
4 By 'social contract theories' I am referring to the theory of the State of Hobbes, Locke and
Buchanan. John Rawls also belongs to this tradition, although the purpose of his contract is to agree
on principles of justice rather than a constitution. The particular features of Rawls' theory are
discussed later.
5 Forsyth, Murray (1994), p37.
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function (including agreement on the domain of such a function), or rejection of the
social welfare function altogether. This opening section discusses several different
strands of contractarian thought and explores the implications of differences in
opinion on the points identified above for the notion of social welfare. Given the
quite marked differences in contractarian ideas, this chapter focuses on two
contractarian writers in particular. It considers their particular "brands" of
contractarianism in more depth and explores the implications of their thought for the
interpretation of Sen's Paretian liberal paradox.
One of the earliest writers within the contractarian tradition was Thomas Hobbes.
Hobbes's contract can be viewed as a pragmatic solution to the brute fact that human
beings by nature have a "permanent tendency" towards "violent conflict" 6. This
tendency towards conflict was a direct result of the fact that individuals have
conflicting individual desires and objectives. Such conflict could be viewed as
precipitating the common desire for peace, and thus the unanimous agreement that
individuals should be ruled by a single authority, Leviathan. Thus individuals
surrendered their natural freedom and were subject to rule by Leviathan, the only
right which they retain is their right to self-preservation:
"For Hobbes, the political order was granted full autonomy. It was not the pale
offspring of a higher, spiritual kingdom 	 The political order, for Hobbes, had its
own original roots in the perpetual tendency of human freedom to produce war."7
Another way of interpreting the passage above is that the social contract was
individually motivated, it was not motivated by the idea that there exists some
6 Forsyth, p42.
7 Ibid. p41.
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common good, but the mere fact that, without some form of government to regulate
individual conduct, individuals would be unable to pursue their own separate ends.
What is interesting about the social contract of Hobbes is that, post-contract,
individuals have surrendered their autonomy to some sovereign body which could
suggest the use of some kind of social welfare function to determine outcomes, i.e. a
more organic view of social welfare. However, the subjection of individuals to some
sovereign is necessary on the grounds of individual utility. There is an important
similarity with the modern contractarian ideas of Buchanan in this individual
motivation for Hobbes '5 contract. This is interesting because the initial contract
produces such different results in terms of the constitution: Hobbes was in favour of
a single authority, Buchanan for as much individual freedom as possible and yet the
motivation for the original contractual agreement is the same. (I return to this
similarity later.)
There is also similarity between the social contract of Hobbes and that of Rousseau,
although the similarity here is on a practical rather than a theoretical level. It lies in
the fact that, in the post-contractual situation, individuals are ruled by a sovereign.
However, whereas Hobbes resolves conflict between individual liberty and welfare
by arguing that individuals would unanimously consent to surrender liberty for the
sake of welfare, Rousseau's social contract is more abstract:
"Rousseau's contract is in one sense anything but contractual. Postulated is a pact
between a collectivity considered as a single moral person and each of its members
taken individually. From this it follows that of the two contracting parties it is only
one - the individuals concerned - who could be in breach of the agreement entered
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into. By an altogether different route we arrive therefore at a conclusion that at one
level is similar to that of Hobbes: the social contract gives 'absolute power' to the
sovereign over his subjects."8
The contract element to Rousseau's approach to social welfare is that each individual
consents to be ruled by the general will (the "single moral person" in the above).
However, his contractual agreement is only similar to Hobbes on a practical level,
i.e. individuals are ruled by some sovereign. There are fundamentally important
differences between the two writers with respect to issues of individual and social
welfare. In the case of Rousseau, there is the idea of some identifiable public good at
the outset that, to contractarians like Buchanan, seems anti-contractarian9 . This idea
of public good is in every individual and thus, theoretically, there is no subjection of
individuals to some external power when they consent to be ruled by the general will.
Referring to the possibility of conflict between individual liberty and social welfare,
the general will serves as an analytical device which reconciles individual liberty
with rule by the general will (a kind of social welfare function). It reconciles it at the
individual level. Given the absence of the general will in Hobbes's theory, one could
view Hobbes's state of nature as a state in which there is clear conflict between
individual liberty and individual welfare. It is resolved by individuals surrendering
their liberty and consenting to be ruled by some sovereign which is external to them.
Thus, according to Hobbes's contract, the liberty/welfare conflict is resolved at the
social level (by abandoning individual liberty). Buchanan, however, objects both to
the idea of a common good and to individuals surrendering their liberty to anyone
S Jennings, J. (1994), p118.
9 Buchanan's position on this is discussed below.
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else. Thus his particular 'brand' of contractarianism can be distinguished from both
Hobbes and Rousseau, although there is an interesting similarity between Buchanan
and Hobbes in that the motivation for the initial contractual agreement is
individualistic, it is not based upon the idea of some identifiable common good (or
social welfare function).
It is the clear idea of some identifiable common good, that is in some sense objective
that distinguishes Rousseau from other social contract theorists. His idea of a
general will is in some sense analogous to the idea of a social welfare function. All
issues are subordinate to the general will which is at variance with the value that
contractarians place on individual liberty. This is why Rousseau's approach to social
welfare is dealt with elsewhere, in chapter two.
The rest of this chapter is divided into two parts: part one focuses on the thought of
James Buchanan, and part two on John Rawls. In each case their ideas of individual
and social welfare are discussed and related to debate on the Paretian liberal paradox.
PART I: JAMES BUCHANAN
The key features that distinguish Buchanan's thought from that of some earlier
contractarians are the following:
1. The idea of social good is eschewed, there is only individual good.
2. The initial contractual agreement does not consist of individuals surrendering
their natural liberty entirely, but agreeing to the rules and rights by which they
are to be governed. Thus the State to Buchanan is more minimalist than that
101
envisaged by Rousseau or Hobbes. Such a notion of the state (in a sense)
follows from point one above.
3. Buchanan views hypothetical contractual agreements as a nonsense, the only
meaningful agreements are actual agreements.
I Two Mutually Exclusive Approaches to Social Welfare:
Individualism Versus Collectivism
The Paretian liberal paradox is concerned with establishing an acyclical ranking of
social states which represents the welfare of society for any given set of individual
rankings of these social states. The notion of social welfare is individualistic in the
sense that it is derived solely from the preferences of individuals. Yet it is a ranking
which reflects the welfare of society as a collective. Thus the whole notion of social
welfare embodies both collective and individual notions of rationality. This is at
variance with Buchanan's view of welfare:
"We may adopt the philosophical bases of individualism in which the individual is
the only entity possessing ends or values. In this case no question of social or
collective rationality may be raised. A social value scale as such simply does not
exist. Alternatively, we may adopt some variant of the organic philosophical
assumptions in which the collectivity is an independent entity possessing its own
value ordering. It is legitimate to test the rationality or irrationality of this entity only
against this value ordering."I°
I ° Buchanan, J.M (1954), p116.
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The above passage is taken from a paper in which Buchanan was criticising the
Arrow theorem. It is a requirement of Arrow's theorem that the collective choice
rule generate an ordering of social states, whereas Sen only requires that the
collective choice rule generate an acyclical ranking of social states. The above
criticism, however, applies to Sen's as well as Arrow's theorem since a set of social
preferences is being derived from individual preferences. Each individual has values,
each individual has a set of preferences over end social states. According to
Buchanan's view, quoted above, such an approach would be classified as
individualism. But in social choice theory, there is also a 'social value scale' which is
itself derived from these individual value scales. Interpreting Sen's result in these
terms, Sen is showing that, where this social value scale reflects both Paretian and
liberal value judgements, there will be some configurations of individual preferences
for which such a social value scale does not exist. This is entirely consistent with
Buchanan's view that the existence of a social value scale is inconsistent with an
individualistic approach to social welfare. The Sen result, therefore, presents no
problem. It is based on a view of society as a collection of individuals, not as an
entity in itself, thus the idea of social rationality is meaningless.
But in the case of the Sen paradox, one could argue that the approach taken is
organic on some level since the task that Sen sets himself is to derive a value scale to
be representative of the welfare of society, as a distinct concept:
"any social value scale may be discussed only within an organic framework. Once
this approach is taken, the question as to whether or not the social value scale may be
based on individual values may properly be raised, and the individual orderings of all
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possible social states may be the appropriate starting point in the construction of a
social ordering that is to be based on individual values."
In 1954, when the paper from which this passage is taken was published, Buchanan
did not object to the theoretical construction of a social value scale from individual
values, provided one accepted that the approach taken was organic as opposed to
individualistic. Buchanan did, however, object to the evaluation of a choice process
which was individualistic on the basis of such a social value ordering since this
constituted a confusion of the two philosophical approaches, of collectivism and
individualism. A choice mechanism such as the market arrives at social states as a
result of individuals exercising choice independently. It is an individual choice
framework and, therefore, we may only raise the question of whether decisions are
individually rational:
"..the market does not call upon individuals to make a decision collectively at all.
This being the case, market choice is just as consistent as, and no more consistent
than, the individual choice of which it is composed."12
On this view, it is only appropriate to evaluate a collective, but not an individual
decision in terms of a social value scale. In the case of the Sen paradox, the value
judgement that individual rights are desirable is indicative of acceptance of
individualism, thus creation of a social value scale would not be regarded as
meaningful. This idea is related to Buchanan's dissatisfaction with the evaluation of
end states independently of the process by which those end states came about:
" Ibid. p116-117, italics not in original. This passage relates to the Arrow problem and, therefore,
refers to a social ordering rather than an acyclical ranking as is required in the Sen problem. But it can
equally well be applied to the Sen problem.
12 Ibid. p122.
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"It becomes an empty exercise to evaluate rules independently of the outcomes that
are predicted to emerge under their operation. It should be equally empty to evaluate
imagined social states without consideration of the structure of rights, or rules, that
may be expected to generate them."13
The approach standard in welfare economics is to evaluate allocation mechanisms, in
this case rights structures, in terms of whether or not they bring about social
outcomes which are desirable. But implicit in this is the assumption that individuals
are indifferent about the mechanism, the process by which the outcome came about.
This in itself is a value judgement, one which Buchanan rejects.
Buchanan, however, does not make the point in quite this way. In a more recent
(1995) paper, Buchanan comments on rights themselves:
"in any social setting, individuals have rights, by which I mean that individuals
retain control over actions along at least some minimal set of dimensions of
behavioural adjustment. Once this elementary proposition is accepted as a positive
description of social reality, the logical fallacy involved in any analyses of choice
among social states stands clearly expo5ed."14
The first italicised phrase is a statement about what occurs in fact, it is a description
of 'social reality'. There is no logical fallacy involved in an evaluation of which
social states are socially desirable because the latter involves value judgements as
opposed to facts. In other words, any 'social value scale' should be independent of
which social states will come about in fact ('social reality'). Buchanan's dispute
13 Buchanan, J.M. (1995), p147. Italics not in original.
14 Buchanan, James M., p142.
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stems from the fact that he attaches value to the rights themselves. It is not the fact
that the rights are 'social reality', but that the rights themselves are also valued.
The whole notion of social welfare needs reassessing in a contractarian context. In
the case of a consequentilist ethic such as utilitarianism, social welfare is evaluated
with reference to outcomes. But where value is attached to the process, then the
construction of a ranking of outcomes is not sufficient to represent the welfare of
society. What does the social welfare function look like in a contractarian context?
It cannot merely be a ranking of end states as it is in the case of the Sen problem.
We can conclude the following in respect to the normative social welfare function. It
is rejected, on this view, for two reasons:
1. The outcome which is deemed to be "best" by such a function may not be
feasible, it may not emerge under any set of "political rules".
2. "one cannot properly evaluate outcomes normatively unless one has information
as to how the outcomes came about....process is intrinsically of normative
relevance."15
It is Buchanan's view that outcomes cannot be separated from the process by which
they came about that implies that a conventional social welfare function cannot
possibly serve the role which it is intended to - to determine which outcome is
socially best. Further, the whole notion of social good is not consistent with his
methodological individualism, the idea that individuals are the sole sources of value,
15 Ibid. p17.
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this is discussed further in the section on his particular 'brand' of contractarianism.
II Buchanan's View of the Contractarian Paradigm
Buchanan's discussion of the `contractarian vision' 16 is illuminating since the
definition implicitly excludes several other important 'brands' of contractarianism.
"The contractarian derives all value from individual participants in the community
and rejects externally defined sources of value, including "natural rights"17
The social contract of Locke and Nozick is ruled out by this definition, since these
writers envisage a social contract which is based on natural rights, and also that of
Rousseau since his is based on the idea of a general will (despite Rousseau's
assertion that it is the will of each individual). Of early contractarian writers he
aligns most closely with Hobbes because, for Hobbes, there was no 'higher'
justification for the social contract, its purpose was merely to prevent war.
According to Buchanan, individuals establish a state by unanimous agreement, and
"there is no resort to any source of value external to the expressed preferences of
individuals who join together in political community. The state does not emerge to
protect "natural rights".. ."Social welfare" cannot be defined independently, since, as
such, it cannot exist." 18 In other words, the rights or rules which are agreed on are
agreed because they serve the separate interest of each individual. This position can
be contrasted from that of Locke's where the right to self-preservation was viewed as
16 Brennan and Buchanan, chapter two, p19-32.
17 Ibid., p21.
18 Ibid.,p22.
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a duty to God. The social contract was necessary because it was easier to carry out
that duty in the political state as opposed to the state of nature. The origin of
Nozick's natural rights is less clear, but the idea of natural rights which we possess
as human beings is there nonetheless.
The initial contractual agreement for Buchanan is agreement on rules and rights. The
process of agreement of these rules is discussed in detail in The Calculus of
Consent 19 . Buchanan argues that a unanimous agreement on rules is possible, given
the fact that there is uncertainty with regard to the final outcome thus it is very
difficult for any individual or group to identify his own separate interest. He
dismisses Rawls' veil of ignorance as "an idealised normative construction"20 ,
although recognises the clear similarity between the actual agreement on rules that he
envisages and choice of rights in Rawls' original position:
"To the extent that a person faced with constitutional choice remains uncertain as to
what his position will be under separate choice options, he will tend to agree on
arrangements that might be called "fair" in the sense that patterns of outcomes
generated under such arrangements will be broadly acceptable, regardless of where
the participant will be located in such outcomes"21
For Buchanan, instead of being ignorant of their situation, individuals are uncertain
as to how any given rule will affect them and thus it is uncertainty as opposed to
ignorance that implies that rules will be unanimously agreed to. However, the
19 Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
2° Brennan and Buchanan, p30.
21 Ibid.
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Rawlsian contractual agreement is hypothetical given that individuals do, in reality,
have an awareness of their situation in society.
For Buchanan, there is no single common good, only the separate goods of
individuals. Thus he clearly distinguishes his position from the position taken by
Rousseau, that there is also an identifiable common good which is the common good
of each as a member of the community. He opposes such an idea because "the
paradigm is "organic" in that it embodies a definition of "good" in application to
the whole community of persons rather than to individual members. In such a
definition, however, there need be no crude postulation of some organic unit - for
example "the state" or "society". Individuals may still be reckoned to be the ultimate
units of consciousness... The "good" defined in application to the community
remains, nonetheless, supraindividual because individuals cannot question its
independent existence." 22
The above is a perfect description of the idea of social good envisaged by Rousseau -
'individuals may still be reckoned to be the ultimate units of consciousness' and yet
there is a clearly identifiable social good. The above also contains elements of the
idea of a social welfare function. It is Buchanan's rejection of such an idea of social
good that distinguishes his 'social choice' of rights and rules from other writers
considered in this thesis such as Rousseau, Mill and Rawls. The absence of any kind
of social welfare function is also the fundamental parallel between his ideas and the
approach implicit in some of the modern resolutions of the Sen paradox. On
22 Ibid., p41.
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Buchanan's view, the idea of a social welfare function is anticontractarian since it
presupposes some notion of common good, irrespective of how this notion is arrived
at.
"The contractarian-constitutionalist perspective is almost necessarily
nonconsequentialist and deontological. Evaluative criteria must be applied to rules
or processes rather than to end states or results, at least in any direct sense. As such
there is no means of evaluating any end state because there is no external standard or
scale through which it can be "valued'"23
The above does not preclude consideration of the possible set of outcomes when
evaluating any given set of rights/rules. Indeed individuals will consider possible
outcomes, but can agree on the rules, because the outcome will be uncertain at the
time of deciding the rules. The motivation is individual not social (although this
does not preclude any individual from deriving utility from the well being of others).
Given these views on individual welfare and the rejection of a social welfare
function type view of social welfare, the original Sen problem would not concern
Buchanan, it would merely be viewed as an irrelevant abstraction. Buchanan is not
interested in the question of identifying a socially best social state, firstly, because he
rejects the whole notion of a socially best outcome and, secondly, because such an
outcome may turn out to be infeasible, given assignments of individual rights.
Buchanan is, however, interested in the social choice of rights and rules, but this
social choice is to be the outcome of interaction between individuals, each of whom
23 Ibid., pll.
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seeks to maximise utility. He describes the process of agreeing on rules as analogous
to the process of trade in the market:
"In politics, at the most general level, the result of "trade" among persons will be a
set of agreed-on rules rather than a well defined imputation of goods among separate
individuals"24
It is in this sense that my reference to a social choice of rights and rules is
inappropriate, given that it is the product of individual interaction where each
individual pursues his own private ends. Buchanan's view of individuals as the sole
sources of value rules out the idea of any social welfare function even if it is the
socially best rights structure that that function seeks to identify. Thus the idea of a
social welfare function is meaningless, but the notion of Pareto optimality is not.
Pareto optimality can be accepted as desirable on individual grounds. The fact that
game theory analyses individual interaction implies that the modern reformulations
of the Sen problem are meaningful to Buchanan's contractarianism, whereas the
absence of game theory in the original formulation implies that this is not. Thus
consideration of Buchanan's ideas serves to highlight the fact that modern
formulations of the paradox address a different problem25.
Buchanan would have two objections to the approach to social welfare taken by Sen:
1	 It rests on a notion of social welfare (social rationality) as depending entirely on
individual welfare (individual rationality). On Buchanan's view, either there is
some organic notion of society to which we can attribute a ranking of social
states or the welfare of society is merely the welfare of individuals who make up
24 Ibid., p25.
25 I discuss this point later.
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society. The two approaches are mutually exclusive, i.e. it does not make sense
to derive some ranking of social states which reflects the welfare of the
collective (society) from rankings of social states which reflect the welfare of
individuals. Buchanan favours an individualistic approach, i.e. there is no notion
of social welfare in the Sen sense, only the welfare of separate individuals.
2 In conventional social choice theory (and thus the Paretian liberal paradox) the
individual preferences (and thus the social preferences) are given over end
states, i.e. with no reference to the process (rights structure) by which these end
states came about. Implicit in this is the assumption that individuals are
indifferent to the process by which social states are attained. Buchanan rejects
this assumption.
III The Link Between Buchanan, Hobbes and Game Theoretic
Formulations of Paretian Liberal Conflict26
One of the key prevailing features of Buchanan's work is the absence of any kind of
social welfare function and a reluctance to evaluate outcomes independently of the
process by which those outcomes came about. In this sense, Buchanan's
contractarianism is the antithesis of the ideas of Rousseau. Outcomes are evaluated
with reference to individual, not social, welfare. The purpose of the initial
contractual agreement is not to agree to some social welfare function, but to agree to
the rules by which individuals are to be governed:
26 Game theoretic formulations are discussed in chapter 6.
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"The same individuals, with the same motivations and capacities, will interact to
generate quite different aggregate outcomes under differing sets of rules, with quite
different implications for the well-being of every participant."27
There are two points to be noted with respect to the above passage: Buchanan
stresses the role of individual interaction in generating final outcomes, and reference
is made to the well being of separate individuals rather than the well being of society
under different sets of rules. Further, Buchanan makes reference to Hobbes in
arguing for the need for rules which suggests that the rationale for rules is
individually rather than socially motivated:
"We require rules in society because, without them, life would indeed be "solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short"... .Rules define the private spheres within which each
of us can carry on our own activities"28
It is the stress that Buchanan places on individual interaction within given rights and
rules that puts his analysis of society and social outcomes in line with the game
theory interpretations of the Paretian liberal paradox:
"The prisoners' dilemma interaction is highly simplified, but it does contain in its
structure most of the elements required for an understanding of the central problems
27 Brennan and Buchanan (1985), pl.
28 Ibid.,.p3.
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of the social order, those of reconciling the behavior of separately motivated persons
so as to generate patterns of outcomes that are tolerable to all participants" .29
From the above, one can interpret modern game theory formulations of Paretian
liberal conflict. In the original Sen problem, the social problem as it were, was to
provide an acyclical ranking of alternative end social states. In the above, Buchanan
was essentially rejecting the idea of ranking alternative social states as the social
problem which is to be solved. Instead of considering construction of a ranking of
alternatives which is to be representative of social welfare, the social problem is a
co-ordination problem - that of co-ordinating the independent choices of individuals
so that the possible outcomes generated will be 'tolerable to all participants'. This is
consistent with the fact that he cites Hobbes in support of a set of rules to constrain
individual choices: Hobbes's contract was motivated by a co-ordination problem in
the initial state of nature, that there would be war of all against all thus generating
disastrous outcomes for individuals. In the light of this discussion, the modern
reformulations of the Paretian liberal paradox can be viewed as rejecting the idea that
the social problem is to construct a social welfare function, and embracing the
modern contractarian idea of the social problem as a co-ordination one. In this sense,
the reformulation of the Sen paradox in game theoretic terms can be viewed as
reflecting developments in contractarian thought, albeit belatedly.
The initial contractual agreement for Buchanan is the choice of rules by which
individuals are to be governed. Buchanan is unambiguously clear about the purpose
of rules:
29 Ibid. p5.
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"rules that constrain sociopolitical interactions must be evaluated ultimately in terms
of their capacity to promote the separate purposes of all persons in the polity. Do
these rules permit individuals to pursue their own private ends, in a context where
securing these ends involves interdependence, in such a way that each person
secures maximal attainment of his goals consistent with the equal liberty of others to
do the same? "30
Rules are there to serve the separate interests of each person, not some common
social interest. Again, one can interpret the above as a modern contractarian
reformulation of the original Sen problem:
1. 'each person secures maximal attainment of his goals...' provides an
individualistic justification for the desirability of a Pareto optimal social state.
Acceptance of the desirability of a Pareto optimal social state does not have to
imply acceptance of some social welfare function. In Buchanan's case, his view
of the individual as the source of value provides the value judgement which
explains the desirability of Pareto optimality.
2. '...consistent with the equal liberty of others to do the same.' provides
justification for some specification of rights. The rules can be viewed as
specifying permissible strategies for individuals.
This is in line with modem game formulations of the paradox. Although the two
ideas of Paretianism and liberalism are still there, analytically, the situation is very
different. To interpret the prisoner's dilemma as an example of the paradox of a
Paretian liberal is to miss the markedly different views of ideas of individual and
social welfare which underlie the original problem and the very recent game theoretic
reformulations. However, these marked differences become clear when one
30 Ibid. p7-8.
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compares the thought of a writer such as Rousseau, who embraces the idea of a
general will as a kind of social welfare function, to a writer like Buchanan who
cannot accept such a view of social welfare. In arguing for rules, Buchanan would
never claim to be doing the same as Rousseau. Similarly, modern social choice
theorists who claim to be merely restating the original Sen problem using game
theory are engaging in a very different exercise analytically.
"In constitutional design, where there are no effective pre-existing rules, all that is
relevant is the choice between the rule that generates one set of outcomes and the
rule that generates an alternative set"31
Again there is a clear parallel between this and the way that social choice theory
itself has developed post 1990. Instead of social choice of a social state, social
choice theorists now take the view that we should be considering social choice of a
rights structure. The choice of a rule is tantamount to the choice of a possible set of
outcomes. Thus game theory is needed to predict which possible sets of outcomes
will result from which rules.
PART H: JOHN RAWLS
I The Rawlsian Contract
The social contract envisaged by Rawls differs markedly from that of Buchanan:
1. Rawls' contract is hypothetical. It is an analytical device.
2. The main purpose of Rawls' contract agreed in the original position32 is to
derive unanimously agreed to principles of justice which are "to regulate all
31 Brennan and Buchanan (1985), pll.
32 The original position is analogous to the state of nature in traditional social contract theory, this is
discussed below.
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subsequent criticism and reform of institutions".
3. The acceptability of rights and rules is dependent on whether or not they violate
the principles of justice.
Instead of the social contract as the device which represents the transformation from
a 'state of nature' to a 'civil society', Rawls' state of nature (original position) is
really there to lend acceptability to the two principles of justice which he advocates.
Any individual can put himself into the original position at any time in order to
understand the desirability of the principles of justice:
"....we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society or
to set up a particular form of government... .the principles of justice for the basic
structure of society are the object of the original agreement"33
"In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of
nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. The original position... .is
understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterised so as to lead to a certain
conception of justice"34
The 'veil of ignorance' is the abstract device which characterises the original
position, it denies each individual knowledge of her class, abilities, any information
which is particular to herself, including her utility function:
33 Rawls, John (1972), A Theory of Justice, p1 1.
34 Ibid.
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"no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he
know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence
and strength. Nor again does anyone know his conception of the good. "35
It is this absence of particular information relating to himself that ensures that the
principles of justice agreed to in the original position will in fact be just because such
ignorance of particular personal details puts each individual in an equal situation.
Rawls stresses the fact that the principles of justice are the outcome of a rational
choice, yet at first sight, it is unclear as to how one might apply rational choice
theory to a situation in which no individual has knowledge of either his own utility
function or of his own endowments. Rawls, therefore, needs to make some
assumption as to what would increase utility for any individual irrespective of what
his de facto preferences happen to be. He argues that this is true for "primary social
goods" which he defines as "rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income
and wealth"36 (also self-respect). Thus individuals in the original position seek to
maximise their index of primary social goods. Individuals are thus faced with
choosing between different principles which will ultimately imply different possible
assignments of primary social goods where each individual does not know which
assignment will belong to him, nor does he have anything but the vaguest knowledge
of the likelihood that it will belong to him. It is in this sense that the veil of
ignorance places each individual in an identical position, each individual has an
identical objective. This identification of each individual's objective leads to a
unanimous choice of principles of justice:
35 Ibid., p137.
36 Ibid., p92.
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"the original position is interpreted so that any one can at any time adopt its
perspective. It must make no difference when one takes up this viewpoint or who
does: the restrictions must be such that the same principles are always chosen. The
veil of ignorance is a key condition in meeting this requirement. It insures not only
that the information available is relevant, but that it is at all times the same"37
Rawls argues that individuals will choose to adopt the maximin rule in choosing
principles, due to concern on the part of each that it is he who will be the one with
the lowest index of primary social goods.
"...the original position has been defined so that it is a situation in which the
maximin rule applies"38
It is adoption of the maximin decision rule which results in the following two
"principles of justice" which Rawls advocates:
"1 Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others."
2. The "difference principle": "the social order is not to establish and secure the
more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage
of those less fortunate"39 or "initial inequality in life prospects is justifiable only
if the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the representative man who
is worse off'4°
37 Ibid., p139.
38 Ibid., p155.
39 Ibid., p75.
4° Ibid., p78.
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These principles are accepted as just because each individual is aware that he would
accept these in the original position behind the veil of ignorance. The idea of a
hypothetical contract is used to explain the universal acceptability of the principles.
Economic arrangements, i.e. rights and rules are determined in accordance with these
principles.
II The Idea of Justice and its Relationship with Social and Individual Welfare
Thus social welfare is not determined by some social welfare function derived from
actual preferences, but established in the original position when no individual has
knowledge of his actual utility function. Rawls emphasises the fact that individual
preferences are ever changing over time, as a result of reflection and changing
circumstances41 . To base an idea of social welfare on actual preferences at any point
in time would be tantamount to make it dependant on 'accidental circumstances' 42 of
the world which would not make for a stable society. The fact that the idea of social
good is independent of actual preferences at any given point in time can be
interpreted as unease with the idea that preference satisfaction is always good,
irrespective of the preference itself, similar to Mill:
"...in justice as fairness one does not take men's propensities and inclinations as
given, whatever they are, and then seek the best way to fulfil them. Rather their
desires and aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of
justice 	 the concept of right is prior to that of the good 	 The priority of justice is
41 Discussed below.
42 Rawls (1972),.p475.
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accounted for, in part, by holding that the interests requiring the violation of justice
have no value."43
Thus social welfare is not based on individual preferences, irrespective of what those
preferences are, as in the construction of a Sen type social welfare function.
The actual rights structure is established on the basis of the principles of justice, and
is thus only an indirect result of the initial contractual agreement. The principles of
justice, therefore, are operative at a social level in that rights and rules must be
consistent with them. But it is also the case that each individual has a sense of
justice which constrains that from which he derives utility:
"moral personality is characterised by two capacities: one for a conception of the
good, the other for a sense of justice"44
Rawls is using a contractarian device to explain an individual's moral sentiment, or
moral personality:
"...the explanation of some moral feelings cite some principle of right that would be
chosen in the original position 	
The individual's "sense of justice" acts as a constraint on his pursuit of the good.
"the general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends"45
The are parallels with Rousseau's ideas of the individual's general and private will
here: exercise of the individual's private will was implicitly subordinate to
'exercise' of his general will. Similarly, if an individual's idea of 'good' violates his
43 Ibid., p31.
44 Rawls, p561.
45 Rawls, p5.
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sense of justice, then he does not act upon it. His first priority is not to violate his
sense of justice. Further, I have argued in chapter two that the general will is the
individual social welfare function. Analogously, his sense of justice serves social
welfare.
A Theory Of Justice is a deontological ethical theory in the sense that it "does not
interpret the right as maximising the good" 46 in the way that utilitarianism does.
There are notions of right and wrong which are established independently of the
actual utility functions of individuals. It is the fact that the principles of justice are
independent of de facto preferences, and that the principles of justice serve the social
welfare that pre-empts the possibility of conflict between individual liberty and
social welfare.
The fact that individuals have these two senses, a notion of their own interest and a
moral sense could be interpreted as a dual preference (utility) framework: Each
individual has a set of actual (de facto) preferences. But, in cases where acting
according to these de facto preferences would require him to violate his sense of
justice, he does not. The set of preferences underlying his acts, therefore, is slightly
different, in that it also incorporates this moral sense. It incorporates the fact that he
does not wish to act upon a desire which violates his sense of justice.
Rawls' assertion that social welfare is independent of actual utility considerations
stems from his unease with viewing the individual's de facto preferences at any point
46 Rawls (1972), p30.
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in time as representing his good. He prefers to take a longer-term view, using the
idea of an individual's rational plan of life:
"a person's good is determined by what is for him the most rational long-term plan of
life given reasonably favourable circumstances. A man is happy when he is more or
less successfully in the way of carrying out his plan 	 the good is the satisfaction of
rational desire."47
An individual's conception of his good can be thought of as his rational plan of life,
or preferences consistent with this rational plan of life. He is free to choose any plan
of life provided it is allowed by the principles of justice. He then employs reason to
assess which of his desires are consistent with his life plan, these are rational, and
which are not. There is a parallel with Rousseau here. Utility is not merely the
satisfaction of any existing preference.
"An individual who finds that he enjoys seeing others in positions of lesser liberty
understands that he has no claim whatever to this enjoyment. The pleasure he takes
in others' deprivations is wrong in itself it is the satisfaction which requires the
violation of a principle to which he would agree in the original position. The
principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have value;
they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one's good"48
47 Rawls, p92-3.
48 Rawls, p31.
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This passage can be interpreted as follows: "enjoys" relates to the individual's de
facto preferences, or what he really desires with respect to the various alternatives
(ignoring his sense of justice). But the individual does not passively seek to satisfy
his desires in his actions, he acts according to (what is referred to here as) his
"conception of the good". The principles of justice agreed to in the original position
come prior to his de facto preferences (his desires), they constrain his de facto
preferences in that they "put limits on what satisfactions have value". One can use a
dual utility idea to understand this passage:
1. 'enjoyment' relates to his satisfactions, or his desires taken at face value. There
is no reason involved here, no discrimination between one desire and another, it
simply represents his desires taken as brute facts. This is what I mean by his de
facto preferences.
2. ' conception of good', in the above, can be taken to refer to the preferences that
underlie the individual's choices. This set of preferences is based upon his
desires, but incorporate the individual's moral sense.
Therefore, the "moral capacity," 49 which each individual has constrains his pursuit of
the good, and this can be interpreted as two sets of preferences: one constrained by
the sense of justice, one unconstrained.
III The Idea of Individual Good as a Rational Plan
Provided it does not conflict with the principles of justice, individuals are free to
hold whatever conceptions of the good that they choose. In this section, I intend to
focus on Rawls' idea of the good and rationality post-original position, assuming that
49 Rawls p46
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the sense of justice is not violated. Possibly the most fundamental difference
between Rawls' notion of the good and the notion of the good standard in economic
theory is the importance given to the role of reason in determining which desires are
rational and which are not. Rawls emphasises the process of reflecting on
preferences and thus change in preferences over time, in some ways similar to Mill's
emphasis on the process of individual preference development. One can link Rawls'
view of individual good as a longer-term plan of life rather than a set of preferences
at any given point in time to his idea of social welfare as something which is
independent of individual preferences (the fact that the initial contractual agreement
on the principles of justice takes place behind a 'veil of ignorance'). Rawls' main
problem with utilitarianism is that it assumes that satisfying all desires is good:
"even if interpersonal comparisons of satisfaction can be made, these comparisons
must reflect values which it makes sense to pursue. It is irrational to advance one
end rather than another simply because it can be more accurately estimated. The
controversy about interpersonal comparisons tends to obscure the real question,
whether the total happiness is to be maximised in the first place"5°
Rawls does take the view that happiness should be maximised, but he does not
accept that the satisfaction of all desires will necessarily make someone happy. He
has an Aristotelian idea of happiness, of happiness as eudaimonia, the idea that
humans are happiest when they feel fulfilled. Individualsfirst decide upon a rational
plan of life using deliberative rationality, their wants can then be classed as rational
50 Rawls, p91.
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or not according to whether or not they are consistent with the rational plan.
"a rational plan of life establishes the basic point of view from which all judgements
of value relating to a particular person are to be made and finally rendered
consistent."51
Only those wants which are consistent with one's plan are rational. This is the only
difference between Rawlsian rationality and economic rationality. It is not rational
to pursue all desires according to Rawls, it is not rational to pursue those which
conflict with our rational plan of life:
"Keeping in mind that our overall aim is to carry out a rational plan, it is clear that
some features of desires make doing this impossible"52
The rational plan itself is formed as a result of rational deliberation, "a rational
person will not usually deliberate until he has found the best plan open to him. Often
he will be content if he forms a satisfactory plan"53
This does not necessarily imply that Rawlsian rationality suggests satisficing rather
than maximising behaviour. The above passage is perfectly consistent with the
motive of utility maximisation as is supported in the quote below:
"Rational deliberation is itself an activity like any other, and the extent to which one
should engage in it is subject to rational decision. The formal rule is that we should
51 Rawls, p409.
52 Ibid., p419.
53 Ibid., p418.
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deliberate up to the point where the likely benefits from improving our plan are just
worth the time and effort of reflection"54
The idea is that a rational (i.e. utility maximising) period of deliberation is
deliberation up to the point where the marginal benefit of deliberation is equal to the
marginal cost. So the idea that the rational plan is a satisfactory plan is consistent
with the idea of rationality as maximising utility. One can see a parallel between this
idea that the plan should be satisfactory rather than the best plan and Mabbott's idea
that one should not spend too long in deliberating to form a time plan.
"Planning of time itself consumes time and may leave too little of these commodities
for the activities planned."55
Rawls emphasises the role played by reason in forming our idea of our good.
"Awareness of the genesis of our wants can often make it perfectly clear to us that
we really do desire certain things more than others. As some aims seem less
important in the face of critical scrutiny, or even lose their appeal entirely, others
may assume an assured prominence"56
Clearly the major difference between the Rawlsian utility function and the utility
function standard in economic theory is in the role of reason as necessary in
54 Ibid.
55 Mabbott, J.D. (1953), p122.
56 Rawls (1973) p 420.
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determining Rawlsian individual preferences. I am not trying to imply that reason is
normally absent, but it is not necessary. The notion of rationality in economics is
simply choice consistent with existing preferences. Rawlsian rationality emphasises
the role of reason in changing preferences. It is the rational plan of life that
determines a person's good, not satisfaction of any desire that he has (similar to
Mill). Rawls appears to have been influenced by Mabbott's paper 'Reason and
Desire' 57 since he cites this in his discussion of desires and one's rational plan of life.
Mabbott discusses the role of a time-plan in influencing our desires, in determining
which are satisfied and which are not. It suggests that Rawls was averse to the
Humean idea that "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions" 58 but that one
can use one's reason to influence one's desires. Rawls' notion of the rational life
plan suggests that he does not want individuals to be slaves to their desires. In my
view, most important is Mabbott's view that one can alter desires by adopting a
certain plan because this highlights the fact that desires need not be accepted as brute
facts.
"there are many ways in which planning results in altering the desires themselves,
and the possibility of satisfying them. The desire whose satisfaction is postponed
may diminish or disappear 	 I may reject altogether the satisfaction of one desire as
being incompatible with the satisfaction of too many others"59
57 Mabbott, J.D (1953), p113-123.
58 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, quoted in Mabbott (1953).
59 Mabbott, p115.
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I am not trying to argue that the utility function of orthodox economic theory is
hedonistic where reason has no role, for this is clearly not the case. An individual
could desire to smoke a cigarette, but a long-term concern for his health could cause
the individual to rank the social state in which he does not smoke it above that in
which he does. In this case he derives more utility from the state in which the desire
for a cigarette is not satisfied because his long-term health is an argument in his
individual utility function as well as pleasure. This is the advantage of the notion of
utility adopted by economists, utility is whatever the individual regards as good, that
which is preferred. An individual may or may not use reason in forming his
preferences. But, because the use of reason is not necessary in forming preferences
in economic theory, one's preferences at any given point in time may not be
consistent with a considered judgement about what is in one's interest. The
acceptance of preferences as brute facts by economists has a Humean flavour to it,
the suggestion that one cannot alter preferences by the use of reason.
IV The Notion of Social Welfare, the Link with Individual Welfare
and the Paretian Liberal Paradox
"The utilitarian must concede the theoretical possibility that configurations of
preferences may lead to injustice as ordinarily understood. For example, assume
that the larger part of society has an abhorrence for certain religious or sexual
practices. This feeling is so intense that it is not enough that these practices be kept
from public view; the very thought that these things are going on is enough to arouse
the majority to anger and hatred. Seeking the greatest satisfaction of desire may,
then, justify harsh repressive measures against actions that cause no social injury.
To defend individual liberty in this case the utilitarian has to show that given the
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circumstances the real balance of advantages in the long run still lies on the side of
freedom"6°
In the above passage, Rawls is essentially using the possibility of Paretian liberal
conflict to argue against utilitarianism as an approach to social welfare: If social
welfare is equated with 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', where
'happiness' is defined as preference satisfaction, then the socially best state may be
one in which individual liberty for some individuals is sacrificed. But the argument
could be interpreted more broadly than this, as an argument against any benchmark
of social welfare which is based upon existing preferences, i.e. a Sen type social
welfare function (where all issues are subject to the social welfare function, e.g.
liberty). Rawls is unambiguously clear that an issue such as individual liberty should
not be at the mercy, so to speak, of individual preferences (or some idea of social
welfare based upon individual preferences), as is the case here. Rawls's
contractarian argument establishing the priority of liberty could be viewed as pre-
empting such an undesirable scenario, where liberty is subject to a preference-based
idea of social welfare. According to Rawls' idea of social welfare, there is no
question of Paretian liberal conflict ever arising for the following reasons (points two
and three essentially follow from point one):
1. Social welfare is identified with the principles of justice (which are agreed upon
behind the veil of ignorance) and whether or not institutions are consistent with
them.
2. The right to individual liberty is not contingent on individual preferences, but is
independent of them. It is one of the principles of justice and thus cannot be
violated. Further, each individual's sense of justice implies that each does not
60 Rawls, p450
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wish to impinge upon the liberty of any other irrespective of his preferences over
outcomes.
3. The acceptability of Paretianism is questionable. The problem with Paretianism
is that it is based upon actual preferences at any given point in time which reflect
the different situations of individuals. As a principle of justice itself, therefore,
it would be rejected. Once the priority of individual liberty is established, it is
the difference principle, not Pareto optimality, which provides a benchmark for
the socially best allocation of resources. Such a social state would be consistent
with Paretian value judgements, although, given a situation of injustice, changes
may be required which do not constitute a Pareto improvement:
"....the difference principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency. For when
the former is fully satisfied, it is indeed impossible to make any one representative
man better off without making another worse off, namely, the least advantaged
representative man whose expectations we are to maximise 	 Justice comes prior to
efficiency and thus requires some changes that are not efficient in this sense."61
Equal liberty is part of the initial contractual agreement made behind the veil of
ignorance and thus cannot be violated:
"On the contract view, the grounds of liberty are completely separate from existing
preferences. Indeed we may think of the principles of justice as an agreement not to
take into account certain feelings when assessing the conduct of others."62
61 Rawls, p79-80.
62 Ibid. Italics not in original.
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But if one were to construct a Sen type social welfare function, for example, for use
instead of the difference principle for determining the best social state once the
priority of liberty were established, based upon individual preferences, it is the sense
of justice which pre-empts any possibility of Paretian liberal conflict because it rules
out the possibility of any individual holding the kind of preferences which would
give rise to Paretian liberal conflict:
"The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have
value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one's good"63
There are clear parallels with the resolution implied by Rousseau's notion of the
general will:
1. Individuals are acting autonomously when acting according to the principles of
justice chosen in the original position. Thus they are more free when
'constrained' by their sense of justice.
2. The notion of social good is similar: the sense of justice is similar to the general
will. Everyone has this sense and the original position describes the conditions
in which we discover it.
"In the original position the parties agree to be held responsible for the conception of
justice that is chosen. There is no violation of our autonomy so long as its principles
are properly followed"64
Another way of viewing this analogy is in viewing de facto preferences as individual
private wills. Any social welfare function based on de facto preferences would not
" Rawls, p31
64 Rawls, p519.
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be representative of the common good, but would be something similar to the will of
all. This is why the veil of ignorance is necessary in determining the principles of
justice in the original position, so that establishment of the principles is truly in the
interest of society and not influenced by particular considerations that relate to any
private individual:
"..the requirement of a unanimous agreement connects up with the idea of human
beings who as members of a social union seek the values of the community"65
The 'well-ordered' society follows from the fact that the members of this society
have a sense of justice, i.e. the sense of justice is in the interest of social welfare.
Rawls is providing us with a sketch of the kind of individual who will make up a
'good' society. This is reminiscent of the way that Plato identifies a 'type' of
individual corresponding to each type of society (democracy, tyranny etc.) in The
Republic66. But there is an interesting and fundamentally important difference
between Rawls and Plato. Plato evaluates different types of society from the
individual's perspective. The notion of social good is absent. Plato argues that the
republic is better than tyranny by showing that "the tyrant is 729 times more unhappy
than the philosopher king"! 67
 In other words, Plato argues for being just by arguing
that the individual will be better off if he has such a sense.
Rawls, however, acknowledges the possibility that the individual may not view
himself as better off with such a sense. Rawls does not justify acquisition of a sense
65 Ibid. p565.
66 Plato (1974). The four types of imperfect society and the corresponding character types are
discussed in book VIII (pgs 543-592b).
67 Ibid. Editor's note, p413 of this edition.
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of justice from the point of view of individual good. His argument is that it is
collectively rational to have such a sense of justice:
"our good depends upon the sort of persons we are, the kinds of wants and
aspirations we have and are capable of. It can even happen that there are many who
do not find a sense of justice for their good; but if so the forces making for stability
are weaker...Yet none of this nullifies the collective rationality of the principles of
justice; it is still to the advantage of each that everyone else should honour them."68
Thus Rawls justifies the sense of justice with reference to the social good rather than
the individual good.
In the light of Rawls' discussion, the Paretian liberal paradox can be interpreted as
illustrating the problem of basing a notion of social welfare upon de facto
preferences of individuals. The purpose of Rawls' principles of justice are to make
for a stable society. They are based on the idea of a common good:
"the principles of justice are public: they characterise the commonly recognised
moral convictions shared by the members of a well-ordered society"69
Again, note the parallel with the general will: these commonly held moral
convictions serve the common good. There is a further parallel with Rousseau in
that individual freedom is defined with reference to adhering to the principles of
justice:
"the desire to express our nature as a free and equal rational being can be fulfilled
only by acting on the principles of right and justice as having first priority."70
68 Rawls, p576.
69 Ibid., p570.
70 Ibid., p574.
134
This is analogous to Rousseau's assertion that we are more free when ruled by the
general will. However, in contrast with Rousseau, in the case of Rawls the first
principle of justice is equal liberty for all members of society. This requires
individuals being given actual liberty to make choices, whereas in the case of
Rousseau the extent to which individuals should have liberty to exercise their private
wills is more difficult to ascertain71.
CONCLUSION
The notion of social welfare is of fundamental importance to the Paretian liberal
paradox in that the paradox arises when trying to rank social states according to their
desirability for society. The paradox rests on a particular view of social welfare as
being represented by a social welfare function. The result is that it is impossible to
derive a ranking of social states which represents the welfare of society from
individual rankings of social states, where the social ranking can be said to reflect
both Paretian and liberal value judgements. The paradox is interesting in that a value
judgement which essentially relates to the process by which social states (outcomes)
are achieved (a judgement about individual rights) is incorporated into the social
welfare function itself. Although the social welfare function merely specifies a
social ranking over end states for a given set of individual rankings over end states,
Sen has incorporated a condition which reflects a value judgement that individual
liberty is desirable, a value judgement about the process, within an analytical
framework which solely values outcomes. Within social choice theory, there has
been much debate, particularly during the 1980s, on the issue of whether condition L
adequately captures this value judgement. Some writers took the view that social
71 discuss this issue in depth in chapter two.
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choice theory, as an analytical framework, was incapable of capturing this value
judgement which precipitated a move towards the use of game theory to formulate
the paradox. Game theory models individual interaction and the possible outcomes
of such interaction. Thus it is capable of formulating individual rights. However,
the issue which is almost invariably overlooked within the social choice theory
literature, is that as an analytical framework, it is incapable of handling the view of
social welfare implicit in the original Sen paradox.
Contractarian approaches to social welfare, in general, place value on the process of
agreement. More specifically, they involve an initial contractual agreement in which
individuals unanimously agree on either the set of rights/rules by which they are
subsequently to be governed, or they agree to be ruled by some sovereign. In the
case of Rawls they agree to principles of justice which must not be violated in all
subsequent conduct. The initial contractual agreement could be either individually or
socially motivated. To be individually motivated there is no need to accept some
idea of a common good or social welfare, all one needs to accept is the idea of
separate goods of individuals: in general, individuals are better off with rather than
without the contractual agreement. The contractarian thought of Hobbes and
Buchanan can be put into this category. The contractual agreement of Rousseau and
Rawls falls into the other category: the contract is socially motivated, i.e. it rests on
some idea of common good.
James Buchanan's approach to social welfare (i.e. as merely the collection of
separate individual utilities of individuals) implies the rejection of a social welfare
function. It does not, however, imply the rejection of Paretian and liberal value
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judgements. The desirability of Pareto optimal social states can be justified on
individualistic grounds (as social states in which it is not possible to make any
individual better off without making at least one individual worse off) and individual
liberty is valued. Modern game theoretic reformulations of Paretian liberal conflict
can be interpreted as illustrating "the central problems of the social order, those of
reconciling the behavior of separately motivated persons so as to generate patterns
of outcomes that are tolerable to all participants". 72 Thus analysis of the
contractarian thought of Buchanan is illuminating in highlighting the different nature
of the problem that the game theoretic formulation is dealing with. Game theory
formulations cannot be interpreted as attempts the identify the best social state, but
can be interpreted as dealing with Buchanan's contractarian problem (of individuals
deciding upon a set of rights/rules) given that there is no social ranking of social
states, only separate individual rankings. It thus highlights that what is generally
acknowledged to be a reformulation of the original Paretian liberal paradox is,
analytically, a very different exercise.
Rawls's social contract resolves the paradox by the fact that the contractual
agreement on principles of justice is made when each individual is placed behind the
veil of ignorance, i.e. when each individual has no knowledge of his actual
preferences. Abiding by the principles of justice is in the interest of social welfare,
and thus these principles come prior to individual utility considerations. Another
way of viewing this resolution to the problem is that the social welfare function is
not based upon actual preferences, thus when individual preferences go against
liberty considerations (as in the case of Sen's example) there is no conflict because it
72 Ibid. p5.
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is not de facto preferences which determine social welfare. The determinants of
social welfare are established in the original position when noone has any knowledge
of de facto preferences. This contractarian approach to social welfare, therefore,
precludes the possibility of any conflict between individual liberty and social
welfare, given that individual liberty is established as a necessary condition for social
welfare in the original position:
"On the contract view, the grounds of liberty are completely separate from existing
preferences. Indeed we may think of the principles of justice as an agreement not to
take into account certain feelings when assessing the conduct of others "73
In terms of the motivation for the contractual agreement, there are parallels with
Rousseau: the contract is established in the interest of social welfare. However, at
variance with Rousseau, individual liberty (natural liberty), i.e. freedom to exercise
one's preferences is fundamentally important and is assigned priority.
In terms of logical ways out of the paradox, the contractarians analysed in this
chapter suggest the following solutions:
1. Buchanan. We should get rid of the idea of a social welfare. The whole idea of
common good is meaningless, there is only individual good. Thus the
construction of a social welfare function is a pointless exercise. If it is
impossible to construct such a function then this presents no problem, given that
the whole notion of social welfare which it represents has no meaning anyway.
Logically, it is the social welfare function itself which is abandoned. Social
73 Rawls, John (1972) 'A Theory of Justice', p450.
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choice of a social state is a pointless exercise, rights and rules are chosen and they
are chosen to serve the separate interests of individuals. The value judgements of
Paretianism and liberalism are not abandoned, thus conflict may persist in a
different form. It may be the case that a rights structure which could be deemed to
be libertarian could result in social states which are not Pareto optimal, but this is
a separate issue and does not present a problem to a contractarian such as
Buchanan. It is the process of agreement which is the most important issue, thus
agreement to an outcome is more important than the issue of whether or not it is
Pareto optimal.
2. Rawls. Social welfare is independent of de facto preferences. Thus the Sen type
social welfare function (based upon existing preferences) is not truly
representative of social welfare. It is unanimously consented to principles of
justice that make for a stable society. Such principles should be independent of
existing preferences. Abandonment of a Sen type social welfare function is not
necessary to resolve the conflict between Paretianism and liberalism. The sense
of justice is accepted at the individual level, it constrains individual preferences,
thus individuals would not desire that other individuals had lesser liberty for the
sake of getting a more preferred social outcome.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DID SOCIAL CHOICE THEORISTS RESOLVE CONFLICT
BETWEEN LIBERTY AND SOCIAL WELFARE? (1970-1980)
I Introduction
This chapter first explores the link between the social welfare function and Rousseau's
idea of the general will of society which was suggested in chapter two. The Sen paradox
is interpreted as stemming from giving the social welfare function the status of the
general will. That is to say, of accepting the social ranking of alternatives as
representative of social good and thus the idea that all issues, including all rights, should
be subordinate to it, whilst also adhering to the mono-utility idea. Of the interpretations
of a social welfare function which were discussed in chapter one of the thesis, this
corresponds to what I refer to as interpretation one, an ethical interpretation, together
with the idea that such a device is actually to be used to determine social outcomes. The
extent to which writers either accept or reject this interpretation has implications for the
possible logical ways that the paradox can be resolved. Section three outlines these
possible approaches to resolution of Paretian liberal conflict, and the remaining sections
of the chapter link some of the resolutions which have been proposed within social
choice theory with these different approaches. The chapter also highlights the way that
resolutions presented in chapters two to four of the thesis relate to the approaches
identified here.
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II The Extent to Which the Social Welfare Function Can be Interpreted
as Representative of the General WM of Society
"..a value judgment is implied in any given way of making social choices based on
individual utilities... .But, given these basic value judgments as to the mode of
aggregating individual desires, the economist should investigate those mechanisms for
social choice which satisfy the value judgments and should check their consequences to
see if still other value judgments are violated. In particular, he should ask the question
whether or not the value judgements are consistent with each other.."
The above passage highlights one of the main differences between Rousseau's notion of
the general will and the ranking of alternatives which represents society's good within
social choice theory: The axioms of Arrow's and Sen's theorems have value in
themselves because they represent basic value judgements which are deemed to be
desirable. The Social Contract, however, gives one the impression that there is some
general will which is 'out there' to be discovered, all we need to do is to bring about the
conditions which are most likely to discover it. In other words, if the social welfare
function were merely a means of discovering the general will, we would be looking for
axioms which were most likely to make that general will known. Rousseau attaches no
intrinsic value to the process of discovering the general will, and thus axioms would
have no intrinsic value. On this view, one could interpret the Paretian liberal paradox as
follows: The conditions P, L and U may not enable us to discover the general will and
thus are not appropriate axioms to impose on a social welfare function. The social
'Arrow, K.J (1963), p4-5.
141
choice theorist, however, concludes that the value judgements are not consistent with
each other.
Rousseau states that the general will is found by the majority view2, and he suggests that
the larger the majority, the more sure we can be that we have found the general will:
"the more important and crucial the decision is, the more nearly unanimous should be
the opinion which prevails.."3
There is an obvious link between unanimity and Sen's condition P, given that the latter
is an equivalence between a unanimous preference over a given pair of alternatives and
society's ranking of these two alternatives. But a unanimous preference is just one
aspect of Paretian value judgements. Rowley and Peacock identify two others4:
1. Each individual is considered to be the best judge of his own welfare and
2. Social welfare is solely dependent on the welfare of individual members of that
society.
Both of the value assumptions above are at variance with Rousseau's idea of a general
will. Referring to the general will, Rousseau comments,
"Thus when an opinion contrary to my own prevails, this proves nothing more than that I
was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not."5
The above suggests that it is not the individual that is the best judge of social welfare,
but 'society'. Any single individual can be mistaken with regard to the social good
2 (where individuals are motivated by the common good, this is discussed in chapter two.)
3 Rousseau, Book 4, Chapter 2. (4.2), p119.
4 Rowley, C.K and Peacock, A.T (1975), p7-9.
5 Rousseau, (4.3) p118.
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because individuals are fallible. The idea of an infallible general will which is "always
right" and should, therefore, govern society seems to run contrary to the spirit of
Paretian value assumptions one and two above. This is not only because it questions the
judgement of the individual, but also in its suggestion of a less straightforward link
between individual and social welfare 6 . The fundamental point is that the only link
between Sen's condition P and the general will lies in the fact that unanimity is a process
by which the general will may be discovered. The link does not apply to Paretian value
judgements per se.
However, it is the similarity between the social welfare function and the general will
which is the underlying theme of this chapter. Sen requires that the ranking of
alternatives generated by the social welfare function be acyclical:
"R (the social preference relation) should generate a 'choice function', that is, in every
subset of alternatives there must be a 'best' alternative ..."7
The similarity between the general will and the social welfare function lies in the fact
that the latter identifies an outcome which is socially 'best'. The difference lies in the
interpretation of the two, discussed above. But if one accepts the idea that one can
derive a ranking of alternatives which is representative of society's good, to which all
issues are subordinate, then there is a sense in which one is accepting the idea of the
social welfare function as analogous to the general will. To be more specific, the Sen
paradox may be interpreted as stemming from giving the social welfare function the
6 Aggregation of individual preferences via voting could give us the will of all, rather than the general will.
7 Sen, A.K. (1970b), p152-7. Brackets added.
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status of the general will, i.e. of accepting that all issues, including basic rights and
liberties, are to be subject to the social welfare function. In other words, the paradox can
be viewed as a result of assigning the social welfare function as much importance as
Rousseau assigns to the general will:
"the general will alone can direct the forces of the state in accordance with the purpose
for which it was created, namely, the common good. It is exclusively on the basis of this
common interest that society must be governed."8
The analogy applies to the role and status of the general will, as the device which
represents the social good and determines all issues within society. Acceptance of the
idea that there is some general will which exists prior to the process of preference
aggregation, which this process is designed to discover, is not necessary for the
acceptance of this analogy. One has to accept interpretation one of the social welfare
function set out in the introduction, that the social welfare function is generally accepted
as a device which identifies the best social state, together with the further value
judgement that the function should actually be used to determine the complete social
state.
III Possible Ways in Which Paretian Liberal Conflict can be Resolved
Sen is trying to construct a social decision function which is to be representative of
social welfare. He imposes three conditions on this function: unrestricted domain, U,
8 Rousseau, (2.1) p25. Italics not in original in this and all subsequent quotes, unless otherwise stated.
144
weak Pareto principle, P and minimal liberalism, L 9 . He finds that it is not possible to
impose both conditions P and L (given the imposition of U) and still generate an
acyclical ranking of alternatives, i.e. imposition of both these conditions make it
impossible to establish such an analytically distinct concept of social good. In the light
of the analysis of earlier writers of chapters two to four, the following routes out of the
paradox are suggested:
1. Commitment to the concept of a social welfare function,  (a distinct concept of
social good) as well as
(i) Commitment to the mono-utility idea, that each individual has a single utility
function.
This is not a route out of the paradox suggested by earlier writers, but it is one which has
been chosen by social choice theorists in the early 1970s. In this case, one of the axioms
P or L has to be abandoned because imposition of both makes it impossible to construct
a social welfare function. Many social choice theorists have responded in this way
because of their commitment to the concept of a social welfare function and the mono-
utility framework of microeconomic theory. Given acceptance of both these ideas, the
only way round the problem is to modify or abandon one of the axioms. Condition P
follows from acceptance of an individualistic approach to social welfare, which only
leaves L. However, the liberty/welfare conflict is not really resolved. Such a
resolution is tantamount to choosing social welfare over liberty and thus does not really
resolve the conflict.
9 I discuss this at length in chapter one.
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(ii) Rejection of the mono-utility idea
One possible reason for commitment to the idea of a social welfare function would be
acceptance of the idea of the general will. In this case, although condition L may have to
be abandoned, one is not having to choose between liberty and social welfare because it
is the social welfare function (general will) which is representative of the true welfare of
each individual. In other words, the liberty/welfare conflict is dealt with by 'splitting'
the individual's utility function.
Another possibility is that the dual utility idea implies that the individual preferences
which give rise to the paradox will not arise. For the case of Rousseau, this possibility
was explored in the concluding section of chapter two: If the general will includes an
element of natural liberty, then when individuals express preferences which reflect their
general as opposed to their private wills, there will be no conflict between P and L. This
is because the individual preferences expressed reflect a liberal attitude, they reflect a
preference for private spheres. On this interpretation, conflict between P and L only
arises if individuals express preferences which represent their private wills.
This also applies to the case of Rawls. But a `Rawlsian' resolution of conflict would
never require abandonment of L. Individuals each have a sense of justice. One can
think of the two sets of preferences here as their actual preferences ignoring the sense of
justice, and the preferences they wish to act upon which are 'constrained' by their sense
of justice. Individuals' first preference is for liberty, thus there is no conflict between P
and L. Technically, this resolution works by abandoning U: there are certain sets of
preferences which will never arise, given that individuals only express preferences
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consistent with their general will/sense of justice 10 .
2. Reject the concept of a social welfare function as having the status of the general
will. The social welfare function does not have the status of the general will in that
individual liberty considerations are not subordinate to it, but are independent of it. In
other words, the individual liberty issue is not viewed as a social problem, it is mutually
exclusive to any social welfare function. Writers who are of this view, therefore, cannot
accept the idea of liberty being represented as a condition imposed on a social welfare
function. This is the approach taken by contractarian writers such as Nozick and
Buchanan. It can be subdivided as follows:
(i) There is still a social welfare function operating, but it does not have the status of
the general will, i.e. some issues (individual liberty) are deemed to be outside its
domain. Writers who argue that rights should constrain the domain of alternatives of the
social welfare function fall into this category because they are essentially subordinating
the social welfare function to considerations of individual welfare. Conflict is resolved
by weakening the status of the social welfare function and not allowing it to act as a
general will, i.e. not allowing all rights to be subordinate to it.
(ii) The idea of a social welfare function is abandoned altogether. This is the approach
taken by James Buchanan. The idea of an analytically distinct concept of social welfare
10 This also indicates a possible link between Rawls and Rousseau: the Rawlsian veil of ignorance could
be thought of as a device which enables individuals to "see" their general will because, from behind it,
information regarding their own particular interests is denied them.
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is viewed as meaningless, or inconsistent with commitment to individual liberty.
Society is nothing more than separate welfare of individuals (not aggregated). Thus
there is no Sen problem.
The rest of this chapter discusses some early responses to the Sen paradox (1970-1980)
and seeks to link these responses to the resolutions suggested by political philosophers
identified above.
IV Commitment to the Concept of a Social Welfare Function and Mono-Utility
Framework, but Abandonment of Condition L (and thus liberty)
For writers who choose to retain the idea of a social welfare function as representative of
the social good, it is more common for them to abandon or modify L as opposed to P.
This is due to the almost universal acceptance amongst economists of the idea of a
Pareto improvement as being socially better, the majority of writers were reluctant to
question such a well established notion. This section focuses on writers who fit into
category 1(i) above. A clear commitment to the idea of a social welfare function based
on condition P is evident. What is interesting about a lot of the writers in this section is
that the Paretian social welfare function almost seems to be assigned the status of the
general will in that it is this which is accepted as representative of social good, whilst
other issues (such as the idea of a private sphere of choice) are merely subordinate to it.
This seems to be why L is abandoned in these cases, the independent justification for L
seems to be lacking here, it is merely subject to the Paretian social welfare function.
But, unlike Rousseau, there is almost no evidence of any dual utility device. Thus these
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writers must 'resolve' the problem by choosing social welfare over liberty.
Hillingher and Lapham l I argue for abandoning condition L by violating Hume's law 12 in
claiming that the principle of liberalism "does not apply" in cases such as Sen's where
there are externalities:
"When individual choices are independent, the Paretian principle does not conflict with
the principle of liberalism. In the general situation of interdependence, there applies no
general principle of liberalism of which we are aware, although the Pareto principle
applies. Therefore, there cannot be any conflict between the two principles. The
contradiction obtained by Sen is the consequence of his imposing on the social choice of
a society arbitrary values which conflict with the preferences of individuals of society"I3
The terms 'independent' and 'interdependent' relate to utility, i.e. independent means
there are no externalities, interdependent means there are externalities. It is the italicised
sentence which is of interest, given that Paretian liberal conflict stems from the presence
of externalities. This sentence can be read as follows:
"From the fact that there are externalities, it follows that the liberal value judgement
does not apply." They are essentially making the desirability of the liberal value
judgement contingent on the absence of externalities. Thus liberalism is not a basic
value judgement and the liberal axiom is not valued in itself. It is the "preferences of
11 Hillingher, C and Lapham, V (1971), p1403-5.
12 The rule that one cannot derive a value judgement from a fact.
13 Hillingher and Lapham (1971), p1405, italics added.
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society" which are sovereign whereas as liberalism is dismissed as an "arbitrary" value
judgement. In this case, it is clearly the Pareto principle which determines social
desirability, liberalism is subordinate to this. But Hillingher and Lapham go even
further than this, arguing that liberalism is not a separate value judgement at all:
"when the actions of one individual do not impinge upon the welfare of others, then
liberalism follows as a special case of the Pareto principle."14
In other words, there is no need for an axiom which reflects the liberal value judgement
because in cases where it conflicts with the Pareto principle it is not desirable, and in
cases where it does not, it is unnecessary. Thus there is only one basic value judgement
here, Paretianism. Hillingher and Lapham's resolution of the conflict rests on the
argument that liberalism is merely a 'special case' of this value judgement and,
therefore, cannot conflict with it. Referring to the last sentence of the passage cited in
note thirteen above, Hillingher and Lapham attribute the paradox to the 'imposition' on
society of a set of 'arbitrary values' which conflict with the preferences of individual
members of that society. This again reflects their dismissal of liberalism as a value
judgement. Condition L is dropped, therefore, because it interferes with the
establishment of a Paretian social welfare function.
Gibbard proposes a resolution of Paretian liberal conflict which, he argues, reflects the
'strong libertarian tradition of free contract': "There is a strong libertarian tradition of
free contract, and on that tradition, a person 's rights are his to use or bargain away as
14 Ibid., p1403.
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he sees fit....it does seem important at least to find a version of the libertarian claim that
is consistent with the Pareto principle, and thus permits those bargains to which
everyone would agree" 15 . The resolution that he proposes does not actually involve a
rights trade, but rights waiving. He argues that individual rights should be alienable, i.e.
individuals should be just as free not to exercise their rights as to exercise them. Sen has
presented us with the result that imposing both conditions L and P on the social welfare
function generates cyclical social preferences. Gibbard addresses the question, "At
which point should the cycle be broken?" in a pragmatic way, i.e. by considering
whether, in practice, an individual would exercise his right or not. His argument can be
thought of as follows: If I have a right over alternatives x and y (and I prefer x to y) but
exercising my right to x would ultimately lead to an outcome z which I feel to be worse
than y, then I would realise that choosing x is tantamount to choosing z and thus would
waive my right to x in order to avoid the outcome z. The point is that, in assigning an
individual a right over (x,y), he is being given the power to avoid outcome y (by
exercising his right), but this is of no use to him if avoiding y will result in a worse
outcome, z (via someone else exercising her right to z over x or unanimous preference).
In that case, he would waive his right to avoid y in order to avoid z. Gibbard presents an
example on pages 398-399 of his paper which illustrates this. My problem with the
resolution it that it is too pragmatic, considering what, in fact, will happen here, the
individuals' utility maximising strategy. Is this what ought to happen? Gibbard would
argue that, yes, individuals ought to have the right to waive rights and this is where the
15 Gibbard, page 397. Resolutions proposed in the 1980s which their authors argue also reflect this
tradition are criticised in part two, chapter six of this thesis. The result which is generally referred to as
Gibbard's paradox is discussed later in the chapter.
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normative element of the analysis creeps in. One could interpret his argument as the
idea that, in stipulating a correspondence between individual and social preference over
pairs of alternatives over which individuals are assigned rights, Sen is denying
individuals the freedom to waive rights. However, Sen could argue that his original
formulation L is more in line with what Mill had in mind for a right to liberty. Mill was
of the view that the right to liberty is inalienable:
"The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not
freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom"16
Although Mill was referring to the particular issue of an individual who wants to sell
himself as a slave here, he adds that it is "of far wider application". However, the idea
of an individual waiving his rights is more ethically appealing than the idea of
individuals trading their rights over their personal spheres, which characterised the
'libertarian' resolutions of the 1980s 17 . If an individual waives his right, he is not
actually giving that right to anyone else, he is merely not using it. One of the problems
that writers had with Sen's correspondence between individual and social preference is
that, they argued, it assumes that individuals would always choose to exercise their
rights.
16 Mill (1993), p.172.
17 See part two, chapter six.
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Thus Gibbard 'breaks the cycle' of social preferences by making rights alienable:
individuals would choose to waive their rights. He is effectively subordinating
individual liberty considerations to Pareto optimality. One has the impression that the
whole resolution is motivated by the acceptance of Pareto optimality as a social
objective:
"How, then, should the libertarian claim be modified to accommodate the Pareto
principle?" 18 Thus it is clear at the outset that it is the libertarian claim which Gibbard
feels has to be relaxed, not Pareto optimality. One could view Gibbard's resolution as
trying to ascertain what kind of right to liberty is consistent with a Paretian social
welfare function. In other words, it is the Paretian social welfare function which is
representative of society's good, all other considerations, including individual liberty,
are subordinate to it.
Blau's approach to resolving conflict is similar to Gibbard's in that he too seems to
accept the idea of unanimity as being socially desirable and, therefore, it is liberalism
which must be relaxed to resolve the paradox:
"I can see no case for an outside observer denying a unanimous choice. This leads
inevitably to modifying L."19
Blau notes that the Sen paradox stems from the fact that "each of the two persons feels
more strongly in opposing the other's private decision than he does about his own
private decision"20, and his resolution works by making the liberal right contingent on
18 Gibbard, p.398.
19 Blau (1975), p401.
20 Blau (1975), p395-402.
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preferences not being meddlesome. A meddlesome individual, i, is someone whose
utility is more affected by what another individual j chooses within j's personal sphere
than it is by what i herself chooses within i's personal sphere. Blau's whole approach
seems to revolve around implicit acceptance of a Paretian social welfare function as all
important and establishing what kind of liberal right is consistent with that. However,
his use of emotive words such as 'meddlesome' and 'nosiness' suggests that he views
the individual preferences in the case of Sen's example as blameworthy in some sense:
" ....the considerations above yield a sufficient condition for nosiness, and
correspondingly a way to weaken L to make it more nearly accord with its stated
purpose."21
(The sufficient condition referred to here is the fact that each individual is more affected
by the private choice of the other.) This is a puzzling statement. Surely the purpose of L
is to protect the individual's right to determine matters which are personal to him, thus it
is in cases of 'nosiness' that L is most needed. What is contradictory about Blau's
resolution is that it involves subordinating all considerations for liberty to a Paretian
social welfare function, whilst asserting that this makes L 'more nearly accord with its
stated purpose'. In reality, such a resolution does exactly the opposite as far as L is
concerned: L is now unable to protect the individual's right to liberty within his personal
sphere because it has been modified such that it is subject to Paretianism. This resolves
Paretian liberal conflict, but it is at the cost of liberalism. Blau expresses concern about
these preferences being 'meddlesome' or stemming from 'nosiness', which could
21 Ibid., p.397.
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provide grounds for "denying a unanimous choice" 22 and thus resolving conflict by
abandoning condition P. His concern at the meddlesome nature of preferences would
constitute a reason for retaining L, not weakening it, however he opts for the latter
alternative because he cannot let go of the idea that Pareto optimality will always be
representative of the social good. It is in this sense that his resolution is somewhat
inconsistent.
Implicit in the analysis presented by Ng23 is the acceptance of a Benthamite utilitarian
social welfare function. The social welfare function is Benthamite because Ng's notion
of individual utility is cardinal rather than ordinal, the socially best outcome is that
which maximises the sum of utilities of individual members of society:
"Suppose you strongly prefer sleeping on your back, but two individuals mildly prefer
your sleeping on your belly and all others are indifferent. Majority voting would dictate
that you should sleep on your belly, which is clearly undesirable. Liberalism may thus
be seen as an alternative to majority rule in this and similar cases."24
According to Ng, liberalism is the idea that choices which are private should be left for
that individual to decide for himself (and he does not accept that this is represented by
condition L), but it is clear from his account that this is merely because this is the rights
allocation which will maximise the sum of utilities. There is no basic value judgement
22 See note 19 above.
23 Ng, Y.K. (1971), p1397-1402.
24 Ibid., p1399, italics added.
155
that individual liberty is desirable, Ng is merely in favour of liberalism because it will
result in maximisation of the sum of utilities of individual members of society. In this
case it is as if the utilitarian social welfare function has the status of the general will: all
considerations are subordinate to it. Ng's idea of 'the practice of liberalism' that "one is
permitted to do anything he likes only if it does not affect others" 25 is entirely dependent
for its existence on the utilitarian social welfare function in the way that rights depend
for their existence on the general will in The Social Contract. Ng's argument for
liberalism is based on the fact that, in the majority of cases, the individual to whom a
choice is personal will be more affected (his utility will be more affected) than the utility
of individual(s) for whom the choice is not personal:
"the enforcement of liberalism would lead to a social improvement in nine out of ten
cases"26
Thus, according to this utilitarian social welfare function, one should be left to himself
to decide whether to sleep on his back or front.
V Commitment to the Concept of a Social Welfare Function,
but Rejection of the Mono-Utility Idea
To my knowledge, only one writer uses a Rawlsian idea of a sense of justice to resolve
conflict (Ben Fine). Sen provides discussion of choices and preferences which seems to
indicate acceptance of the dual preference idea of private and general will, but does not
go on to use this to resolve conflict between liberty and social welfare. The ideas of
25 Ng (1974) p1400.
26 Ng, p1400.
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both writers are presented here, starting with Ben Fine.
If each individual accepts the liberal value judgement, and acceptance of this is reflected
in his preferences, then there will be no conflict between liberalism and Paretianism at
the social level (the ranking of alternatives when conditions L and P are imposed on the
social welfare function will be acyclical). This is because each individual will, firstly,
prefer that other individuals have their own preferences reflected in issues which are
personal to them because of his commitment to individual liberty. Any preferences
which he may have over the outcomes of such private decisions are subordinate to his
commitment to liberty. This notion of a liberal individual is analogous to the
interpretation of Rawls' idea of an individual with a sense of justice, presented in
chapter four. One could separate this individual commitment to liberalism from
individual preferences over social outcomes, in which case the liberal value judgement
would create a divergence between preference and choice: the commitment to liberty
would stop individuals from acting on some preferences. This is the dual utility idea:
the individual has a set of actual preferences over outcomes, but this is not necessarily
the set he would want to act upon because he also has a sense of justice. The set of
preferences that underlies his choices (or voting) is his preferences considered in the
light of his desire for justice (liberty).
The way that Paretian liberal conflict is resolved by Ben Fine fits perfectly into this
Rawlsian mould discussed above:
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"We examine the consequences of restricting individual preferences to be liberal.."27
The way that such a resolution works at the social level is that condition U is no longer
imposed on the social welfare function, thus making P and L consistent with one
another. Condition U specifies that the domain of the social welfare function is
unrestricted, i.e. the social welfare function specifies a ranking of alternatives for every
possible configuration of individual preferences. Restricting individual preference
profiles to be liberal is tantamount to restricting the domain of the social welfare
function, i.e. abandoning condition U.
Fine initially separates the individual's commitment to liberalism from his preferences
over outcomes:
"An individual is liberal if, over alternatives which are "none of his business", his
preferences recognise the sovereignty of the individual to whom the alternatives are
personal. This does not exclude the possibility of preference over the choice that might
be made by another, for "I prefer you to decide for yourself whether to read the book or
not, but would rather you decide not to" is apparently neither an inconsistent nor an
illiberal statement."28
According to Fine, a liberal prefers, firstly, that individuals be given freedom to choose
over aspects which are personal to them, but this does not stop him from having a
27 Fine, Ben (1975), p1277. Italics added.
28 Ibid. p1277.
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preference over the outcome of that choice. His own preference over the outcome,
however, is subordinate to his preference that the individual be given the freedom to
exercise choice himself because he is a liberal. Fine is essentially resolving the Sen
paradox at the individual level so that it will not arise at the social level (at the level of
aggregating preferences). At the social level, the paradox can be thought of as conflict
between a value judgement about who should have rights to determine what and a value
judgement that a unanimously preferred outcome is better than another. The former can
be viewed as a value judgement about the process, the latter as a value judgement
relating to outcomes. The social welfare function uses individual preferences over
outcomes. Fine is introducing an individual preference over the process which takes
precedence over the individual preference over the outcome. In a way, he is abandoning
P in favour of L, but at the individual as opposed to the social level. One could separate
out an individual's sense of justice in the same way. In Rawlsian society, individuals all
have a sense of justice which means that they prefer freedom to coercion. But one could
separate this from preference over outcomes (they could still have preferences regarding
what they want another individual to want). These are the individual's two sets of
preferences (one could also think of this as analogous to the individual's general and
private wills).
Fine distinguishes between two types of want: essential wants and (personal) wants.
Our essential wants relate to what we want others to want whilst our personal wants
relate to what we ourselves want. According to Fine, an individual A essentially wants x
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if "A wants x if B wants x and A wants B to want X"29
If the individuals in Sen's example are liberal, then their first wish is that the other
individual is able to choose whether he reads the book or not. Thus liberal lewd
essentially wants prude to read the book and wants to read it himself, whilst liberal
prude essentially wants lewd not to read it and does not personally want to read it30 .
Fine describes it as a conflict between essential wants and wants. The only way to
resolve the conflict, therefore, is if satisfaction of essential wants is always preferred to
satisfaction of personal wants.
Fine's final resolution involves restricting preferences "so that each member of society is
indifferent to matters which are none of his business"31
Adopting the Rawlsian dual preference idea discussed above, the set of preferences
which Fine refers to here can be thought of as his preferences constrained by his sense of
justice. Fine incorporates what could be thought of as the individual's liberal sentiment
into his preferences over outcomes: The individual firstly prefers that others be free to
choose in affairs that are their business and thus effectively would want any personal
preference over those issues to be ignored in considerations of social welfare. Or, one
could argue that, given that the individual firstly wants others to be free to choose (due
to his sense of justice), he is incapable of deriving utility from anything which violates
this. Thus his individual preferences reflect this. This is essentially how Rawls was
analysed in chapter four. Either way, the dual utility idea is still there: we have two sets
29 Ibid, p1279.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid p1281.
160
of preferences corresponding to whether or not we take into account the individual's
sense of justice.
There is a clear parallel with Rousseau's notion of the general will here. The parallel
lies in the fact that Rawls argues for the individual cultivation of a sense of justice with
reference to the social, rather than the individual, good:
"It can even happen that there are many who do not find a sense of justice for their
good; 	 Yet none of this nullifies the collective rationality of the principles of justice; it
is still to the advantage of each that everyone else should honour them."32
Similarly, according to Rousseau, individuals should act (or vote) according to their
general will (social good). Thus there is clearly some form of social welfare function
implicit in Rawls' analysis. One could argue that it is consistent with the general will
that individuals have a sense of justice. This aspect of Rawls' theory means that he has
more in common with Rousseau than with other contractarians, those for whom the idea
of a social welfare function is absent or viewed as meaningless.
Several writers have resolved conflict by arguing that individual choice will not
necessarily reflect underlying individual preferences. They argue that actual choice will
be influenced by factors other than individual preferences, which will create a
divergence between the two. This argument, if applied to choice per se., obviously
32 Rawls, p576.
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undermines Sen's condition L as a condition which places value on allowing individuals
to determine aspects of the social state which are private to them: if individuals are not
going to choose according to their preferences, then condition L is no longer appropriate
to reflect a value judgement about individual liberty. This section argues for an
interpretation of this view as attributing two sets of preferences to the individual, one for
his role as a private individual, the other for his role as a citizen, i.e. each has a private
will and a general will. By individual preferences, these writers mean to refer to the
individual's private will, his choice may reflect his general will.
The clearest illustration of Rousseau's ideas of a private and general will can be found in
a 1983 paper by Amartya Sen in the Journal of Philosophy33 . The analogy is clearest
here because Sen was defending his condition L against the argument that there is a
divergence between choice and preference. Sen's counter argument was that, although
in general choice may reflect factors other than individual preference, in matters which
are private it will not:
"The force ofpreferring as a ground for choosing is altogether more powerful in
decisions about one's personal life, which do not directly affect others, than in decisions
of other kinds. One's desire is a good reason for choosing in one's own personal sphere,
but less compelling for choosing in other people's personal spheres or even in public
spheres."34
33 Sen, A.K. (1983), p5 -28.
34 Ibid., p20-21, italics added.
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Sen discusses an example to illustrate his point. An individual has a preference for
peaches over apples and is selecting a fruit when the fruit basket is passed around the
table after dinner.
"There is only one peach, but many apples in the basket. The choice is not a purely
personal choice for him, since his taking the peach would leave some with no choice at
all"
Sen's point is that the individual will not necessarily act according to his personal
preference by choosing a peach because it does not lie within his recognised personal
sphere - there is a direct effect on others. Sen cites this as a case in which an individual
may well "act against his own preference" and uses it to show that it does not constitute
an argument against his preference based characterisation of individual liberty, because
his individual liberty condition applies only to recognised personal spheres.
I shall use the example to show the sense in which each individual can be viewed to
have a private and a general will, as opposed to merely a single private will. When the
fruit basket is passed around the table after dinner, the individual could be viewed as
acting according to his general will rather than, "against his own preference". This is
because the individual is aware that his decision has consequences for the rest of society
and it is these considerations that influence his decision. The difference can be
attributed to the fact that one decision is purely private and thus the individual is
motivated by his self-interest, the other is not and thus he is motivated by the social
interest (he is acting as a citizen, according to his individual social welfare function).
One can conceive of two separate rankings of alternatives which reflect these two
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motivations. It is interesting to consider the following passage taken from the Social
Contract in the light of the above discussion:
"Each individual may, as a man, have a private will contrary to, or divergent from the
general will he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite
differently from the common interest; his existence being naturally absolute and
independent"35
In the language of Rousseau, Sen's argument can be interpreted as follows: Each
individual will act according to his private will within his recognised personal sphere
because there is no effect on society. In choices in which there are externalities,
however, he should act according to his general will. The latter might imply acting
contrary to his private will, since the common interest may diverge from the private will
he has as a separate individual, but it does not imply acting against his own preference
since the general will is his own preference, but the motivation differs.
However, the personal sphere is now defined in terms of whether or not there are
externalities present. The idea of liberty as a separate value judgement has been lost, it
is now effectively subordinate to utility considerations. Thus this resolution appears to
lie along the lines of Rousseau's subordinating everything to the general will.
35 Rousseau, J.J, p18-19.
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VI Rejection of the Concept of a Social Welfare Function as
Having the Status of the General Will
This section discusses writers who reject the idea of a social welfare function as
analogous to the general will of society, i.e. they reject the idea that all considerations,
including the issue of individual liberty, are subject to the social welfare function. We
can distinguish between those who reject the whole idea of a social welfare function per
se. (e.g. Buchanan) and those who accept it, but argue that the individual liberty issue
should be independent of it (e.g. Nozick). The section begins by considering Gibbard's
paradox36. Gibbard's paradox can be viewed as formalising a concept of individual
liberty which makes it impossible for a social welfare function to exist.
(i) Gibbard's Paradox
Alan Gibbard presented the result that, if Sen's condition L is strengthened a little, then
imposition of this strengthened condition L alone is sufficient to generate cyclical social
preferences thus making it impossible for the social welfare function to act as a general
will. One can use J.S.Mill's views on individual liberty to argue for imposition of
Gibbard's condition L rather than Sen's which suggests an underlying problem with
representing a right to liberty in the way that Sen has done:
"considerations behind the (libertarian) claim in Sen's version also lead in a natural way
to a version that is inconsistent by itself."37
36 Gibbard, pp.388-410.
37 Gibbard, p.388.
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The only difference between Sen's and Gibbard's condition L is that Sen gives each
individual the right over at least one pair of social states (which differ with respect to an
aspect of the social state which is private to that individual) whereas Gibbard gives each
individual a libertarian right over every pair of social states which differ with respect to
this aspect. Gibbard uses an example of two individuals who are deciding on the colour
of their bedroom walls - either white or yellow. In this case, the colour of the walls is
the personal aspect of the social state. Each individual is assigned libertarian rights over
every pair of social states which differ solely with respect to the colour of his walls.
Referring to Gibbard's example, I am assigned libertarian rights over (a,v, ayw) and
(awy, ayy) where the first subscript refers to the colour of my walls, the second to those of
the other person (referred to as Grundy). Similarly, Grundy is assigned (awy, av iw) and
(ayv, an). "I want my bedroom walls to be a different colour to Mrs Grundy's
....Grundy....wants her bedroom walls to be the same colour as mine" 38 These individual
preferences lead to cyclical social preferences in the following way: aywPa,, a wyPayy for
my rights and aPawy, ayyPayw for Grundy. This produces the cyclical social preferences
aywPawwPawyPayyPaywPaww 	etc.
Thus we cannot identify the best social state, given this assignment of rights and these
individual preferences and there has been no mention of condition P. Gibbard's
modification of condition L is intuitively appealing since both of these pairs (aww,ayw)
and (awy,ayy) can be viewed as lying within my recognised personal sphere, in that they
differ with respect to an aspect of the social state which is my business alone. In this
way, Gibbard's paradox can be combined with Mill's idea of a right to liberty in
38 Gibbard, A (1974), p.389.
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personal matters to argue that "the social choice formulation of individual rights is
incompatible with Mill's conception of the right to liberty" 39 . Sugden has used the
paradox in this way in a relatively recent paper (1993). He uses the argument to support
the idea that to model rights, we need to model procedures (by using game theory), not
just preferences over outcomes 40. The fact that such a minor and intuitively appealing
modification of Sen's condition L can generate a cycle of social preferences raises
questions about the underlying formulation itself. Sugden draws attention to the fact
that the social preference cycle implies that, if we are committed to identifying a best
outcome, society cannot respect the personal spheres of both individuals. Another way
of interpreting the result is that the idea of rights to liberty within personal spheres
conflicts with the idea of the social welfare function as the general will of society and
thus one cannot consistently advocate both these ideas.
It is Mill's idea of a right to liberty within one's personal sphere which perhaps explains
why writers who criticise Sen's condition L often do so by using Gibbard's modified
condition L. It has thus strengthened the case against the use of social choice theory to
formulate rights41 . Sen does not accept criticisms of his formulation L which are based
upon the use of Gibbard's stronger condition L on the grounds that he was seeking to
incorporate minimal considerations of individual liberty into the social welfare function
39 Sugden (1993), p132.
40 The debate between game forms versus preference forms is the focus of chapter six, part 1 of this thesis.
41 Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1992) discuss difficulties which apply to Sen's condition L and also
Gibbard's stronger version arguing "it is not clear why one should object to (1.6) (Gibbard's formulation)
if one is ready to accept (1.1) (Sen's formulation). At the very least, they seem to have much in common
as far as the underlying motivation goes."(p.164, brackets added.) This paper by is discussed in chapter
six.
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whereas Gibbard's condition is stronger42.
(ii) A Contractarian Approach to Social Welfare
"From the perspective of indirect utilitarianism, each person's rights matter by virtue of
their contribution to the overall good of society... Rights, then, ultimately serve a social
purpose. From a contractarian perspective, in contrast, there is no such social purpose.
Each person's rights matter to her because they work for her good.... The overall good of
society is not relevant to contractarian morality." (Robert Sugden)43
The above illustrates how contractarianism can resolve the Paretian liberal paradox: by
rejecting the whole idea that there is some analytically distinct concept of social good
which can be represented by a social welfare function. The Sen paradox arises in
assessing individual liberty with reference to the social good, where the social good is a
ranking of outcomes. In contrast, contractarians such as James Buchanan do not
recognise such a notion, they assess rights with reference to individual good. Many
writers follow Buchanan in abandoning the idea of a social welfare function as being
representative of the social good. Nozick does not abandon the idea of a social welfare
function altogether, but he treats issues over which individuals have rights as
independent of this ranking. Referring to the Sen problem, Nozick states:
42 Sen (1992).
43 Sugden, R (1993), p148-149.
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"The trouble stems from treating an individual's right to choose among alternatives as
the right to determine the relative ordering of these alternatives within a social
ordering"44
In other words, the problem arises as a result of evaluating rights with reference to social
welfare, as opposed to individual welfare. One could interpret his response as arguing
that it is inappropriate to make rights dependant on the social welfare function, or
general will. He sets out what he regards as a 'more appropriate' view of individual
rights:
"each person may exercise his rights as he chooses. The exercise of these rights fixes
some features of the world. Within the constraints of these fixed features, a choice may
be made by a social choice mechanism based upon a social ordering; if there are any
choices left to make! Rights do not determine a social ordering but instead set the
constraints within which a social choice is to be made.. .Rights do not determine the
position of an alternative or the relative position of two alternatives in a social
ordering; they operate upon a social ordering to constrain the choice it can yield"45
The above reveals a great deal about Nozick's views of individual and social welfare.
The two notions are separate. Individual rights are there to serve individual welfare and
therefore should not be assessed with reference to social welfare. Further, individual
44 Nozick, R (1974), p165.
45 Ibid p166.
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welfare is implicitly given priority over the welfare of society by allowing exercise of
individual rights to constrain the domain of social alternatives over which a social
choice mechanism operates. I do not think that Nozick has this view in mind, he views
the two notions as entirely separate (the idea of social welfare is not relevant to
questions of individual rights because rights concern the good of the individual). By
allowing individual rights to "fix some features of the world" and then excluding these
features from considerations of social welfare, one is unable to assess whether these
rights serve the social good. Nozick is effectively arguing that the question of social
good is not relevant here, but this is a debatable assumption. It could be argued that
liberalism is the value judgement which justifies such an approach: liberalism gives
rights to fix features of the world to certain individuals. This seems to be the approach
Nozick is taking. There are fundamental similarities between these views of individual
and social welfare and the approach taken by Buchanan. The similarity lies in the idea
that rights are concerned with individual, as opposed to social, welfare. The key
difference lies in Buchanan's refusal to accept any sort of social value scale, i.e. the
notion of social welfare seems to be redundant in this case. Nozick can accept the idea
of social choice, but he is implicitly giving individual welfare priority by allowing
exercise of rights to determine the domain of social alternatives.
However, the first sentence of the passage below suggests that Nozick may be thinking
of the actual choice process as opposed to a value scale:
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"Social choice must take place within the constraints of how people choose to exercise
rights.. .How else can one cope with Sen's result? The alternative of first having a social
ranking with rights exercised within its constraints is no alternative at all."46
Nozick is concerned with the fact that individual rights will be ineffective if the social
outcome is determined by the social welfare function in reality. In this sense he is
adopting a pragmatic approach to what is essentially a theoretical problem. The clear
parallel with the ideas of Buchanan can be seen in the following passage (taken from this
1995 paper) below:
"in any social setting, individuals have rights, by which I mean that individuals retain
control over actions along at least some minimal set of dimensions of behavioural
adjustment. Once this elementary proposition is accepted as a positive description of
social reality, the logical fallacy involved in any analyses of choice among social states
stands clearly exposed."47
The Sen paradox is not a 'positive description of social reality', the analysis is normative
and thus independent of social reality. Both of the above quotes from Nozick and
Buchanan suggest that they are thinking of the actual determination of a social state
using this social ranking, which would obviously invalidate all individual rights. Their
view is that such analysis is pointless, given that in practice, individuals have rights.
46 Ibid. p166.
47 Buchanan, J.M (1995), p142.
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Their approach reflects a refusal to accept any evaluation of rights with reference to
social good, there is only individual good and thus there is no Sen paradox.
The first paper within the social choice theory literature to suggest a resolution to Sen's
paradox which reflects a contractarian approach to social welfare was a paper by V.S.
Ramachandra in 197248.
"It appears that the whole problem of paradox lies in attempting to find an optimal
situation for the society at a single stroke... .In any organised behaviour, first, a
framework is decided upon and second, within that framework people try to achieve the
best possible situation."49
This is one of the papers of the 70s which is critical of the analytical framework itself, of
the whole approach to social choice50 . It is the first to propose the idea of there being
two stages to the determination of a social state: determination of a rights structure, then
the exercise of those rights. Ramachandra's ideas presented in section three of his paper
reflect a contractarian approach to social welfare in the sense that the existence of two
stages necessitates consideration of the process by which a social state is brought about.
The framework within which Sen presented the original theorem is incapable of
incorporating such a consideration in that it solely ranks end states.
48 Ramachandra, V.S. (1972), p49-54.
49 Ibid p52.
50 Other writers critical of the social choice approach in the 1970s were Rowley and Peacock (1972 and
1975) and Sugden (1978).
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There is a clear link between the discussion of a two stage process presented by
Ramachandra and the ideas of Buchanan and Rawls. Ramachandra refers to the first
stage as "choice of a `Constitution'". By the term 'Constitution' he means a rights
structure51 . Referring to the domain of alternatives of this first-stage decision function,
he writes:
"....some alternatives cover all aspects of society and how it should function, including
the positions of each individual. Some alternatives may be content with defining only
policies for certain vital issues leaving much for the individuals to decide for
themselves. The outcome of the first stage decides the domain for the second stage."52
The second sentence of the above (italicised) describes what most would regard as a
liberal Constitution. This is the sense in which liberalism may or may not be "an
outcome of social choice": Instead of being a condition which is imposed on a social
welfare function which ranks final social states, liberalism is an alternative itself at the
first stage along with illiberal Constitutions. Thus whether or not the rights structure is
liberal is dependant on how individuals rank alternative rights structures, it may or may
not be the outcome of the social choice of a Constitution. Ramachandra's point is that,
in the Sen paradox, there is no discussion of the actual rights structure itself. If a liberal
51 Note the distinction between Ramachandra's use of the word 'Constitution' and Arrow's notion of a
constitution as a "process of determining a social ordering or choice function from individual orderings (of
outcomes") (Arrow (1963), p104-5). This section refers to Ramachandra's notion of a Constitution as a
rights structure, and uses a capital 'C' to distinguish this from Arrow's.
52 Ibid p53.
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Constitution is chosen via a social welfare function at the first stage, it "restricts
accordingly the set of alternatives to be considered at the second stage" 53 . Here lies a
similarity with Nozick and Buchanan: individual rights act as constraints, but in
Ramachandra's framework those rights are themselves the outcome of a social choice,
thus the notion of a social welfare function has not been abandoned completely. The
obvious weakness with Ramachandra's discussion is that he says nothing of the social
welfare function itself, but this was written at a stage when such two stage procedures
were in their infancy.
"Suppose two states, x and y, differ only in a matter purely private to individual j.
Would a Liberal say that individual j should be decisive between x and y, so as to have a
modicum of individual liberty? He is much more likely to say that there is no
social choice to be made between x and y, since they differ in a matter private
to individual j."54
Farrell's paper can be viewed as formalising the ideas of Nozick, where individual rights
constrain the domain of social alternatives of the social welfare function. Although the
social welfare function has not been abandoned altogether, it can no longer act as a
general will of society in that the domain of this social welfare function is now
constrained by the assignment of individual rights. In other words, there are now certain
rights which do not depend on the general will for their existence. In this sense, the
53 Ibid., p53.
54 Farrell, M.J. (1976), p9.
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social welfare function is subject to considerations of individual welfare as opposed to
individual welfare being subject to the general will. Farrell deems all pairs of social
states which differ solely with respect to a matter which is private to some individual j to
be "socially equivalent". Such socially equivalent pairs make up the elements of a set P,
a partition of the set S of all possible social states.
"Thus the problem of social choice is that of choosing among elements of P, not
elements of S; once a socially equivalent subset has been selected, the choice of an
element from this subset is not a social one, but will be determined by the private
decisions."55
The above can be compared to Nozick's example below:
"If I have a right to live in New York or in Massachusetts, and I choose Massachusetts,
then alternatives involving my living in New York are not appropriate objects to be
entered in a social ordering"56
Social states which differ solely with respect to whether Nozick lives in New York or
Massachusetts are "socially equivalent" and thus this subset of social states is a single
element of the set P. Thus the social welfare function in this case is ranking pairs or
groups of social states. Presumably, for any given socially equivalent pair of social
states, the social preference relation between them is implicitly social indifference. Here
55 Ibid., p9.
56 Nozick, R (1974), p166.
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lies the key to a Nozicic/Farrell type resolution of conflict: Instead of interpreting
Liberalism as a correspondence between individual and social preference over pairs
differing only with regard to a private aspect, Farrell (and Nozick implicitly) is deeming
members of such pairs to be "socially equivalent" (which can be read as socially
indifferent). The social welfare function is silent on the question of which member of
such a pair is better and thus there is nothing to conflict with Paretianism. There is still
a social welfare function operating here, but it does not have the status of the general
will because there are certain issues which are outside its domain. Thus the
Nozick/Farrell resolution could be interpreted as a result of not allowing the social
welfare function to act as a general will of society.
VII Conclusion
This chapter has set out the limited number of logical ways out of the Sen paradox that
are available. We can take as our starting point the idea that there is some social welfare
function which is to determine all issues in society, all rights are subordinate to it. In
this sense, the social welfare function is being given the status of the general will (all
issues are subordinate to the social welfare function). However, given Sen's result, it is
not possible to incorporate any commitment to liberty within such a welfare function.
Thus we are left with a conflict between liberty and welfare.
The number of ways out of the conflict are limited. Some early responses to the paradox
from social choice theorists reflect commitment to both the idea of a Paretian social
welfare function and the mono-utility paradigm of economic theory. These two
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commitments imply that these writers are forced to choose between social welfare and
liberty. These writers (Blau, Hillingher & Lapham, Gibbard, Ng) subordinate the liberal
right to the Paretian social welfare function. The way that they write suggests that the
Paretian social welfare function has the status of the general will: the liberal value
judgement is dismissed in the face of conflict with the Paretian social welfare function.
The chapter also identified a resolution of conflict which used the dual utility device:
Ben Fine resolved conflict by 'liberalising' individual preferences. His resolution is
analogous to the way that conflict is resolved by the Rawlsian sense of justice. Further,
there is awareness of the dual utility idea from Sen, although Sen does not use it to
actually resolve the paradox. The only other remaining ways out of the conflict are to
either abandon the concept of a social welfare function altogether or to accept the idea
that there are certain natural rights which are absolute (Nozick). Farrell employed a
device which reflected Nozick's view of social welfare, and Ramachandra suggested the
idea of choosing rules instead of social states, thus reflecting a Buchanan type approach
to social welfare.
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS OF THE SEN PARADOX
WITHIN SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, POST 1980
This chapter divides debate within the social choice literature during the 1980s and
1990s into two main strands, each of which is discussed:
1. There was much debate on game form versus preference formulations of
individual liberty in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although there was some
discomfort with Sen's preference based formulation as a characterisation of
liberty in the 1970s (see Sugden 1978), game theory formulations were not used
widely until the mid-1980s. The debate focuses on how well these formulations
articulate rights, the extent to which each formulation is consistent with our
intuition about what having a right entails. In other words, the issue of liberty is
considered independently of issues of individual and social welfare. Sugden
argues for the game form against the preference form in the light of Mill's
discussion of liberty (1985). Sen and Riley are arguing that the two formulations
are equally suitable. However, the point that is almost invariably missed (with the
possible exception of Sugden, 1993) is that whether Sen's formulation L or the
game form is chosen almost invariably has implications for social welfare. If the
object is to construct some kind of social value scale, then something like Sen's
condition L is needed (i.e. liberty needs to be reflected as a condition on some
kind of social welfare function), irrespective of how one feels rights should be
articulated. Post 1990, the Sen paradox is often discussed within a game theoretic
framework. The chapter shows how this analytical framework precludes
consideration of the original problem that Sen was addressing (establishment of
the socially best outcome), unless the game theory constitutes part of a broader
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social choice framework. Without some kind of social welfare function, the
notion of social welfare is implicitly contractarian. Pattanaik and Suzumura
develop a conceptual framework which combines elements of game theory and
social choice theory. However, they do not use the framework to show how Sen's
condition L and the game form specification of liberty could be used
simultaneously and thus illustrate that the two formulations serve different roles in
relation to social welfare. Instead, Pattanaik and Suzumura's discussion of the
Sen problem is along the lines of others working purely within a game theoretic
framework, of considering whether the social outcome is likely to be Pareto
optimal, given some rights assignment. This, however, is an entirely different
question.
2. The second strand of the debate in the 1980s focused on "libertarian resolutions"
to the Sen problem. These resolutions still adopt preference based formulations of
individual liberty but introduce an additional "stage" in the determination of the
social outcome, development of an idea which was first suggested in the early
1970s. They argue that the idea of a trade in rights is reflective of contractarian
thought, i.e. Buchanan. The idea of rights trading to resolve the paradox has been
viewed as problematic and is rejected by Sen (1983 and 1992). The social welfare
issues underlying this debate are discussed.
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Part I: Debate Between Game Form And Preference Based Formulations
Of Individual Liberty And The Link With The Notion Of Social Welfare
I Introduction
Sen's formulation of individual liberty is generally referred to as "preference-based"
in that it establishes a link between individual and social preference. For any pair of
social states, x and y, over which an individual has been assigned a libertarian right,
the individual's preference over this pair of states is reflected in the social ranking.
In other words, the social value scale which is being constructed ranks x above y if
and only if, for this individual, i, xP iy. Objections to this characterisation of
individual liberty almost invariably focus solely on the extent to which such a
definition captures our intuitive idea of what an individual right entails i . It is argued
here that such a narrow focus leaves important issues of social and individual welfare
unanswered. Such issues are fundamental to the Sen paradox, given that the
paradox arises as a direct result of constructing a social value scale based on
individual value scales. The debate during the 1980s and very early 1990s is
characterised by this narrow focus on the formulation that best represents what we
intuitively understand by individual rights, with the possible exception of Sugden
(1993).
Writers tend to cite either J.S. Mill, Nozick, or both in support of an alternative
formulation of an individual right as a game form. It is no coincidence that two
authors who have quite markedly different views of social welfare are both cited in
'See Sugden (1985), Riley (1989 and 1990), Gaertner, Pattanaik & Suzunaura (1992), Sen (1992).
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support of the same formulation of individual liberty, the social welfare issue is not
dealt with. This part of the chapter focuses on this debate and the use which has
been made of game theory within the literature on the problem, post 1990. It argues
that the adoption of game theory is indicative of the fact that the debate on the
problem has focused almost entirely on the liberty issue, the result of which is that
the underlying social welfare problem which Sen was addressing has been lost.
II Game Form versus Preference Based Formulations of Individual Liberty
The first paper focused on is a 1985 paper by Robert Sugden to critically analyse the
arguments against the preference based formulation because the two main objections
raised by him were shared by other writers who advocated use of game forms as
opposed to the preference based formulation. Sugden's critique in his 1985 paper
was largely based on the idea that Sen's formulating liberty as a correspondence
between individual and social preference has the following problematic implications:
(i) It does not accurately describe what having a right entails in practice.
(ii) If individuals were assigned rights over private spheres and left to exercise choice
independently, the social outcome may imply a violation of Sen's condition L when
no violation of any individual's liberty had actually occurred, given that each was
exercising choice freely. These objections were shared by Gaertner, Pattanaik and
Suzumura in their 1992 paper. My objection to this approach is that it focuses solely
on a positive analysis of what occurs in fact when individuals exercise their rights,
without considering the implications of such an approach for the notion of social
welfare. The implications for social welfare of rejecting the original analytical
framework of Sen in favour of the game theory framework are far reaching: It is
tantamount to abandonment of a view of social welfare as an analytically distinct
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concept, in favour of an individualistic approach along the lines proposed by some
contractarian thinkers such as Buchanan 2 . I am not arguing that such an approach is
not a valid resolution to the Sen problem, but that it is not merely a characterisation
of liberty which is being rejected, but a view of social welfare.
"On the sort of matters that belong to the personal sphere,...individuals do not
normally choose between alternative social states...Thus Sen's characterisation of
individual liberty ties social preferences to choices that in most cases can only be
hypothetical"3
Sugden's objection is typical: Sen's condition L does not reflect what happens in
practice when individuals are given rights over aspects of the social states which are
personal. Sugden presents an example of two individuals who are keeping private
diaries to clarify the point. There are four possible social states corresponding to
outcomes where either one or both individuals express political or non-political
views:
"The procedure actually used in all remotely free societies can be described very
simply: each individual chooses the content of his or her own diary. Note that this is
not a choice between social states: the content of any one person's diary is a
characteristic of the social state, and not a social state in itself."4
The approach taken by Sugden, above, is to consider how well Sen's formulation of
liberty describes the exercise of rights in practice. But this is not what condition L is
2 James Buchanan and David Gauthier are prime examples - the social welfare function is absent, all
that remains is the separate utilities of individuals.
3 Sugden (1985), p217-218.
4 Sugden (1985) p219
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supposed to do. Given that Sen's analysis was normative, the criticism that
formulation L is not representative of actual choice is unfair, yet it is a criticism that
is shared by other writers 5 . Sugden concludes that, "the best way to describe this
kind of procedure is a game form". But Sen is not trying to describe a procedure by
which a social state comes about with condition L, he is trying to construct a social
value scale. Use of game theory to represent an individual right may be more
consistent with our intuition of what a right to liberty entails, but it divorces the
individual right from considerations of social welfare. A game can describe
individual or group choice, but this puts it in the realm of positive as opposed to
normative analysis. The fact that L may not best describe the procedures by which
social states come about does not constitute a reason for rejecting it.
To return to Sugden's private diary example, he also uses the example to make
another point (point (ii) above). The example is identical to Gibbard's (1974) wall
example but for the fact that individuals are choosing the content of private diaries as
opposed to the colour of walls 6 . Sugden assigns each individual the right to choose
whether to express political or non-political views in his diary. Individual
preferences are such that one individual (Ken) prefers to express the same views as
the other whilst the other (Liz) likes to be different. At the time of choosing,
however, each individual is ignorant of the choice of the other. Sugden considers the
outcome that would result if each individual adopted a maximin strategy in choosing
the content of his diary. He also assigns any pair of social states which differs with
5 Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura consider a similar example in their 1992 paper.
6 Gibbard, Alan (1974), p388-410.
183
respect to the individual's private aspect of the social state to that individual's
personal sphere. Referring to the actual outcome that results from individuals
exercising choice independently, he writes, "On Sen's characterisation of liberty, this
outcome fails to respect Liz's personal sphere.. ..But who has invaded Liz's personal
sphere? No one....The logic of the claim that her liberty is not being respected is that
this hypothetical choice is not being respected. But if liberty is understood in terms
of non-interference, it is surely Liz's actual choice that has the first claim on
society's respect."7
The above argument confuses positive and normative issues. The liberal value
judgement is in the initial rights assignment, but there is then a positive analysis of
what outcome will result in fact when individuals exercise choice independently so
as to maximise utility. Each individual is motivated by his own individual good
(although not necessarily) so why should the outcome serve the social welfare?
Given that condition L reflects a correspondence between individual and social
preference only when the aspect of the social states which is private to the individual
i differs and all other aspects remain the same, as a value judgement it seems fairly
unobjectionable.
Sugden presents another example of three people with varying preference of who
they do or do not marry8 . Again Sugden uses this example to show that, due to
uncertainty, the outcome which results in fact from individuals exercising choice
7 Sugden (1985) p.220.
8 Ibid. p.221-222.
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may well violate condition L (i.e. the outcome is the least preferred of two
alternatives within someone's recognised personal sphere). He reiterates the point:
"Sen's approach seems to require that society respect a hypothetical choice even
though it runs counter to a real one"9
My argument is that it is not condition L which is inappropriate, but Sugden's
insistence on comparing it to "real" choices. Condition L is not only reflective of a
liberal value judgement, but also a particular view of social welfare. This view of
social welfare is absent in considering the "real" outcome of a game where
individuals have been assigned individual rights. Sen is constructing a social value
scale against which "real" choices can be assessed. Sugden is using the fact that,
given some particular rights structure the outcome may violate condition L, to argue
against the value scale.
"These examples show that in two particular cases, traditional ideas about liberty
cannot be expressed in Sen's framework. Traditional liberals would say that each
individual ought to be left free to choose the thoughts he or she expresses in a private
diary; formulated in Sen's terms, this principle can generate a contradiction"1°
However, this "contradiction" is as much about a conflict between different views of
social welfare as it is about a conflict between different views of liberty.
"Traditional liberals" are unlikely to embrace a view of social welfare which
subordinates all issues to a social welfare function, and yet it is this idea that
underlies the Sen paradox. The examples which Sugden uses both use game forms
9 Ibid. p.222.
10 Ibid. p.222.
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to specify rights, i.e. value is implicitly placed on liberty above anything else.
"Traditional liberals" might be more likely to adopt a contractarian approach to
social welfare, i.e. it is the fact that the process by which the social state came about
is agreed to which is important to them as opposed to the actual outcome itself. This
is the approach to social welfare which underlies the examples which Sugden
presents in his paper, the process by which the outcome is brought about does not
violate anyone's rights to determine some aspect of the social state. Given the very
different views of social welfare underlying Sugden's examples and the Paretian
liberal paradox, it is unsurprising that there should be contradiction here. In the light
of this, one can reinterpret Sugden's claim, 'traditional ideas about liberty cannot be
expressed in Sen's framework', as 'valuing liberty above all other considerations
contradicts subordinating all considerations to a social welfare function'. Interpreted
in this way, the contradiction between Sugden's examples and Sen's formulation L is
unsurprising. The question, therefore, is not whether formulation L is appropriate,
but whether one who values individual liberty could accept the idea of a social
welfare function acting as a general will of society.
Sugden then proceeds to reformulate liberty as a game form:
"A recognised personal sphere is a property of a game form, and it is quite
independent of individuals' preferences or hypothetical choices over social
states... .views about rights can be expressed by describing rightful procedures for
making social choices. A rightful procedure is a game form in which all the
strategies open to every individual are the ones which may be rightfully chosen"
" Ibid. p.225. Italics added.
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Placing value on the 'rightful procedure' implies a different view of social welfare.
Sugden then notes, "On this characterisation of liberty and rights, the two examples
cause no problems at all." 12 This is unsurprising, given that it is precisely this
characterisation of rights which underlies the examples which Sugden has presented
us with!
Given Sugden's reformulation of individual liberty, he then reformulated the
question of consistency of Paretian and liberal value judgements as,
"if a society adopts procedures that respect individual liberty, will these procedures
tend to choose Pareto-efficient social states?"13
This is the question that he and many subsequent writers who have used game theory
to consider the Sen paradox are asking. It is not a normative question, but a positive
one. Sugden notes that this is "an empirical and not a logical question", whereas Sen
was dealing with a logical question. This is exactly the point: where is the normative
analysis now? The Sen problem has been dealt with by abandoning the idea of a
social welfare function, but this is in the guise of rejecting Sen's formulation of
individual liberty. Sugden presents us with examples where the underlying view of
social welfare is contractarian, or liberal, and then attempts to surprise us with the
revelation that these examples contradict Sen's formulation of liberty. Within Sen's
analytical framework, the liberal value judgement is being used, together with
Paretianism, to construct a social value scale, to identify the socially "best" outcome.
Sugden's examples are doing no such thing. Presumably, Sugden and other writers
who have argued in this vein would claim that the normative component of their
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. p.227.
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analysis lies in the fact that there is a normative basis for the game form (liberalism)
and the outcomes are being evaluated with reference to another value judgement
(Paretianism). However, the view of social welfare is different. No longer is a value
scale being constructed. Instead individual liberty has priority and thus the notion of
social welfare appears to be redundant, there is only individual welfare left.
Using this reformulation of the Sen problem quoted above, Sugden 'restates' Sen's
result as, "We must, I think, accept that procedures that respect individual liberty will
sometimes bring about Pareto-inefficient outcomes." I4 Notice again the emphasis on
procedures, a different approach to social welfare. Finally, Sugden concludes:
"It is perfectly consistent to claim, as Mill did, that every individual human being is
entitled to an area of life to be controlled by himself or herself alone
	 It may be that
such a claim cannot be formulated in the language of conventional social choice
theory, but if so, that reveals only the inadequacy of that theory."I5
Given the differing views of social welfare discussed above, I prefer to interpret this
conclusion as follows: The idea that every individual has an absolute right to liberty
in certain private matters is inconsistent with the idea that it is possible to construct a
social welfare function which is representative of the social good. Perhaps the
reason why it is assumed that the idea of a personal sphere which is protected from
outside interference is consistent with having a social welfare function is that it was
Mill, a utilitarian, who advocated such a personal sphere. As a utilitarian, Mill
presumably would accept a utilitarian social welfare function. Sugden is not the only
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. p.229.
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writer to cite Mill in support of the personal sphere, many others also cite him.
However, all focus on his view of liberty without considering his view of utility.
A 1992 paper by Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura presents further examples where
individuals are given the right to determine an aspect of the social state and thus,
once again, the social outcome violates Sen's condition L 16 . Gaertner et al use the
emotive phrase "intuitive conception" 17 to refer to their formulation of individual
rights as the "power to determine a particular aspect or feature of the social
alternative." 18 They discuss the rights issue in detail, but, in common with Sugden,
focus on what we intuitively feel a right to liberty entails and how Sen's formulation
violates this. However, there is a very different view of social welfare underlying the
'intuitive conception', as discussed above. Their approach taken is along the lines of
the approach taken by Sugden in that they consider an example and how the actual
choices violate Sen's formulation L. They argue the following:
"In the absence of a tight link between the social states and the alternative options
that the individual can choose with respect to the aspect of social states that falls
within his recognised personal sphere, there arises a tension between our intuition,
which runs in terms of choice over such options, and formulation S(1.1) (Sen's
formulation L) which runs in terms of individuals' preferences over social states."19
This is because, intuitively, we tend to think in terms of individual welfare with
respect to individual rights. Or, to put it another way, the approach to social welfare
16 Gaertner, W., Pattanaik, P.K. and Suzumura, K. (1992), p161-177.
17 Ibid. p.167.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. Italics and brackets added.
189
which underlies our intuition is contractarian. Once an individual has been assigned
a right, in practice, he knows he is free to exercise it as he chooses, thus he tends to
think about his own individual welfare in respect to it. The approach to social
welfare underlying the Paretian liberal paradox is not contractarian hence the
'tension' between intuition and condition L.
Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura conclude that rights need to be represented by
game forms, and also pay particular attention to Nozick in support of this argument:
"Under Nozick's conception, the individual's act of choice from among the
alternative options fixes only some features of the social states; and this, rather than
the individual's preferences over some pairs of social states, imposes the constraint
on social choice,"2°
What Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura fail to note is that Nozick's conception
implies a slightly different view of social welfare: social welfare is subordinate to
considerations of individual welfare, instead of vice versa. The Sen problem stems
from subordinating all considerations to the social welfare function, when the social
welfare function is based on individual liberty and Paretian value judgements.
Nozick is adopting the view that considerations of individual liberty constrain the
domain of such a welfare function. There is a sense in which social welfare is
subordinate to individual welfare on this view. This resolves the Sen problem, but it
is by abandoning Sen's view of social welfare rather than any intrinsic problem with
his condition L. The problem with Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura's discussion is
20 Ibid. p175.
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that they cite Nozick without explicitly acknowledging why it is that his approach
provides a way out the problem21.
Amartya Sen also contributed to the game form versus preference form debate in
1992, largely replying to criticisms made by Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura22.
Sen's argument took the same approach as that taken by Sugden and Gaertner,
Pattanaik and Suzumura, by considering the extent to which his formulation was
consistent with our intuition of what a right to liberty entails. Gaertner, Pattanaik
and Suzumura had criticised Sen's formulation L for assigning individuals more
power than they would be allowed if they were merely free to determine a single
aspect of the social state. However, this is because they were adopting the approach
also taken by Sugden, Gibbard and others of assigning each individual not just one
pair of social states, but every pair which differed with respect to the aspect of the
social state which was private to him. Sen argued, however, that his condition L (or
ML) was intended to be necessary but not sufficient for liberty:
"The minimal demand for personal liberty was formulated in terms of a person
having the choice over at least one pair of social states, differing from each other in a
way that is his or her private concern, given everything else. The condition of
'minimal liberalism' or 'minimal liberty' (ML) requires that at least two persons in
the society must have a non-empty private sphere of at least one pair each."23
21 Nozick's approach to social welfare is discussed in chapter five.
22 Sen, Amartya (1992), p139-159.
23 Ibid. p140.
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Such a minimal requirement gets around the problem of Gibbard's paradox 24 and the
problems identified by Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (similar to problems
identified by Sugden, 1985).
Sen focuses on the "versatility of social choice formulations" 25 . He distinguishes
between two interpretations of social preference, xPy:
"Social choice: y should not be the outcome in the choice over any set that contains
x.
Social judgement: x is socially judged better than y."26
He also distinguishes between two interpretations of individual preference xPiy:
"Individual choice: person i does not choose y from any set that contains x.
Individual desire: person i desires that x be chosen rather than y."27
The advantage of his condition L, he argues, is that it permits this variety of
alternative interpretations. Sen's formulation allows for the desire as well as the
choice interpretation of individual preference. This can take account of 'invasive
actions', i.e. where one's personal sphere is invaded as a result of the action(s) of
other(s) and what he terms 'choice inhibition' where 'social influences may induce a
person not to choose in the way he or she would really like' 28 . Sen's idea of 'choice
inhibition' is interesting because it is very similar to the possibility of an individual
being motivated by social factors when his choice affects others 29, this was
24 Gibbard, Alan (1974). Gibbard showed that if each individual is assigned the right to be decisive
over every pair of social states which differ with respect to the aspect which is private to the
individual, then cyclical social preferences could be generated without imposing condition P.
25 Sen (1992) p.142.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. p.143.
29 See Sen's example of an individual choosing a fruit when the fruit bowl is passed around the table
after dinner, cited (and discussed) in chapter 5.
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discussed as the possibility of an individual being motivated by his general will in
chapter five.
It is the social judgement interpretation above that contractarians would find hardest
to accept since it is a judgement about outcomes with no reference to the process by
which these outcomes came about. Sen argues for the importance of the social
judgement interpretation of the social preference scale:
"dismissing the 'social judgement' interpretation is inconsistent with valuing liberty
adequately"3°
This need not necessarily be the case. One could argue that the assessment of social
welfare with reference to a ranking of alternatives does not place sufficient value on
liberty. This is the main reason why writers have called for the specification of rights
as game forms, so that individuals have the power to fix certain aspects of the social
state. Implicit in calls such as Nozick's for individuals to have the power to fix
features of the world is the idea that valuing liberty is inconsistent with the idea that
a social welfare function should be used to determine certain issues.
Rather than argue against specifying rights as game forms, Sen focuses on the links
between the social choice and game form formulations of individual liberty. He
focuses first on the problem caused for game forms of cases where one's right to do
something is conditional on what others do/prefer, e.g. the right to smoke being
contingent on others not objecting to smoking. In cases of interdependence such as
3° Sen (1992) p.144.
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this, the permissible strategy sets would need to be specified with reference to the
actions of others.
"The 'game form' formulation may well be helpful, but for it to work, the connection
with freedom to influence outcomes - even if seen simply as combinations of
strategies - would have to be clearly established. And this indicates that the alleged
contrast between the game-form approach and the social choice approach cannot be
particularly deep."31
His main argument that links these two approaches to modelling rights is that the
assignment of individual rights is very often motivated by consideration of the
outcomes which will result from given assignments of rights. Therefore, although
rights are specified in terms of permissible strategies, the strategies which are
permissible will almost invariably be determined by the consequences of such
strategies:
"A combination of strategies produce an outcome - a social state. Social choice
formulations concentrate directly on social states. Game-form formulations
concentrate, instead, on 'admissible' strategies for each player. As admissibility is,
in turn, worked out - directly or indirectly - in the light of characteristics and
consequences of combining different people's strategies (e.g. smoking is
inadmissible if it leads to 'passive smoking' of unwilling victims who happen to be
there), the alleged dichotomy is more presentational than substantial."32
3 1 Ibid. p.152.
32 Ibid. p.153.
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But the difference between the two formulations lies in the fact that, with the
preference formulation, the focus on outcomes is necessary, whereas with the game
form formulation it is not. Sen is assuming above that individual rights will be
assigned by considering the outcomes that will result from given assignments of
rights. But this is because underlying many government policies is a utilitarian social
welfare function. Consider Sen's example of a policy of banning smoking in public
places:
"...smoking is often banned in public places whether or not others are present there,
or whether or not others object to smoking. But if it is asked what motivates such a
ban, we have to come back to the likely outcomes and to interdependencies. A
general ban may be in practice the most effective way of avoiding passive smoking,
even when no explicit reference is made to the motivation of avoiding passive
smoking."33
Referring to Mill's idea of a recognised personal sphere, in order to protect the
sphere of the non-smoker, it is necessary to forbid smoking in public places by
smokers.
III Analysis of the Paradox within an Extended Social Choice Framework
By the early 1990s, there were essentially two points of view on the subject of the
correct specification of individual rights:
1.	 Game forms are needed to specify individual rights, preference-based
formulations being somewhat counter-intuitive (this view is taken by Sugden,
Nozick, Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura).
" Ibid.
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2.	 Both social choice theory and game theory can be used to specify individual
rights, the analytical framework used does not alter the basic Sen result that
individual rights conflict with Paretian value judgements34 . (This view is taken
by Sen and Riley.)
It is unsurprising, therefore, that analysis of the Paretian liberal conflict largely took
place within a game theoretic framework post 1990. This section disputes point two
above, and argues that writers who claim to analyse the Paretian liberal paradox
within a game theoretic framework are not addressing the problem with which Sen
was originally concerned at all. The problem stems from the fact that the debate on
the most appropriate formulation of liberty largely centred around notions of liberty
and the extent to which social choice and game form formulations of liberty were
consistent with an intuitive idea of what an individual right entailed. This obscured
underlying issues of individual and social welfare. Thus the original analytical
framework of social choice theory was rejected on intuitive grounds rather than
welfare grounds.
Deb, Pattanaik and Razzolini address the Sen paradox wholly within a game
theoretic framework35.
"given the game form formulation of individual rights, there cannot be any direct
logical contradiction between individual rights and the Pareto principle, but one can
still distinguish between two types of indirect tensions between rights and the Pareto
principle"36
34 J. Riley's theorem 1 explicitly links the results within social choice theory and game theory. See
Riley (1989).
35 Deb, R., Pattanaik, P.K., Razzolini, L. (1997), p74-95.
36 Ibid. p.76.
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Deb, Pattanaik and Razzolini acknowledge the impossibility of the original conflict
identified by Sen persisting within the game theory framework, thus it is unclear
what analysis within such a framework can contribute to the original question.
Referring to the original logical problem of constructing a social welfare function
which reflects both Paretian and liberal value judgements, logically it is resolved by
abandoning the view of social welfare upon which the original problem was based.
	 under the game form approach rights are described by specifying the
permissible strategies of the individuals and the outcome function; so long as every
individual is free to choose any of his permissible strategies and so long as no
individual chooses an impermissible strategy, the rights of all individuals are fully
protected, irrespective of the preferences that individuals may have and irrespective
of the final outcome that may result 	 "37
The approach to social welfare implicit in the above is that of Nozick or Buchanan
(Buchanan probably being more accurate). The italicised phrase is the key:
individual liberty now takes priority over all other considerations. Deb, Pattanaik
and Razzolini also include a section in their paper on the intuitive appeal of
specifying rights in terms of game forms, again obscuring the social welfare issue. In
terms of addressing Sen's original logical problem, adopting the approach of
modelling rights as game forms resolves it. What is interesting about Deb, Pattanaik
and Razzolini is that they insist on addressing a contemporary Sen problem within
this alternative analytical framework. The problem with which they are concerned is
whether or not a Pareto optimal outcome will result from a given assignment of
37 Ibid. p.82. Italics added.
197
rights. This can be distinguished from the original problem in the following way:
The question of which is the most socially desirable social state has already been
answered, it is accepted that those social states which are Pareto optimal are the most
socially desirable. All that remains, therefore, is to analyse whether such a socially
desirable social state will come about in fact. Instead of being a logical
contradiction, the revised version of Sen's paradox is a 'tension' between individual
rights and the Pareto principle:
"Given a game form G representing individual rights, the individual rights are in
conflict with the Pareto principle if and only if, for some preference profile
(Ri,...,R,), there exists an "equilibrium" of the game (G; (R1,...,Rn)), and for some
"equilibrium", the outcome is Pareto inoptimal within the game."38
Deb, Pattanaik and Razzolini refer to this situation as the "weak paradox", weak
because "it only shows the possibility of conflict between individual rights and the
Paretian principle." They also identify a strong version of the paradox, in which all
equilibrium outcomes are Pareto inoptimal (for some given type of equilibrium).
The fundamental problem with the game theoretic treatment of the Sen paradox is
that it is treating it as a classic case of collective failure: the Nash equilibrium (or
some other notion of equilibrium) is Pareto inoptimal, thus the current rights
assignment is deemed to be undesirable. However, in assigning everyone absolute
rights, the status of the social welfare function is undermined (because individual
rights have priority over the operation of the social welfare function). It can either be
seen as a pragmatic solution to the Sen paradox or reflect a genuine dissatisfaction
38 Ibid. p.83.
198
with the idea of a social welfare function being assigned the status of the general
will. Buchanan and Nozick do not accept such an idea. According to Nozick, rights
exclude certain alternatives from the domain of any social welfare function, whilst
Buchanan rejects the whole concept of a social welfare function. Such an approach
to social welfare thus resolves the original logical problem.
A 1996 paper by Pattanaik and Suzumura provides an interesting combination of a
social choice approach to social welfare with game theoretic analysis 39 . Pattanaik
and Suzumura consider the social choice of a rights structure, thus formalising earlier
suggestions from the 1970s that the appropriate objects for social choice are not
outcomes but assignments of rights. They define an extended alternative as an
ordered pair where the first element specifies the narrowly defined social outcome
and the second the rights structure. They adopt the game form approach to
specifying rights thus the rights are given by assigning permissible strategies to
individuals. One can derive an extended social welfare function from individual
preferences over extended social alternatives which is analogous to the conventional
social welfare function over conventional social alternatives: the extended social
welfare function specifies a single ordering of extended alternatives for every profile
of individual orderings of extended alternatives. Pattanaik and Suzumura envisage a
two stage process by which a social outcome is reached: first, the rights structure is
determined by society, then a conventionally defined social alternative emerges after
people exercise their rights40 .
39 Pattanaik, P.K., Suzumura, K (1996), p194-212.
4° This is reminiscent of the procedure that Ramachandra had in mind in his 1972 paper — see
chapter 5.
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"..when choosing the rights structure, the society has to take into account the
conventionally defined social state(s) that may result when the individuals exercise
their rights subsequently.... ,A1
Game theory comes into play in predicting the outcomes of any given rights
structure, i.e. game theory enables us to associate a set of outcomes to a given rights
structure. Given that, in practice, there is likely to be more than one outcome
associated with any given rights structure, the social choice that society faces at the
first stage is not choice of an extended alternative, but choice of an ordered pair
which consists of an uncertain prospect and a rights structure. Therefore, we need a
social welfare function which ranks ordered pairs of (B,G) where B is the set of
possible outcomes associated with a rights structure G. Pattanaik and Suzumura
refer to such ordered pairs as generalised extended alternatives (GEAs), where the
final outcome is an element of BxG. It is thus assumed that individuals have
preferences over generalised extended alternatives and that these can be used to
derive a generalised extended social welfare function. The generalised extended
social welfare function (GESWF) provides a unique ranking of GEAs for any given
profile of individual orderings of GEAs.
The social choice of a rights structure is essentially the identification of the best
GEA. The GESWF is exactly analogous to the conventional social welfare function,
but in this case it is defined over assignments of rights rather than social outcomes.
In other words, the idea of a ranking of alternatives which is representative of the
social good is still in the analysis. What is disappointing about the Pattanaik-
Suzumura paper, however, is that the Sen problem is not addressed in the context of
41 Pattanaik and Suzumura, p198.
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identifying the best GESA. This is because they view Sen's original condition L as
merely an articulation of rights, one which can be used as an alternative to game
forms. Since they are choosing to specify rights as game forms, they appear to take
the view that this implies that there is no room for Sen's condition L:
"the game form articulation of individual rights does not assign any role to individual
preferences, since the formal contents of rights are construed to consist solely of the
complete freedom in choosing permissible actions or strategies and the obligations
not to choose an impermissible strategy",42
However, condition L is not merely an articulation of rights, it plays a key role in
identifying the social welfare. Given the conceptual framework of the original
problem (i.e. rankings of conventionally defined social alternatives), once individual
rights have been specified as a game form there is no room for condition L, since the
social outcome would be determined by the way that individuals chose to exercise
their rights. However, this is not the case in the enriched conceptual framework of
Pattanaik and Suzumura, since they are concerned with the social choice of a GEA.
In other papers, where rights are specified as game forms (e.g. Deb, Pattanaik and
Razzolini above), the liberal value judgement is represented by a specific game form,
thus the rights assignment is determined at the outset by the liberal value judgement.
Since these rights must be protected, there is then no room for any social welfare
function over outcomes to operate: the outcome is determined by rights exercising.
However, given Pattanaik and Suzumura's GEAs, it would be possible for them both
42 Ibid., p205.
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to specify rights as game forms and to impose condition L on the GESWF. They do
not do this.
Despite their enrichment of the social choice theory framework by identifying a
GESWF, in their analysis of the Sen paradox, Pattanaik and Suzumura treat the
socially best GESA as given, it has already been identified:
"Suppose that, given an issue A and a profile (of GESAs), the society chooses rights-
structure G* and suppose x* emerges as the final narrowly defined social a
outcome 	 Since this social outcome x* emerges through the free exercise of rights
which are embodied in the A-based game form GA, there is no possibility of any
violation of individual rights whatsoever in the sense of game form rights. In order
to see if the Pareto libertarian paradox persists even when we choose to articulate
individual rights in terms of game forms, what remains to be examined is the Pareto
(in-)efficiency of the social outcome generated through the exercise of game form
rights."43
Pattanaik and Suzumura's paper is illuminating in identifying the way that the
original Sen problem has been 'lost' in this literature. Sen's condition L is viewed
merely as a way of articulating individual rights rather than as part of a process of
ranking social alternatives according to the social good, part of a process of
identifying the social good. The game form approach to specifying rights is viewed
as a mutually exclusive articulation of rights. But the game form and preference
form articulations are only mutually exclusive within the conventional social choice
43 Ibid. p.209.
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framework, where the social welfare function is specified over final outcomes. One
of the advantages of Pattanaik and Suzumura's framework is that it helps to elucidate
the point that the game form specification of rights is merely a way of articulating
rights, questions of social welfare are left open. Sen's formulation, however, is a
way of incorporating liberty considerations into a social value scale. Thus, within
this extended framework, one could have rights specified as game forms and impose
condition L on the GESWF.
In their analysis of the Sen paradox, however, Pattanaik and Suzumura assume that
the best GESA is the n person version of the prisoner's dilemma, thus the narrowly
defined social outcome will not be Pareto optimal. This prompts the following
conclusion:
"It is clear from this example that the conflict between game form rights and the
requirement of Pareto efficiency of the social outcome persists in this extended
framework in a slightly different form."44
Thus, despite, their introduction of an alternative SWF, their conclusion with respect
to the Sen problem itself is essentially the same as Sugden's (1985) and Deb,
Pattanaik and Razzolini's above.
Pattanaik and Suzumura have essentially identified a different form of the social
welfare function. Given that the social welfare function in this case ranks alternative
assignments of rights, the Sen problem is concerned with identifying the socially best
44 Ibid.
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assignment of rights. If Pattanaik and Suzumura can do this incorporating Paretian
and liberal value judgements, then there is no Sen problem.
Part II: 'Libertarian' Resolutions To The Sen Problem
(Avoiding The Paradox Via Rights Trading)
I Introduction
This part focuses on the argument put forward in the 1980s that the Sen paradox can
be resolved by individual parties agreeing to trade their rights over their respective
private spheres with one another:
"any inefficiency can be resolved by a Pareto improving contract jointly decided
upon by some of the involved individuals"45
Writers focused on in this part of the chapter are essentially arguing for the
introduction of a first stage in the determination of the social state, where individuals
are free to trade rights with each other and then exercise them. The motivation for
such a contract is obvious: The individual preferences that give rise to the Paretian
liberal paradox are such that each individual's utility is more affected by the aspect
of the social state which is personal to the other individual, thus each individual
would prefer to have the right to determine the aspect of the social state which lies
within the private sphere of the other individual. This part focuses on three papers of
the late 1980s which argue that such an initial contract resolves Paretian liberal
conflict, and the responses which Sen has given to such an idea. It argues the
following:
45 Harel, A and Nitzan, S (1987) , p.338.
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1. That, somewhat paradoxically, such a contract is not consistent with the
thought of either Rawls or Buchanan. Writers tend to argue that such a trade of
rights is consistent with the tradition of "free contract". This part of the
chapter uses the analysis of Rawls and Buchanan presented in chapter four to
argue precisely why both Buchanan and Rawls would not support such a
contract.
2. The fact that writers feel a Pareto improving contract would resolve the
problem suggests that they are either unaware of, or seeking to evade, the
normative question which the paradox poses. The Tareto improving contract'
does not address the normative question with which Sen was concerned, of
how we are to identify the best social state if we accept both these value
judgements. This is essentially the argument made by Sen (1983), but this part
expands on his argument and relates it to contractarian and Rousseau-type
views of social welfare.
II 'Libertarian Resolutions' to Paretian Liberal Conflict
Barry's 'resolution' of conflict follows from his value judgement that "the Pareto
principle is a criterion for judging the goodness or badness of states of affairs,
whereas the liberal principle a la Mill or Hayek is a criterion for assigning rights to
individuals"46 . He views the two things, Pareto optimality and liberalism as having
"different subject matters" and, therefore, rejects condition L given that it constitutes
an attempt to incorporate considerations of individual liberty into an idea of social
welfare. In discussing his proposed resolution to the paradox, he makes no reference
46 Barry, p.27.
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to a social welfare function because, as he later reveals, he rejects this idea of social
welfare47 . He treats the Sen paradox as a case of collective action failure by
analysing what a 'utility-maximising actor' would do, given these individual
preferences and assignment of rights. He argues that, if we allow for trade in rights
before rights are exercised, individuals will "exchange control over the event in
which they are less interested for control over the event in which they are more
interested."48 The argument rests on his view that liberalism assigns control over
pairs of outcomes within one's personal sphere (i.e. individual rights), and is
unrelated to social welfare. Individuals should be at liberty to trade these rights with
one another. In the case of the Lady Chatterley example, liberalism assigns Prude
control over whether he (Prude) reads the book and Lewd control over whether she
reads the book. However, because Prude's utility is more affected by whether or not
Lewd reads the book than by whether or not Prude himself does, Prude would prefer
to have the right to determine Lewd's reading or not reading. The same argument
applies to Lewd, she prefers to control Prude's choice of whether to read or not.
Thus Prude trades his right to choose whether he reads Lady Chatterley for Lewd's
right and vice-versa. Post rights trade, each individual has control over the event in
which (s)he is most interested, prude determines that lewd does not read Lady
Chatterley, lewd determines that prude does and, therefore, the outcome is Pareto
optimal.
This would solve a collective action problem where we were concerned that an
assignment of rights were going to result in a Pareto suboptimal outcome (ignoring
47 I discuss these further in the following section.
48 Ibid. p.16.
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the problem of enforcement of the re-assigned rights), because in that case the best
outcome would not be in question. Instead of addressing this normative question as
to what is the socially best outcome, Barry assumes an answer to it (that Pareto
optimality is best), and shows how this outcome might be achieved. This is the
fundamental problem with Barry's resolution, but it follows from the fact that he
rejects the normative question which Sen is addressing.
Peter Bernholz also approaches the paradox from the perspective of a utility
maximising individual. He takes individual preferences as given and considers the
possibility of the occurrence of Pareto optimal outcomes under different structures of
rights and decision rules. Given that he is analysing independent individual
behaviour under different institutional frameworks, the criticism made of Barry's
analysis, that he does not address the normative question with which the original
paradox was concerned, can also be applied to him.
"The members of society decide within an institutional framework, which may result
in mutually inconsistent decisions and in non-Pareto optimal outcomes no one had
wanted. This is the meaning of expressions such as 'intransitive' or 'cyclical social
preferences' containing non-Pareto optimal outcomes. The existence of a 'social
welfare function' or a 'social preference ordering' would thus convey the idea that
the decisions that the members of society take lead to a consistent pattern and to
Pareto optimal outcomes, if each person has transitive preferences."49
49 Bernholz, P (1986), p.250.
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In other words, conditions P and L have disappeared, and so too has the social
welfare function of the original paradox. Instead, the existence of a 'social welfare
function' is inferred from the occurrence of Pareto optimal social states under
different assignments of rights and decision rules. Liberalism is no longer a
condition imposed upon a social welfare function, but instead describes the
constitution itself Sen's impossibility result goes because Bernholz finds that:
".....we always can find a liberal constitution that assigns the rights to decide among
all different pairs of outcomes to two or more persons and that assures the existence
of a transitive social preference order and a Pareto-optimal outcome to which no
other Pareto-optimal outcome is preferred by society."5°
But the 'social welfare function' to which Bernholz refers does not exist, there is no
normative construct which is identifying the best social state since the best social
state has already been identified as that which is Pareto optimal. Bernholz illustrates
the implications of this result for the Paretian liberal paradox by referring specifically
to Sen's Lady Chatterley example. He assumes there to be four possible outcomes
(he includes the possibility of both individuals reading the book). He adopts the
interpretation of liberalism used by Gibbard, where each individual is assigned a
right over all social states which differ with respect to the aspect that is personal to
them, thus prude is assigned rights over pairs {(1,1), (0,1)} and {(0,0), (1,0)1 and
lewd assigned rights over {(1,1), (1,0)1 and {(0,1),(0,0)} 51 . He argues that it
50 Bernholz, P (1986), p.256.
51 The first element of each pair refers to prude's choice, the second to lewd's. 1 denotes that the
individual reads the book, 0 that he does not.
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"would correspond to the spirit of liberalism", if the outcome over the pairs {(1,1),
(0,0)1 and {(0,1),(1,0)1 were determined by the unanimity rule, presumably because
these pairs differ with respect to both aspects of the social state and thus affect the
personal spheres of both individuals. Recalling the preferences of Prude and Lewd:
Prude Lewd
(0,0) (1,1)
(1,0) (1,0)
(0,1) (0,1)
(1,1) (0,0)
Such an assignment of rights and use of decision rules means that prude would
choose not to read the book [(0,1) over (1,1) and (0,0) over (1,0)] whereas lewd
would choose to read it. However, the individuals would collectively agree that (1,0)
were better than (0,1) ((1,0) is unanimously preferred to (0,1)). Bernholz's point is
that such a collective agreement is consistent with "the spirit of liberalism" and thus
the resulting cyclical preferences should not be interpreted as a contradiction
between liberalism and the Pareto principle. He argues that the cyclical social
preferences should be attributed to the initial assignment of rights instead and,
therefore, the cycle can be removed merely by reassigning these rights. Individuals
would agree to the reassignment of these rights because they collectively prefer (1,0)
to (0,1) (and such a collective agreement does not conflict with liberalism, in his
view). He, therefore, argues for resolving the paradox by reassigning rights in the
way that Barry does, by assigning each individual the right to decide what the other
reads because these are the rights which result in a Pareto optimal outcome and,
therefore, would be agreed to collectively:
209
"...it would be profitable for both of them to exchange their original rights which
allow them to decide on their own actions"52
But the problem with such a resolution is that the rationale for the rights
reassignment is the fact that the outcome which results from the initial assignment is
not Pareto optimal. Bernholz focuses on the fact that the reassignment will be agreed
to collectively to argue that it is 'in the spirit of liberalism', but the collective
agreement is motivated by the fact that it ultimately leads to a Pareto improvement.
Referring to the passage quoted above, Bernholz seems to view the reassignment as a
Pareto improving trade. But the initial rights assignment (condition L) reflected the
value judgement that each individual ought to be free to decide matters which are
personal to him for himself. The rights reassignment is viewed as good because it
would be agreed to, but the reassignment cannot reflect the same value judgement as
before, given that each individual now has the right to determine the aspect of the
social state which is personal to the other individual. Bernholz would presumably
counter this with the argument that the process of consent is consistent with
liberalism, but if so, such an argument needs a fuller justification53.
Harel and Nitzan's resolution provides a more comprehensive justification for the
initial rights trade. They use the possibility of rights trading to modify condition L.
They propose a weaker version of condition L which "also respects the libertarian
tradition of free contract by allowing voluntary exchange of rights. Any rights-
system is interpreted ...as the final outcome of an exchange process that hinges, first,
52 Bernholz, P. p.262, italics added.
53 This point is discussed further in section three below.
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on the initial endowment of individual rights and, second, on the individuals'
preferences on rights"54
Thus the rationale for the rights trade is essentially the same as that provided by
Barry and Bernholz, but Harel and Nitzan justify it more carefully. This is the sense
in which the final rights assignment has been consented to by individuals. I shall
argue in section three that such a condition imposed on the social welfare function is
not reflective of the contractarian thought of Buchanan. For the moment, it is
accepted. The individuals' preferences on rights are based on ordinal intensity of
preference over outcomes. Given two pairs of alternatives, an individual prefers to
have a right over the pair of alternatives which affects his utility the most, e.g. if
xP iyPizPiw, then (x,w)P1(y,z)55.
This is the sense in which individual preferences over pairs of alternatives over
which they would like to be decisive are derived from individual preferences over
final outcomes. In the case of Sen's 'Lady Chatterley' example, the rights trading
suggested by Barry and Bernholz is consistent with Harel and Nitzan's extended
individual preferences over pairs of alternatives.
Harel and Nitzan modify condition L so that all mutually advantageous trades of
rights have taken place. The initial rights assignment is determined by the idea that
individuals should be free to determine aspects of the social state which are personal
to them, but the modification of L reflects the idea that individuals ought to be free to
trade this right. Thus the modified condition L, condition L", can be viewed as
54 Harel, A. and Nitzan, S. (1987), p.340.
55 Ibid. p.341.
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incorporating an additional value judgement, that rights to liberty over private
spheres can be traded amongst individuals. Hare! and Nitzan argue that this
"respects the libertarian tradition of free contract". I argue against this in section two
below. In summary, the resolution stems from the social state being determined by a
two stage process: replacing condition L with condition L" resolves the paradox at
the second stage because the individuals have exchanged their rights to liberty within
their respective private spheres at the first stage.
III Link Between These 'Libertarian' Resolutions And The Approach To
Rights And Social Welfare Taken By Contractarians
The account of the libertarian resolutions in section one has emphasised the
similarities between them. However, at first sight the papers themselves suggest
different underlying views of social welfare. Bernholz and Harel and Nitzan discuss
the paradox in terms of a social welfare function, whereas Barry explicitly divorces
the idea of individual rights within personal spheres from the idea of a social welfare
function:
"....if a social welfare function tells us what constitutes a better state of the world,
there can be no conflict between any social welfare function, whatever its content,
and the principle that there should be a protected sphere within which people shall be
legally free to do what they choose. For the two have different subject matters: one
is about what is 'socially better', the other about what people shall be able to do
without legal coercion."56
56 Barry, B. (1986) p19.
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The above passage is consistent with the contractarian idea that individual rights are
there to serve the individual's good (not the social good). It is reminiscent of
Nozick's idea that the assignment of individual rights exclude these issues from the
domain of any social welfare function. On this view, liberalism determines the
assignment of individual rights, but the use made of those rights is then irrelevant to
considerations of social welfare. Although the libertarian resolutions to the conflict
discussed here all reflect this approach to social welfare, Barry is the only one of the
three to explicitly reject the idea that liberal considerations can be incorporated into a
social welfare function. However, although Barry's approach to individual and
social welfare referred to here is similar to the approach taken by Nozick, the idea
that individuals will trade these individual rights is not.
All three writers view the final assignment of rights as being determined by a two
stage process:
1. Individuals have some initial assignment of rights which is determined by
some idea of liberalism (i.e. that individuals have rights over those pairs of
alternatives which differ with respect to aspects of the social state which are
personal to them).
2. They are then free to trade their assignment of rights with others, analogous to
the way that individuals trade goods with one another. It is this element which
resolves Paretian liberal conflict.
It is only after these two stages have taken place that the actual exercise of rights
takes place. To draw an analogy with social contract theory, the initial contractual
agreement can be viewed as the rights trade which takes place at stage two in the
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above since this is where the process of agreement comes into play. Further, this
contractual agreement is individually rather than socially motivated and is thus more
consistent with the ideas of Hobbes or Buchanan. It is not consistent with the ideas
of Rawls. However, the similarity ends here for the reasons discussed below.
Although Buchanan at one point refers to the process of agreement of rights and
rules as a kind of trade, analogous to the way that individuals trade goods, the
analogy is taken to an extreme by Harel and Nitzan. Buchanan's argument as to why
individuals will reach unanimous agreement on rights and rules is based on the fact
that rights and rules apply generally, not just to specific cases 57 . In other words, at
the contractual agreement stage, individuals would be agreeing to whether or not
each should have rights to liberty in personal private matters of which reading would
be just one example. It is hard to imagine that individuals would reach unanimous
consent on the rule that each individual is to have the right to determine the reading
matter of another and vice versa! Yet this is the result of the supposedly libertarian
resolutions presented here. The strange result stems from combining only a few
elements of contractarian thought with the idea of a social welfare function. But the
two approaches to social welfare are not compatible, they can be viewed as mutually
exclusive. To a contractarian such as Buchanan, the social welfare problem is for
society to reach agreement on rights and rules, not to identify the "best" social state.
Harel and Nitzan (and Bernholz), however, are trying to do both by attempting to
incorporate the idea of contractual agreement into a social welfare function. This is
why their result is strange. It is the fact that rules and rights agreed to initially will be
57 See chapter four.
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applied generally which creates a 'veil of uncertainty' and facilitates unanimous
agreement on those rights. Individuals do have knowledge of their preferences, but
their preferences will vary depending on the particular issue in question. For
example, in the case of Lady Chatterley's Lover, each individual is more affected by
whether the other reads the novel, but their preferences are unlikely to be like this for
all such personal matters.
The only element common to the resolutions presented here and the thought of
Buchanan is in the fact that the contractual agreement is individually motivated.
However, the rights trade is based solely on individual preferences over final
outcomes and thus no account is taken of individual preference over the process.
Such a process of establishment of rights is entirely at variance with the contractarian
thought of Rawls. Firstly, there is no veil of ignorance, thus the final rights
assignment is dependant on the particular preferences of individuals. The rights
assignment advocated by the 'libertarian' writers here is precisely the kind of
assignment the veil of ignorance is designed to prevent. It is the fact that the
particular preferences of individuals are accepted passively by Harel, Nitzan,
Bernholz and Barry that such an anti-libertarian assignment of rights results.
Individuals are motivated by their own particular interests, their respective private
wills. Thus the initial contractual agreement here is not in the public interest.
These libertarian resolutions provide excellent examples of the problems that can
result in resolving Paretian liberal conflict without fully interpreting what exactly is
going on in terms of issues of individual and social welfare. All resolutions are
somewhat ad hoc in that the rationale for modifying condition L is a rationale for
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rejecting the social welfare function itself, but Barry is the only writer to do the
latter. Of the three resolutions, Barry is the writer who comes the closest to
addressing the normative question as to what is the socially best outcome: The
resulting rights assignment in the case of the Sen paradox shows just how
unsatisfactory such a process of rights establishment could be - individuals end up
with the right to make choices which are personal to other individuals!
IV Failure Of The 'Libertarian' Resolutions To Address The
Underlying Normative Problem Of The Original Paradox
Sen is dismissive of writers who claim to resolve the paradox by a Pareto improving
contract. His 1983 paper clarifies the normative issues involved and the failure of
advocates of a contract to deal with those issues. The fact or otherwise of a contract
does not remove the normative result that, given that we feel individual preferences
over matters within private spheres should be respected and that unanimous
preferences should be respected, it is impossible to identify the best social state.
Referring to Pareto improving contracts, Sen writes,
CC further questions are raised about the normative relevance of such exchanges and
their enforcement 	 the normative problems... .may be viewed not merely from the
position of outsiders, but also from the position of the involved individuals
themselves. In that context, the individual's choice behaviour cannot - obviously -
be taken as given. The question that has to be faced then is: "Should I seek such a
contract?".....the status of preference is one of the central issues involved in the
impossibility of the Paretian liberal. It can be seen as showing the impossibility of
giving priority to preferences over personal spheres while accepting the priority of
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unanimous preference rankings. In the context of the morality of personal choice,
this conflict has to be faced. The possibility of a Pareto-improving contract does
nothing to resolve it."58
Focusing on the first italicised phrase in the above, the underlying normative
problem can be clarified by considering a single individual trying to reach a
judgement as to what is the best outcome based on such a ranking. Consider one of
the individuals in Sen's Lady Chatterley scenario. If the individual accepts
(a) That society should respect individual preferences over social states which lie
within individual personal spheres.
(b) That unanimously preferred outcomes are socially better.
Then it is impossible for him to come to a judgement as to what is the best social
outcome using preference information alone. Logically, the ways round the problem
are limited: either one rejects this idea of social welfare or it is resolved at the
individual level by a prior preference for liberty (Rawls) or some dual utility idea
(Rousseau). Contractarian writers would reject such a view of social welfare, but in
that case, the whole idea of a social welfare function needs to be rejected explicitly
and an alternative approach to social welfare discussed. Logically, writers who
advocate a Pareto improving contract are rejecting (a) above, the value judgement
that individual preferences over personal spheres ought to be respected.
Returning then to the idea of an individual addressing the normative question,
"Should I seek such a contract?"
If I give priority to "preferences over personal spheres", No.
58 Sen, A.K. (1983), .27. Italics added
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If I give priority to "unanimous rankings over social states", Yes.
This, implicitly, is what individuals who agree to such a Pareto improving contract
are doing: the contract itself is motivated by the unanimous preference of
individuals. I accept that this is one way out of the dilemma, but the underlying
dilemma is still there, society is still forced to choose between these two priorities.
This is the point that is almost invariably missed within the literature due to the shift
away from the underlying normative question to analysis of what individuals will
decide to do in fact. This criticism is particularly pertinent to the game theoretic
analyses of the paradox, however, it also applies to libertarian resolutions. These
libertarian resolutions seem to take for granted the idea that the post trade
assignment of rights will be as desirable as the initial rights assignment (where
individuals had rights over personal spheres). The desirability of the post trade rights
assignment seems to rest on the fact that it was consented to by the individuals
concerned. However, for anyone who values the idea that individuals should have
the right to exercise choice in matters which are personal to them, the rights trade is
not desirable. Thus the idea of liberalism implicit in the original result has been
sacrificed.
CONCLUSION
The focus of this chapter has been the way that the underlying normative problem of
the original Paretian liberal paradox has been 'lost' in the 1980s and 1990s in either,
(i) the analytical framework which is used to describe it (game theoretic
formulations, discussed in part one), or
(ii) advocating a Pareto-improving rights trade to resolve it (discussed in part two).
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Both of the above strands within the social choice theory literature lose the problem
by analysing the utility maximising behaviour of individuals and considering the
possible outcomes that could result. The game theoretic analyses rest on the
assumption that Pareto optimal outcomes are desirable, the 'libertarian' resolutions
on the assumption that Pareto optimal trades are desirable. Yet these are issues
which the Paretian liberal paradox prompts us to question. One possible way round
the paradox is to reject the idea of a social welfare function as being representative of
social welfare and adopt a contractarian perspective (Rawls and Buchanan were
considered in chapter four). But, in that case, game theory does not help us since it
analyses the possible outcomes which could result from the utility maximising
behaviour of individuals, given some assignment of rights. It is a positive analysis of
actual behaviour and is thus incapable of addressing the normative issues involved.
Harel and Nitzan argue, of their 'libertarian' resolution, that it is based "not on
disposal of rights but rather on the preservation of individual rights", and that this is
"in accordance with the strong libertarian tradition of free contract". But such a
rights trade would be rejected by contractarian writers. Considering Rawls first, it
seems most appropriate to view the initial rights assignment as that which might be
agreed to in the original position, i.e. when individuals have no knowledge of their
preferences. If this were the case, then the initial rights assignment would be
desirable precisely because no individual has knowledge relating to his own
particular situation. The rights trade to which Harel and Nitzan refer, however, is
motivated by individuals furthering their own particular interests (their private wills,
to use the language of Rousseau). The normative question, "Should I seek such a
contract?" is answered with reference to the principles of justice, not to the
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individual's actual preferences, and thus the answer to the question is an emphatic,
"no!". Individuals would agree in the original position to the priority of liberty
within individual private spheres and thus would not choose to act on their
preference for controlling the reading of the other individual 59. So a Rawlsian
approach to social welfare would reject such a Pareto improving rights trade.
On the surface, there appears to be more chance of Buchanan accepting the
'libertarian' resolutions, given that individuals agree on rights and rules with full
knowledge of their preferences. However, individuals are agreeing to rights that are
to apply to all similar cases, whereas these 'libertarian' writers are referring to a
specific case. Individuals would be extremely unlikely to accept an assignment of
rights which gave each the right to determine the personal decision of the other,
given that their preferences are unlikely to be like this for all similar personal
matters. Further, with the exception of Barry, the idea of a social welfare function is
adhered to. Yet, if the resolution proposed reflects the contractarian thought of
Buchanan, the whole idea of a social welfare function would be rejected, there would
only be the welfare of separate individuals.
We can find answers to the underlying normative question of the Paretian liberal
paradox by analysing the thought of contractarian writers such as Buchanan and
Rawls. However, to merely take elements of their thought and attempt to incorporate
this into conditions imposed on a social welfare function, as Harel and Nitzan have
done, produces a strange result which is counter-intuitive. The counter-intuitive
result is unsurprising, given that it attempts to combine two very different approaches
to social welfare. The problem common to the rights trading resolutions and game
59 Acting on such a preference would go against their 'sense of justice'. 	 1
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theoretic analyses of Paretian liberal conflict presented in this chapter is that the
analysis is largely positive, it analyses how individuals will behave in fact. Such
analysis is, therefore, incapable of suggesting answers to the Paretian liberal
problem, given that this is normative.
221
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION: IS THERE A CONFLICT BETWEEN
LIBERTY AND SOCIAL WELFARE?
In the Paretian liberal paradox, Sen has presented us with a result which suggests that
it is logically inconsistent to be committed to all of the following three ideas:
1. Acceptance of Paretian value judgements (condition P)
2. Some minimal commitment to individual liberty (condition L)
3. Acceptance of a social welfare function as representative of social good.
Point three above constitutes a third value judgement, but this is often overlooked
within the social choice literature. This leads inevitably to an interpretation of Sen's
results as a conflict between just two value judgements, Paretianism and liberalism
per se. Yet, provided one rejects the idea of a social welfare function, there is no
necessary conflict between these ideas. It is the attempt to incorporate liberty into a
Paretian social welfare function which precipitates the impossibility result. Sen has
presented us with a particular view of liberty and social welfare which seems to be
logically inconsistent. The paradox thus poses the question:
"What views of liberty and social welfare are logically consistent?"
To conclude, this chapter considers how the writing of the three different schools of
political philosophy focused on in the thesis help us find an answer to this question.
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Three answers are suggested immediately from inspection of Sen's result itself. One
can accept any two of the value judgements, provided one lets go of the third. This
implies the following logically consistent positions on liberty and social welfare:
1. Commitment to a Paretian social welfare function, but abandonment of some
minimal commitment to individual liberty.
2. Commitment to Paretian value judgements and the desirability of individual
liberty. But rejection of the concept of social welfare as something which can be
represented by a social welfare function.
3. Commitment to the desirability of individual liberty and the concept of a social
welfare function. But rejection of Paretian value judgements.
The third position seems untenable (or unreasonable). It is hard to imagine a
meaningful concept of social welfare which is not a function of the welfares of
individuals (either individual private welfare or the individual's view of social
welfare). This leaves the viewpoints presented in one and two. Focusing first on
point one, we are left with Sugden's vision of the social welfare function as
"dictatorial decision-maker", i.e. serious commitment to the idea of a social welfare
function rules out any commitment to individual liberty. Of the historical writers
considered in this thesis, Rousseau, Mill and Rawls were all committed to some form
of social welfare function and individual liberty. All seem to have come up against
some kind of conflict between the two. Perhaps the most interesting point about this
is the fact that they each had distinctly different views of social welfare, which
1 Sugden (1978)
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implied a different form of social welfare function. For example, it has been argued
(chapter three) that Mill's utilitarian social welfare function does not really fit into
the analytical framework of social choice theory. Rousseau's idea of the general
will, however, does. This suggests that the conflict between liberty and social
welfare identified by Sen is fundamental. Instead of being merely symptomatic of
the particular kind of social welfare function Sen was constructing, the underlying
logical problem is caused by the social welfare function in whatever form.
The other interesting point is that these writers have all resolved conflict between
liberty and social welfare by using what is essentially the same analytical device:
dual utility. Rousseau makes the social welfare function a welfare function of each
individual (alongside his private utility function), thus there is no infringement of his
liberty when he is ruled by the social welfare function. Rawls introduces the idea of
a sense of justice: individuals each have some set of de facto preferences, but the
preferences which they wish to act upon are those which are constrained by their
sense of justice. It is the sense of justice which serves the social welfare. According
to Mill, liberty provides an individual with the opportunity to transform her utility
function into one which she ultimately prefers (thus more utility). Social welfare
follows as the sum of the utilities of separate individuals.
However, there is little evidence for the dual utility device in the responses to the
Paretian liberal paradox from social choice theorists. As far as I am aware, only Ben
Fine (1975) employs the device. Fine's idea of a liberal individual is a perfect
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analogy of an individual with a Rawlsian sense of justice2 . It enables him to
construct a social welfare function based upon conditions P and L (not U). Other
writers who adhere to the mono-utility idea are forced to abandon liberty in order to
retain commitment to a Paretian social welfare function3 . In other words, a dual
utility device is the only way out of position one presented earlier.
We turn now to the second logically consistent viewpoint set out at the start of this
chapter. Apart from dual utility, the only other way of resolving conflict between
Paretian value judgements and liberalism is to abandon the concept of a social
welfare function. Buchanan explicitly rejects Rousseau's dual utility idea that
individuals are motivated by public good in 'political or collective action', e.g.
voting, and private good in 'economic action'. According to Buchanan, writing with
Tullock here, "the same basic values motivate individuals in the two cases "4 . Given
Buchanan's adherence to the mono-utility idea, together with his commitment to
liberty and Paretian value judgements, Sen's result implies that he is forced to reject
the concept of a social welfare function. Thus it is in this sense that Sen's paradox
can be used to explain Buchanan's approach to social welfare.
To conclude, yes, there is a conflict between liberty and social welfare.
Three things suggest that the dual utility route may be the only way out of the
conflict between liberty and the social welfare function:
2 I discuss Fine's paper in chapter five.
3 See chapter five, I am referring to Ng, Blau, Hillingher and Lapham discussed relatively early in the
chapter.
4 Buchanan, J and Tullock, G (1962), p19.
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1. Rousseau, Rawls and Mill all represent quite different schools of thought within
political philosophy. Yet all three employ this device in some form to resolve
conflict.
2. A writer who is vehemently opposed to the idea of dual utility (Buchanan), but
committed to individual liberty and Paretian value judgements, abandons the
whole idea of a social welfare function.
3. Modern writers within social choice theory who adhere to the mono-utility
paradigm seem to have to choose between liberty and welfare.
Unless one adopts what could be thought of as a 'schizophrenic' approach to utility
like Rousseau, or abandons the whole concept of social welfare altogether like
Buchanan, one or the other must be assigned priority. The question then remains,
"how do we respond to the Sen paradox in practice?" In practice, it seems to be the
case that liberty has priority. This is the approach suggested by Nozick. Nozick's
view is that individual rights have priority, rights determine constrains within which
any social welfare function must operate 5 . This pragmatic approach to the result is
reminiscent of the view taken by Adam Smith:
"People of the same trade seldom meet together even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or on some contrivance
to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings by any law which
either could be executed or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though
the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together,
5 Nozick's view is discussed in section six of chapter five. Within the social choice literature, Farrell
proposes a resolution which reflects Nozick's ideas, again discussed in chapter five.
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it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them
necessary." (Adam Smith)6
Smith is arguing that, although meetings of "people of the same trade" may well
conflict with the social good, we cannot deny them the liberty to meet. We have the
impression from this passage that the right to liberty is accepted almost without
question. The position taken by Adam Smith above is indicative of how the
liberty/social welfare issue tends to be resolved in practice today. If a social welfare
function is employed, it is taken for granted that there are certain rights which
constrain the operation of the social welfare function. It is an approach which might
be described as a natural rights approach because there seems to be this idea that
people have certain basic liberties that we cannot violate. It is a pragmatic response
to the Sen problem. Referring again to the quote above, the whole market failure
issue can be looked at in this way. There might be certain things we could do to
improve welfare, but that would involve such a violation of liberty that, in practice,
these policies are not carried out. Thus the pragmatic response to the liberty/welfare
conflict taken by economists is much closer to the response of natural rights theorists
than that suggested by those committed to a Paretian social welfare function.
6 Smith, Adam, p102.
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